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Zusammenfassung
Eines der wichtigsten Argumente für einen kognitivistischen Zugang zur Psychologie 
ist, dass sich die Psychologie nicht grundlegend von der Physik zu unterscheiden 
scheint; mentale Phänomene sind offenbar unmittelbar auf physikalische Realität 
bezogen. Beginnend mit der Psychophysik seit dem neunzehnten Jahrhunderts haben 
Experimente gezeigt, dass dieser Denkansatz nicht nur mit großen Vorteilen, sondern 
auch mit einigen Fallstricken verbunden sein kann. Auf der Basis des 
zugrundeliegenden Konzepts, dass mentale Phänomene physikalischen Ereignissen 
unmittelbar zugeordnet werden können, wird automatisch angenommen, dass die 
zeitliche Verarbeitung von sensorischen Informationen kontinuierlich sei, wie es das 
Zeitkonzept in der klassischen Physik nahelegt. Dieses Konzept widerspricht der 
Möglichkeit einer diskreten zeitlichen Informationsverarbeitung, wie sie in der Tat gilt. 
Des weiteren wird davon ausgegangen, dass Informationsverarbeitung in einem 
homogenen visuellen Wahrnehmungsraum eingebettet ist; dies ist jedoch nicht der Fall. 
Es wird dargestellt, dass mit einfachen sensorischen Reizen oder komplexen 
ästhetischen Stimuli und deren experimenteller Manipulation ein brauchbares 
empirisches Paradigma für ein besseres Verständnis von kognitiven Mechanismen 
bereitsteht, das auf diskrete zeitliche Verarbeitung und einen inhomogenen visuellen 
Wahrnehmungsraum hinweist. In mehreren Experimenten wird gezeigt, daß die 
Modulation der Aufmerksamkeit im Gesichtsfeld nicht homogen ist; 
Reaktionszeitexperimente mit spezifischen Modifikationen stützen die Hypothese, dass 
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funktionell zwei Aufmerksamkeitssysteme im Gesichtsfeld eingebettet sind. Weitere 
unterstützende Beobachtungen über die Inhomogenität des Gesichtsfeldes kommen aus 
Experimenten zur ästhetischen Wahrnehmung westlicher und östlicher Kunstwerke. 
Diese Forschung bestätigt überdies das allgemeine Konzept von anthropologischen 
Universalien sowie kulturellen oder individuellen Spezifika bei der ästhetischen 
Wahrnehmung. Im Hinblick auf die zeitliche Wahrnehmung weisen Histogramme der 
Reaktionszeit auf diskrete zeitliche Informationsverarbeitung hin, was sich auch aus 
Beobachtungen der zeitlichen Ordnungsschwelle herleiten läßt. Bei der Untersuchung 
verzögerter Reaktionen wird gezeigt, dass eine präzise zeitliche Kontrolle erst nach 
einem längeren Intervall erreicht wird. Zusammenfassend kann man aus den 
verschiedenen Experimenten herleiten, dass mentale Prozesse im räumlichen und 
zeitlichen Bereich zwar offenkundig nicht direkt zugänglich sind, doch sollte dies nicht 
als eine undurchdringliche Barriere angesehen werden, um Mechanismen mentaler 
Prozesse zu entschlüsseln. Mit den klar definierten physikalischen Stimuli und der 
genauen Beachtung von Stationaritätsbedingungen bei Messungen kann diskrete 
zeitliche Verarbeitung und Inhomogenität des visuellen Wahrnehmungsraums gezeigt 
werden.
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Abstract
One of the most compelling arguments for a cognitivist approach to psychology is
that psychology does not seem to be fundamentally different from physics; mental
phenomena appear to be directly related to physical reality. Experimental evidence
beginning in the nineteenth century with psychophysics has shown that this approach
can offer great benefits, but can suffer from some pitfalls as well. On the basis of the 
underlying concept that mental phenomena match directly physical events, it is 
automatically assumed that temporal processing of sensory information is continuous 
as it is assumed in classical physics neglecting the possibility of discrete temporal 
information processing, which in fact is the case. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
information processing is embedded in a homogeneous perceptual visual space; this is 
not the case. It is shown that the use of simple sensory stimuli or complex aesthetic 
stimuli and their experimental manipulation provide a useful empirical paradigm for a 
better understanding of the cognitive mechanisms, i.e., indicating discrete temporal 
processing and an inhomogeneous perceptual visual space. A number of experiments 
show that attentional modulation is not homogeneous in the visual field; observations 
using the reaction time paradigm with specific modifications support the hypothesis 
that two attention systems are functionally embedded in the visual field. Further 
supportive findings about the inhomogeneity of the visual field come from 
experiments on the aesthetic perception of Western and Eastern artworks. This 
research also confirms in addition the general concept of anthropological universals 
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and cultural or individual specifics in aesthetic appreciation. With regard to temporal 
perception, reaction time distributions suggest discrete time sampling which can also 
be derived from observations on temporal order threshold. When testing delayed 
reactions after stimulus presentation, it is shown that precise temporal control is 
reached only after a rather long interval. It can be concluded on the basis of the 
different experiments that even though mental processes in the space and time domain
are obviously not directly accessible, this should not be considered as an impenetrable
barrier to unravel the mechanism of mental processes. Employing well-defined
physical stimuli and strictly observing stationarity conditions in measurements
indicate discreteness in temporal processing and inhomogeneity of visual space.
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Introduction
We are creatures living in space and time. Our technologies change the ways in which 
we perceive space and time, but cannot eliminate the fact that we live in space and time. 
The properties of space and time are profoundly different for physical and 
psychological processes, respectively. Physical time and space are ordinal, monotonic, 
and usually homogeneous. Psychological time and space exhibit paradoxical, disorderly, 
and inhomogeneous properties in a wide variety of phenomena that seem to conflict 
with those of physical time and space (Uttal, 2008).
According to the philosopher Henri Bergson (1889/2001), there are two kinds of time, 
homogeneous and heterogeneous. The latter is the time of our experience, and is named 
by him as 'la durée'. Homogeneous time, which is what we ordinarily mean when we 
use the word time, is, in his view, space, on to which the mind merely projects 
psychological time, the succession of our conscious states, thus making it appear to be 
a successive and continuous reality. In fact, it is nothing but an illusion for there is no 
true succession in things which are said to be measured by time, since one state has 
entirely disappeared when another appears. So he wrote: "Doubtless exterior things
change, but their moments only succeed one another with respect to a consciousness 
which remembers them. We observe outside us, at any given moment, a collection of 
simultaneous positions; nothing remains of the former simultaneities".
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This concept of a moment has important consequences for an understanding of 
psychological processes. The time point with a finite duration can also be looked at as
a "temporal window" within which events are constructed, which are the building 
blocks for our conscious activity (Pöppel, 1994, 1997, 2009). Evidence suggests that 
the brain may house distinct temporal windows functioning at different duration ranges, 
for instance distinct psychophysical characteristics at different timescales (Ulbrich, 
Churan, Fink, & Wittmann. 2007), performance being selectively impaired for different 
temporal ranges under a dual-task paradigm (Miyake, Onishi, & Pöppel, 2004), or 
different brain regions being activated for sub- and supra-second intervals (Koch, 
Oliveri, & Caltagirone, 2009; Wiener, Turkeltaub, & Coslett, 2010). The existence of 
inhomogeneous timing mechanisms likely contributes to our ability to cope with a 
constantly changing environment, and understanding their cognitive processes and 
neural bases is, thus, a key goal of behavioral psychology and neuroscience.
The inhomogeneity in cognitive processes is not only time dependent, but also depends 
on space. In the analysis of the experience of space, psychologists study perceptions to 
obtain meaning or understanding of the concept of space (Birx, 2009). Psychological 
space is created out of mental activity. In this respect, space is that which allows us to 
differentiate multiple identical and simultaneous perceptions from one another. When 
we fixate a location in a scene, visual inhomogeneity prevents the perceived image from 
having equal resolution throughout. Thus, we see the outside world through a window 
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of varying resolution such that fine detail is available only within a small area around 
the fixation point (García-Pérez, 1989). The radius of this area covers approximately 
the central 2° of visual angle (Lavidor & Walsh, 2004). Visual inhomogeneity is a well-
known and well-established property of early visual processing.  
Further evidence supporting the inhomogeneity of visual representation is indicated in 
oculomotor or attentional control when different response modes are observed as 
function of stimulus eccentricity. More specifically, using the experimental paradigm 
of "inhibition of return" (IOR) an eccentricity effect of attentional control in the visual 
field has been shown indicating an inhomogeneity of visual processing, i.e., the 
magnitude of IOR is much stronger at the periphery (e.g., 21°) relative to the perifoveal 
(e.g., 7°) visual field (Bao & Pöppel, 2007; Bao, Wang, & Pöppel, 2012), showing 
different processing mechanisms for perifoveal compared to more peripheral stimuli. 
This eccentricity effect of IOR is independent of the cortical magnification factor (Bao, 
Lei, Fang, Tong, Schill, Pöppel, & Strasburger, 2013), and resistant to subjects’ practice 
(Bao, Sander, Trahms, Pöppel, Lei, & Zhou, 2011). It has been proven to be a robust 
phenomenon which is substantiated also by observations using imaging technologies, 
i.e., fMRI (Lei, Bao, Wang, & Gutyrchik, 2012), and MEG (Zhou, Bao, Sander, Trahms, 
& Pöppel, 2010). This confirms previous observations like the inhomogeneity of 
sensitivity throughout the visual field (Pöppel & Harvey, 1973; Strasburger, Rentschler, 
& Jüttner, 2011). However, paradoxically, one observes constancy of brightness of 
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supra-threshold stimuli throughout the visual field, which suggests homogeneity of the 
visual field on the subjective level (Zihl, Lissy, & Pöppel, 1980). We suggest that this 
paradox can be overcome if one uses the basic concept of the reafference principle in 
which sensory and motor aspects of behavior are integrated (von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 
1950). Subjective visual phenomena can lead to unexpected but testable hypotheses of 
neural processing on the structural and functional level in the early visual pathway 
(Zhou et al., 2016; publication No. 1). 
Given the aforementioned observations suggesting different modes for processing 
stimuli in the perifovea compared to the periphery of the visual field, we conducted 
experiments trying to further investigate whether attentional control also operates 
inhomogeneously between our most effective system for achieving high-resolution 
visual perception, i.e., foveal processing, and the relatively lower-resolution perifoveal 
vision (1° vs. 7°). The results displayed a similar eccentricity profile of an exogenous 
attention effect between foveal and perifoveal regions, which supports the concept that 
attention control is inhomogeneous in the visual field, with larger modulation effects of 
exogenous cues for perifoveal than foveal targets (Yang, Zhang, & Bao, 2015; 
publication No.2). 
An increasing body of evidence supports the notion that explicit perceptual processing 
requires participation of attentional mechanisms. For instance, spatial covert attention 
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can improve contrast sensitivity, spatial resolution, and processing speed for stimuli at 
the attended location (for a review, see Carrasco, 2011). However, since these effects 
have mainly been observed during task periods in which stimuli did not change, they 
cannot be extrapolated to change-detection tasks. More importantly, the inhomogeneity 
of attentional control in the visual field has been unexplored and not discussed in most 
of these studies. Therefore, the aim of our study is to investigate the effect of exogenous 
and endogenous attention on speed change detection thresholds in perifoveal and near-
peripheral regions (5° vs. 10°), thereby assessing the generality of the inhomogeneity 
of attentional modulation in the visual field. The results suggest that exogenous 
attentional modulation is dissociable between the perifoveal and near-peripheral 
regions of the visual field, whereas endogenous modulation has an equal effect at the 
two eccentricities tested (Yang, Strasburger & Bao, 2018; publication No. 3).
The inhibitory component of attention - IOR has been found in both detection and 
discrimination tasks with later onset in discrimination tasks probably due to a higher 
processing demand. We examined whether the processing demand of cues can 
also modulate IOR in a detection task. The task to the peripheral cues, either color or 
gap cues, was passive viewing in one session (single task) and discrimination in another 
session (dual task). The results showed that the time course of IOR was resistant to 
the cue processing, while the magnitude of IOR was increased when the processing 
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load became larger in dual task relative to single task. These results indicate that IOR 
in target detection is both reflexive in that its temporal dynamics remains invariant, and 
flexible in that its magnitude is modulated by task requirement (Zhou, Yang, & Bao, 
2018; publication No. 4).
We keep thinking about the fact behind what we measure indirectly, and we come to 
call it attention. "Everyone", William James famously wrote, "knows what attention
is" (James, 1890/1950). However, it is worth reflecting on what most people think
they know about attention. Closer at hand, one of the pioneers of modern 
research on attention, Donald Broadbent emphasized the uncritical use of 
"attention" (Broadbent, 1982). A basic belief is that attention cannot be fully
understood if isolated from the function it serves. Instead of talking about attention 
per se, a number of phenomena in attention research should be addressed in a more 
functional way, such as selectivity of perception, voluntary control over this 
selectivity, capacity limit, and interaction with higher cognitive processing. Thus, a 
further study was conducted showing that the role of attention is involved in the 
emotions perceived for example in music. We found evidence for an amplification 
of perceived emotions in the solitary listening condition, i.e. happy music was rated as 
happier and more arousing when nobody else was around and, in an analogous 
manner, sad music was perceived as sadder. This could be explained by the 
functions of attention: when listening to the music alone, increased attention allows 
us to enter more deeply into the idiosyncratic world and to explore 
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emotions and feelings, thus happy music get even happier and sad music get even 
sadder (Zhang, Yang, Li, Pöppel, Bao, & Silveira, 2017; publication No. 5).
The music experiment reported here was designed to mimic the particular circumstance 
and the social situation in which the music is heard, i.e. listening to music alone or in 
the company of others. We believe that this ecological approach of using real world 
stimuli and scenarios allows a better insight into cognitive mechanisms. Especially, 
perceptual stimuli extracted from the arts like music, paintings or poetry allow a unique 
access to higher cognition complementing other experimental paradigms (Pöppel et al.,
2013; Pöppel & Bao, 2017). We report here studies about different representations of 
the visual world in Eastern and Western art, which can further support the concept of 
visual inhomogeneity in the visual field. When traditional artworks between West and 
East are compared, Western and Eastern artists tend to use different perspectives to 
represent the visual world. Since the Renaissance, Western landscape paintings are 
rather precise reproductions of a visual surrounding (Kubovy, 1986), whereas Chinese 
painting are supposed to convey the experience of "being in nature" rather than
“seeing nature”, which led to an arrangement of spatial information in a vertical 
manner with multi-layers on top of each other in a scroll form (Cameron, 1993; 
Sullivan, 1984; Law, 2011; Tyler & Chen, 2011). Our results showed that both 
Western and Chinese participants gave higher aesthetic ratings to traditional 
paintings from their own compared to the other culture. Besides, landscapes were 
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more preferable than people in a scene across different cultural groups (Bao et.al,
2016; publication No. 6). In a following experiment of viewing Western and 
Chinese landscape paintings in an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) 
scanner, we observed an intracultural bias in the aesthetic appreciation of Western 
and Eastern traditional landscape paintings in European and Chinese participants. 
Europeans showed greater activation in visual and sensory-motor brain areas, regions 
in the posterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus when viewing Western compared 
to Eastern landscape paintings. Chinese participants exhibited greater neural activity 
in the medial and inferior occipital cortex and regions of the superior parietal lobule 
in response to Eastern compared to Western landscape paintings (Yang et al., 2019; 
publication No. 7). We suggest these findings are possibly related to different 
perceptual habits and social practice in everyday life of different cultures.
It is worth noting that substantial evidence has already been gained about constraints 
on aesthetic appreciations from visual processing at the operational level. Aesthetic 
appreciations of a painting may have their source in extracting basic elements of stimuli 
already in the early visual pathway (Chatterjee & Vartanian, 2014; Cinzia & Vittorio, 
2009; Zhou et al., 2016). In a recent study, we are looking for neural correlates of 
aesthetic appreciations in the work of the Chinese artist LaoZhu who represents 
the "third abstraction". The behavioral results show that original red paintings
were preferred over its color-altered counterparts; the fMRI findings demonstrate  
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that in comparison with the original red condition the color-changing paintings led to
higher levels of activation in several brain regions, predominately in frontal and 
parietal cortex. It was likely due to the increased top-down control on the visual 
processing of color-altered paintings. We suggest that the aesthetic judgment is 
modulated as a function of low-level visual properties, and depends on the interplay of 
perceptual and higher order processes (Bao et al., 2017; publication No. 8).
Cultural specificity and its influence on cognitive processing can also be observed in 
timing tasks (Bao et.al, 2013). By comparing the temporal order thresholds (TOTs) 
between Chinese subjects with and without a secondary non-tonal language (i.e., 
English) experience, our study provides evidence supporting the concept that language 
experience can influence the auditory perception of temporal order. While Chinese 
subjects without English proficiency were good at discriminating the temporal order of 
two close frequency tones, Chinese subjects with English proficiency were good at both 
the close frequency and distant frequency order discrimination. Presumably Chinese as 
a tonal language imprints the brain in a selective way to develop a higher sensitivity for 
perceiving the temporal order of near frequency tones (Bao et al., 2013). At the same 
time, the difference between tonal language speakers with and without a secondary non-
tonal language experience supports the neuronal plasticity for perceiving the order of 
frequency-related auditory stimuli. This study also indicates that the choice of an 
experimental paradigm can be essential for the conclusions to be derived (Bao et al., 
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2014; publication No.9). 
Today, reaction time differences as an experimental paradigm to look into the 
complexity and dynamics of cognitive processing are widely employed in most 
psychological studies. This experimental paradigm goes back to the Dutch scientist 
Karl Donders (1868), who used simple and choice reaction times for a better 
understanding of mental operations. In this method of chronometric analyses, 
continuous temporal processing is usually assumed implicitly. However, there is a 
question: is time in the brain represented indeed as a continuous function? We provide 
evidence showing that multimodal reaction time distributions are often masked by 
experimental setups violating the stationarity conditions in measurements. The different 
patterns of reaction times described indicate that temporal processing on this level must 
be of discrete nature. We suggest that qualitatively different temporal mechanism are 
necessary to provide an operative basis for cognitive processing (Bao, Yang, Lin, & 
Pöppel, 2016; publication No. 10).
Discrete temporal processing can also be observed in other temporal domains. If a 
subject does not have to react as fast as possible to a stimulus, but has to delay the 
response by a predefined interval, this approach bears ecological meaning, because 
temporal information is used both for fast reactions and voluntary delayed actions, and 
the quantication of the passage of time is crucial for motor control. According to our 
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observation, for shorter delayed responses the variance is very high, but for longer 
delayed responses the variance is significantly smaller although this phenomenon may 
appear contra-intuitive. Besides, there was a clear learning effect, i.e. the second half 
of trials showed much smaller response variety for all pre-defined delay times (Bao, 
Pöppel, Liang, & Yang, 2014; manuscript No. 11). 
Finally, we emphasize that time windows that express discrete timing mechanisms in 
behavioral control and on the level of conscious experiences are the necessary bases to 
create cognitive order. The brain provides the temporal platform necessary for 
perception or attentional modulation, and being desynchronized, whatever the period 
of the investigated rhythm, can jeopardize brain function and associated health 
outcomes (Bao et al., 2015; publication No. 12).
Psychological space and time do not follow the same laws as their physical equivalents. 
The experiments and theoretical concepts described above indicate that perceptual 
space and experiential time are characterized by "discreteness" on the level of
underlying mechanisms. Classical psychophysical studies or brain imaging 
experiments using simple or complex aesthetic stimuli support this notion in spite of 
the common sense impression of homogeneity of space and continuity of time. A true 
psychological science must attend to the aspects of behavior that are anchored to the 
physical world and eschew excursions into unsupportable theories and hypotheses 
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concerning the nature of cognitive processes.
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Abstract: Single cases may lead to unexpected hypotheses in psychology. We retrospectively analyzed single case studies that suggested
organizational principles along the early visual pathway, which have remained unanswered until now. First case: In spite of the inhomoge-
neity of sensitivity, paradoxically the visual ﬁeld on the subjective level appears to be homogeneous; constancy of brightness of supra-
threshold stimuli throughout the visual ﬁeld is claimed to be responsible for homogeneity; speciﬁc summation properties of retinal ganglion
cells are hypothesized to guarantee this effect. Second case: With a brain-injured patient having suffered a partial visual ﬁeld loss it can be
shown that color induction is a retinal phenomenon; lateral inhibitory processes at the level of amacrine cells are hypothesized as neural
network. Third case: In a patient having suffered a bilateral occipital lobe infarction, some functional recovery has been demonstrated;
divergence and convergence of projection in the ascending neural pathway are suggested as a structural basis for recovery. Slowed down
binocular rivalry discloses a sequential mechanism in the construction of a visual percept. Fourth case: The pre-wired projection of the ret-
ina to the visual cortex in spite of a severe squint of one eye is conﬁrmed, but paradoxically some local neuroplasticity is also suggested.
Fifth case: Using habituation of local sensitivity in the visual ﬁeld and its resetting by interhemispheric interactions as an experimental par-
adigm, it is suggested that spatial attention is controlled at the midbrain level. Sixth case: Observations on residual vision or “blindsight”
support the hypothesis that the visual cortex is the one and only structure responsible for visual perception on a conscious level. The unify-
ing principle of these retrospective analyses is that subjective visual phenomena can lead to unexpected but testable hypotheses of neural
processing on the structural and functional level in the early visual pathway.
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Single case studies have shaped psychology and brain sci-
ence since its very beginning in the 19th century. Such stud-
ies provide the unique opportunity to answer previously
unasked questions (Pöppel et al., 2013), and to discuss what
is usually taken as self-evident in subjective experiences.
Single case observations may lead to unexpected hypotheses
that have previously remained silent. Distinct lesions of the
brain or observations with healthy subjects under unique
© 2016 The Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
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circumstances can disentangle complex functions, for
instance, according to the principle of “double dissociation
of function” (Milner & Teuber, 1968), and they open new
windows to understanding underlying mechanisms of cogni-
tive processing (Martin & Hull, 2007). Cases like “Tan-
Tan” (Broca, 1865), Henry M. (Scoville & Milner, 1957),
and split-brain patients (Sperry, 1961) have opened new
ﬁelds in the understanding of language, memory, visual per-
ception, and other cognitive functions.
On the basis of a taxonomy of functions derived from evo-
lutionary principles and neuropsychological observations
(Bao & Pöppel, 2012; Pöppel, 1989; Zaytseva, Chan, Pöp-
pel, & Heinz, 2015), it has been proven to be useful to distin-
guish between “content functions,” which refer to the “what”
of experiences like perceptions, memories, or emotions, and
“logistical functions” or operational principles, like temporal
control (Bao, Szymaszek, et al., 2013; Wang, Lin, Zhou,
Pöppel, & Bao, 2015; Zhou, Pöppel, & Bao, 2014), atten-
tional mechanisms (Bao & Pöppel, 2007; Singer, Zihl, &
Pöppel, 1977), or activation of functions (Steriade, 1996), as
modulated, for instance, by circadian rhythms (Aschoff,
1965; Bao et al., 2015; Zihl, Pöppel, & von Cramon, 1977).
Operational principles provide the necessary basis for content
functions; without logistical functions, as exempliﬁed for
instance by their disruption during anesthesia, mental content
or “consciousness” would not be possible (Schwender,
Madler, Klasing, Peter, & Pöppel, 1994), and disturbances on
this logistical level result in impairments of cognitive proces-
sing (von Steinbüchel & Pöppel, 1993). In the retrospective
analyses of single case studies from our own research envi-
ronment, we disclose some operational principles for the
early visual pathway from the retina to the visual cortex
focusing on structural aspects of visual perception and on
functional mechanisms on the neural level. These operational
principles are implicit or “pre-semantic” (Pöppel & Bao,
2011); that is, they do not enter the level of conscious experi-
ences, but they provide the necessary bases for visual percep-
tion. Importantly, speciﬁc predictions can be made from the
phenomenal “high level” of visual experiences to the “low
level” of their neural implementation.
Constancy of brightness throughout the
visual ﬁeld
In detailed measurements of increment threshold through-
out the visual ﬁeld to determine a two-dimensional
sensitivity map (Pöppel & Harvey, 1973), one subject
(E.P.) observed that the apparent brightness of threshold
stimuli varied systematically throughout the visual ﬁeld.
Threshold targets at different eccentricities did not have the
same apparent brightness (as was expected), but they
appeared brighter in the periphery of the visual ﬁeld. This
observation was rather counterintuitive (and still is), as one
would expect that at threshold for any location in the visual
ﬁeld the apparent brightness should be the same. Based on
this initial observation, apparent brightness for suprathres-
hold targets was studied systematically both under photopic
and scotopic adaptation conditions (Zihl, Lissy, & Pöppel,
1980). The results indicated that the apparent brightness of
suprathreshold stimuli corresponded to their physical inten-
sity, however, only for photopic adaptation conditions. This
observation implies that the “operative range” between
threshold brightness and supra-threshold brightness is get-
ting continuously smaller for more peripheral visual targets
(Figure 1).
Brightness constancy throughout the visual ﬁeld can be
considered as the functional basis for its homogeneity on
the phenomenal level. Where in the afferent stream of vis-
ual information processing might brightness constancy, and
as a consequence, homogeneity of the visual ﬁeld, be cre-
ated? For ecological reasons, one can assume that this proc-
ess should be localized as early as possible, that is, already
in the retina. If targets with equal physical brightness were
to appear darker in the periphery of the visual ﬁeld, as one
would predict if apparent brightness were determined by
multiples of threshold values (using traditional psychophys-
ical reasoning), their chances of being detected would be
worse compared to targets closer to the fovea. Using a tel-
eonomic argument, it is, however, in the interest of optimal
attentional control that, independent of where something
will appear in the visual ﬁeld, it should have equal proba-
bility of being detected. Only then could spatial attention
be drawn without bias to any position in the visual ﬁeld,
and information appearing in the periphery of the visual
ﬁeld would not be neglected; only then could saccadic eye
movements be programmed appropriately. As saccadic eye
movements are elicited by stimuli that are projected to the
superior colliculus in the midbrain, the compensatory
mechanism to allow equal probability should be prior to
the collicular processing stage. Thus, the creation of con-
stancy of brightness should be implemented already in the
retina. In this case, equal probability of responses towards
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unexpected visual stimuli anywhere in the visual ﬁeld
would be guaranteed.
How could this paradoxical situation be overcome
already at the retina, that is, compensating for the decrease
of sensitivity towards the periphery by creating contours of
equal brightness throughout the visual ﬁeld? The hypothe-
sis is forwarded that more peripheral ganglion cells in the
retina and their surrounding network are characterized by
different summation properties compared to near-fovea
ganglion cells (Figure 1, inserts); instead of a (more) sig-
moid gain function in perifoveal regions, ganglion cells in
the periphery should show a non-linearity of summation at
threshold; the ﬁring rate of retinal ganglion cells “jumps”
from the level of the spontaneous ﬁring frequency
“instantaneously,” that is, with very short latency, to a
higher level of ﬁring frequency. This compensatory mech-
anism with different summation properties would explain
why the apparent brightness is higher for peripheral targets.
To the best of our knowledge, summation properties of
ganglion cells in the primate retina, including the far
periphery of the visual ﬁeld, have not yet been investigated,
although promising results have been obtained from the cat
retina (Roenneberg & Pöppel, 1985). It should be noted
that for the plateau region extending approximately
between 10 and 35 eccentricity along the horizontal
meridian, and from 10 to 20 eccentricity along the verti-
cal meridian (Pöppel & Harvey, 1973), the same gain func-
tions would be expected.
If the phenomenon of constancy of brightness is already
implemented at the retinal level, another problem would also
be solved in a bottom-up way, that is, that the apparent
brightness is the same for the two halves of the visual ﬁeld,
even though they are represented in different hemispheres. In
that case, no intercallosal interactions between the different
hemispheric representations would be necessary with respect
to equalizing brightness as they are getting the same infor-
mation anyway. Furthermore, a top-down mechanism could
be spared, that is, the apparent homogeneity of the visual
ﬁeld is thought to directly match the physical parameters of
optical stimuli because common sense indicates that the “vis-
ual world” (Gibson, 1950) does not show any inhomogeneity
with respect to lightness under photopic conditions.
Constancy of brightness throughout the visual ﬁeld
seems, on the surface, inconsistent with the dissociation of
some attentional responses across eccentricities (Bao &
Pöppel, 2007), such as the inhibition of return (IOR; Klein,
2000), which reﬂects the tendency of preventing attention
from returning to previously cued locations. It has been
shown that the IOR magnitude is signiﬁcantly larger for
peripheral (e.g. 21) than perifoveal (e.g. 7) locations, thus
suggesting that spatial attention to perifoveal and peripheral
visual targets is controlled by different mechanisms (Bao &
Pöppel, 2007). This eccentricity effect is resistant to prac-
tice as is indicated by the relatively stable IOR difference
between perifoveal and peripheral stimuli across experi-
mental sessions (Bao et al., 2011), and it cannot be
explained by the magniﬁcation factor (Bao, Lei, et al.,
2013). It has been proven to be a genuine phenomenon that
is substantiated also by observations using imaging tech-
nologies, for example, functional magnetic resonance ima-
ging (fMRI; Lei, Bao, Wang, & Gutyrchik, 2012) and
magnetoencephalogram (Zhou, Bao, Sander, Trahms, &
Pöppel, 2010; Zhou, Sander, Trahms, Pöppel, & Bao,
2012). However, the dissociation of IOR does not contra-
dict the constancy of brightness; it instead reﬂects that the
attentional control in the perifoveal and peripheral regions
differently involves the cortical and sub-cortical pathways
(Bao & Pöppel, 2007); more importantly, it suggests that
Figure 1. Distribution of increment threshold and apparent brightness along
the horizontal meridian of the visual ﬁeld under photopic adaptation and
binocular viewing conditions. For more peripheral targets (red circle on the
left) a higher stimulus intensity is required to reach increment threshold com-
pared to perifoveal targets (red circle on the lower right). Measurements of
apparent brightness show constancy of brightness throughout the visual ﬁeld
as indicated by the horizontal line. This phenomenon results in the effect that
apparent brightness at threshold is higher for more peripheral targets as indi-
cated by the vertical bar on the right side. For an explanation of different
brightness levels for threshold stimuli on the neural level it is hypothesized
that retinal ganglion cells show different summation properties for more
peripheral compared to more central locations in the visual ﬁeld. With increas-
ing stimulus intensity, more central retinal ganglion cells (RGC) show a sig-
moid summation curve (right lower insert) above the level of the spontaneous
ﬁring rate (FR), while more peripheral retinal ganglion cells show a non-
linearity of summation at threshold (left lower insert) bringing the ﬁring rate
instantaneously to a higher level. (Figure abstracted from Zihl et al., 1980, and
Roenneberg & Pöppel, 1985.)
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distinct mechanisms (at the cortical and sub-cortical level)
are operating in the perifoveal and peripheral visual ﬁelds,
consistent with the summation process of ganglion cells
described above (at the retinal level). Although being con-
trolled by different neural mechanisms, the perifoveal and
peripheral IORs share the same time window (Bao, Wang,
et al., 2013; Bao et al., 2015); they both approach the base-
line at approximately 3 s after the onset of the visual cue.
Such a common temporal control window, together with
constancy of brightness, guarantees a uniﬁed spatiotempo-
ral platform for visual processing.
Color induction at the retinal level
It has long been known that color vision is based on the
selective stimulation of wavelength-sensitive receptors in
the retina, and it has been shown that a cortical area is
responsible for the colors we see on a subjective level
(Wild, Butler, Carden, & Kulikowski, 1985; Zeki, 1980).
The retinex theory of color vision (Land, 1983; Land,
Hubel, Livingstone, Perry, & Burns, 1983) combines both
retinal and cortical mechanisms, and it provides a theory of
color constancy; one aspect of this integrative theory is that
visual information has to be integrated over extended
regions of the visual ﬁeld to allow the construction of color
constancy, that is, the color of an object is computed based
on the ratios of radiation from the object and its surround-
ings that change little under different illuminations; the
long-range color interactions are thus believed to be critical
and the cortex is argued to be necessary for the
achievement of color constancy. Taking this theory as a
conceptual basis, the question arises as to how color induc-
tion (Brandt, Reiser, & Pöppel, 1988; Pöppel, 1986) might
relate to the neural mechanisms attributed to the retinal and
cortical structures. An experiment has been described
(Pöppel, 1986), and is re-analyzed here, that suggests that
color induction is most likely a retinal phenomenon,
although functional mechanisms and detailed structural
aspects have remained open until now. The conclusion that
one deals in color induction with a retinal phenomenon has
been made possible by the unique spatial conﬁguration of a
partial visual ﬁeld loss in patient F.S., who had suffered a
traumatic brain injury affecting the optic radiation (Stoerig,
Kleinschmidt, & Frahm, 1998). The injury had resulted in
the denervation of the left V1 and consequently an area of
blindness in the right visual ﬁeld (Figure 2, black area in
the lower two panels); areas in the lower and upper part of
the right visual ﬁeld had remained functional.
The experiment with the patient can be simulated by the
interested reader: When ﬁxating on the black dot in the cen-
ter of the upper left panel of Figure 2 for some 10 s, a nega-
tive afterimage (magenta) for the green area and an induced
color (green) for the white area is created; the afterimage
and the induced color can be seen for some seconds when
ﬁxating on the black dot in the central white panel. When
ﬁxating on the central black dot in the upper right panel with
the red area on the right for some 10 s, the hue of the central
induced color is shifted towards grey when ﬁxating on the
black dot in the central white panel. The same difference of
an induced color was reported by patient F.S. when the red
area in the upper right panel was presented within the blind
area indicated in black. The difference of the induced colors
and the shift towards grey is simulated in the lower two
panels. The patient reported the same differences of induced
colors as the subjects with functional visual ﬁelds; however,
he could not see the red area in the upper right panel. As has
been demonstrated (Stoerig et al., 1998), this area of the vis-
ual ﬁeld has no direct representation in the visual cortex.
Thus, it can be concluded that color induction has to be neu-
rally implemented prior to the visual cortex.
On the basis of this observation, it is suggested that a net-
work already in the retina is possibly responsible for this
effect. One has to look for a network with lateral interac-
tions as color induction goes beyond local effects, and the
most likely candidate would be the retinal layer of amacrine
cells, which are known to have inhibitory interactions that
are extended laterally, thus, covering large areas of the visual
Figure 2. Experimental procedure to test color induction with a patient who
has suffered a central injury resulting in an area of blindness in the right visual
ﬁeld (black area in the lower two panels). For details see text.
(Figure abstracted from Pöppel, 1986.)
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ﬁeld (Chen, Hsueh, & Werblin, 2011). How might a neural
machinery work, resulting in color induction? Here we rep-
resent a hypothesis, which, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been tested: During an adaptation phase with differ-
ent spectral components of light, local receptors within
deﬁned wavebands will fatigue. This results in a reduced lat-
eral activity within the waveband-speciﬁc channels. Thus, in
lateral areas to the adapted region, this speciﬁc component
in white light will be disinhibited; this disinhibition results
in an overemphasis of the adapted component when ﬁxating
on the white surface. As indicated, this neural hypothesis
implies that the level of amacrine cells is characterized by
an inhibitory lateral network that is waveband-speciﬁc.
Such an inhibitory network would guarantee functional
stability with respect to color vision within the visual ﬁeld,
as not only local but extended regions in the visual ﬁeld
would be suppressed in the nonadapted phase when proces-
sing a local color stimulus giving this stimulus higher sali-
ency. This lateral mechanism operates in a complementary
way to local color processing. For a given position in visual
space represented at one point on the retina, the different
spectral channels are also inhibitory, as is demonstrated by
negative afterimages. Thus, it is the complementarity of
spatially distributed within-channel and localized between-
channel inhibitions that is the basis for efﬁcient color pro-
cessing. If color constancy is created at the cortical level,
as is implied by the retinex theory (Land, 1983), a lateral
network necessary for color constancy might already be
implemented in the retina. Indeed, although the color expe-
rience needs the involvement of cortical structures, the gen-
eration of long-range color interactions, as is demonstrated
by the color induction (Pöppel, 1986), does not necessarily
recruit cortical mechanisms argued by the retinex theory
(Land, 1983; Land et al., 1983). It has to be noted that
there is a functional relationship to constancy of brightness
throughout the visual ﬁeld as discussed above. As color
constancy is a phenomenon based on neural processes
extended throughout the visual ﬁeld, constancy of bright-
ness (Figure 1) is a functional prerequisite. Thus, the two
mechanisms would have to be interconnected.
Restitution of visual function after a brain
injury
Restitution of function after a brain injury has remained a
challenging topic in neuropsychology. Several studies have
shown that after systematic training, the functional visual
ﬁeld can be extended (Zihl, 1980; Zihl & von Cramon,
1985). The ﬁrst patient in whom such extension could be
demonstrated was probably patient H.H. (Pöppel, Brink-
mann, von Cramon, & Singer, 1978), who had suffered a
bilateral occipital lobe infarction sparing the neural repre-
sentation of the foveal and perifoveal region of the visual
ﬁeld (Figure 3, right panel). What could be the functional
and structural basis of such an improvement? The enlarge-
ment of the visual ﬁeld removing blindness at the border of
the scotoma is hypothesized to be structurally based on
divergence of projection from the lateral geniculate nucleus
(LGN) to the visual cortex (V1, Figure 3, upper left panel),
and convergence of projection of projecting axons from the
LGN to V1 (Figure 3, lower left panel). Both of these
structural features (i.e., divergence and convergence) have
been documented experimentally (Blasdel & Lund, 1983;
Peters, Payne, & Budd, 1994). Thus, we hypothesize that
after a cortical injury (as indicated by the dark ellipses),
some visual information coming from the LGN, which has
lost its primary projection ﬁeld at V1, still has some corti-
cal representation in adjacent neurons. With systematic
training, synaptic efﬁcacy of the remaining contacts is sug-
gested to improve, resulting in functional recovery,
although within limits.
This structural hypothesis raises several questions: What
is the amount of divergence of projection from the retina
to the LGN and from there to V1? How far does one have
to “travel” laterally across the visual cortex until one is no
longer getting a direct input from a deﬁned retinal area?
This question has to be turned around, as divergence of
projection is necessarily complemented by convergence of
projection: How much visual space (and retinal area) is
represented within one local cortical position like a col-
umn in V1? There is both neuroanatomical and neurophys-
iological evidence indicating substantial divergence of
projection (Gilbert & Wiesel, 1985) and a distributed rep-
resentation in the visual system (Mitzdorf, Li, & Pöppel,
1994). Divergence of projection can also be indirectly
deduced from the observation that after an occipital injury,
the visual ﬁeld loss is smaller for the temporal visual ﬁeld
compared to the nasal visual ﬁeld (Engler, Zihl, & Pöppel,
1993); it has been argued that divergence of projection
from the nasal retina representing the temporal visual ﬁeld
is larger because of the higher number of retinal ﬁbers
coming from the nasal retina compared to the temporal
retina.
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Another open question that has to be addressed, on the
basis of observations with patient H.H. and other patients
who showed some functional recovery, is how the topology
of visual ﬁeld representation within the recovered area is
maintained or perhaps regained after an expansion of the
functional visual ﬁeld. If extended areas from the retina
project to a circumscribed area of V1 (like a local column),
these retinal areas necessarily lose their retinotopy because
of convergence of projection. In spite of such local overlap
of different retinal regions, retinotopy can be observed after
recovery. This indicates that the retinotopy might either be
re-gained by functional training or (in an ill-understood
way) have never been lost. Also relevant is whether and
how visual cortical neurons change their receptive ﬁelds
after the recovery. For neurons adjacent to the damaged
area, their receptive ﬁelds possibly expand due to the con-
vergence of projection. Similar change, although in the
opposite direction, can be speculated on the basis of diver-
gence of projection for the cortical magniﬁcation factor
within the recovered area. In the primate brain, receptive
ﬁelds are reported to increase during the re-organization of
the visual cortex after lesion, but the change might also
involve intrinsic cortical interactions (Dreher, Burke, &
Calford, 2001; Gilbert & Wiesel, 1992). However, the pic-
ture is less clear in the human brain. A full understanding
of cortical re-organization after brain injury thus requires
more case studies of patients using both behavioral and
neurophysiological measurements.
The observations with patient H.H. lead to a further
hypothesis concerning the mechanism of restitution of
Figure 3. Visual ﬁeld increase after regular visual training in patient H.H., who had suffered a bilateral occipital lobe infarction (panel on the right side).
After a cortical injury as indicated by the dark ellipses (panel on the left side) some projections coming from the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) that
have lost their primary projection at V1 still have some cortical representation in adjacent neurons because of divergence and convergence of projection.
For details see text. (Figure abstracted from Pöppel et al., 1978.)
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function that is open for experimental examinations. It
might be suspected that a long-term improvement of func-
tion is obtained if within a short-term training session the
performance level of a deﬁned function is reduced
(Figure 4). Short-term central fatigue, operationally deﬁned
here as a signiﬁcant performance decrease toward the end
of an experimental session lasting, for instance, for several
hours, is hypothesized to trigger restorative mechanisms at
the neural level by an increase of synaptic efﬁcacy resulting
in positive effects like the enlargement of the functional
visual ﬁeld (Figure 3). The depletion of neurotransmitters
and their subsequent replenishment might trigger the neural
mechanisms that result in the synaptic plasticity in this
case. It can also be considered that there is a limit of
improvement as visualized by the asymptotic upper limit
beyond which no improvement can be expected within a
deﬁned neural population. This hypothesis about long-term
improvement of functions based in short-term central
fatigue can be explored with the use of real-time fMRI, and
this hypothesis would apply to the entire repertoire of func-
tions, not only to visual functions. The underlying idea is
similar to a principle in physical training: In sports one has
to go towards the limits in training, and only then a long-
term improvement can be obtained. Of course, the brain is
not a “muscle,” but improvement in motor coordination is
also not only “muscular.” We assume that a fundamental
principle is addressed with our hypothesis suggesting the
necessity of central fatigue as the driving force for func-
tional improvement. This idea, if conﬁrmed by
neurophysiological and neurochemical measurements, can
help us to obtain deeper insight into the molecular and
structural mechanisms of synaptic plasticity from a new
perspective.
Sequential neural image creation in visual
percepts
The bilateral injury affecting the visual cortex in patient
H.H. also allowed us to obtain deeper insight into the
temporal generation of visual percepts by using binocular
rivalry as an experimental paradigm. When looking at hori-
zontal red stripes and vertical green stripes through a red
glass (left eye) and a green glass (right eye) as indicated by
the two horizontal lines in front of the sketched head
(Figure 5), subjects see sequentially for some seconds only
the red and then for some seconds only the green stripes
(e.g., Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Logothetis, 2008). This
alteration of percepts can apparently not be suppressed vol-
untarily. Patient H.H. reports the same effect but with an
extreme slowing when one percept is replaced by the previ-
ous one. This reversal is symbolized with the sequence of
“clouds” shown on the right (Figure 5), which is derived
from drawings by the patient. The replacement of vertically
or horizontally oriented stripes is characterized by a gradual
and oriented “pushing away” of one percept by the other.
This gradual replacement of one percept by the other took
tens of seconds, and it allows a direct view into the internal
dynamics of visual processing. The slowing down can be
used as a “functional microscope,” and it suggests that the
replacement of one perceived pattern by the other pattern is
not a parallel process that occurs at all retinal positions
simultaneously. It is a temporally dilated process that
begins as a traveling wave (Lee, Blake, & Heeger, 2005;
Wilson, Blake, & Lee, 2001) in one region of the visual
ﬁeld until the alternative percept is obtained. Across ses-
sions, the “push” always starts from the left or right (when
vertical lines serve as the pusher) or from the top or bottom
(when horizontal lines serve as the pusher). If this “func-
tional microscope” is reliable (and we believe it is), and the
slowing down does not establish another neural algorithm
(and we believe it does not), it can be argued that under
normal circumstances, new percepts are created with a
sequential neural mode; it is not a parallel process at all
cortical positions simultaneously that operates in visual
image creation. Furthermore, the observation of a
Figure 4. Hypothesis visualizing long-term effects of training: If within
a short-term interval performance is reduced due to central fatigue, a long-
term improvement of function is hypothesized to occur.
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retinotopically organized replacement with high precision
from one percept to the other (Figure 5) suggests that V1 is
the implementing structure for binocular rivalry.
Global rigidity and local plasticity in visual
ﬁeld representation
It is typical for single case studies with brain-injured
patients that one cannot anticipate opportunities to study
neural mechanisms, but one has sometimes the chance to
“harvest serendipity.” One such opportunity arose with
patient H.P., who, as an adult, had suffered a stroke affect-
ing the left visual cortex, and who had had a convergent
squint in one eye since birth. In this patient, some details
could be uncovered with respect to plasticity and rigidity of
functional representation (Pöppel et al., 1987), although
some essential questions remain unanswered. The visual
ﬁelds of the two eyes were measured independently under
photopic adaptation conditions (Figure 6). Shaded regions
around the central white region represent areas of blind-
ness. In the upper panel (right eye), the vertical meridian in
the lower visual ﬁeld is also the border of blindness. The
blind spot (the small dark spot on the horizontal meridian
at the right side) lies next to the area where acquired blind-
ness begins. In the lower panel, the patient uses a pseudo-
fovea in his squinting left eye for ﬁxation, which lies next
to the blind spot. The “vertical meridian” has been drawn
through the position of the pseudofovea. Note that the area
of blindness in the left eye is not limited with reference to
the pseudofovea but with reference to the anatomical fovea,
which is marked to the right of the blind spot with a dot at
the horizontal meridian.
The special constellation of cortical scotoma and squint
in one eye in this patient made it possible to test whether
the oculomotor system uses the anatomical fovea or the
pseudofovea to program the direction of saccadic eye
movements. A visual stimulus was presented along the hor-
izontal meridian between the projection of the anatomical
fovea and the pseudofovea. The right eye in this experiment
was covered with an opaque occluder. If under this experi-
mental condition the patient looks to the left, he uses as a
reference point the anatomical fovea; if he looks to the
right, he uses the pseudofovea. The patient always looked
right to visual targets with different eccentricities. This
observation proves that the pseudofovea is used as a refer-
ence point for programming saccadic eye movements, thus,
demonstrating plasticity of function in the oculomotor sys-
tem of the squinting eye.
Although rigidity of visual ﬁeld representation and plas-
ticity in oculomotor programming could be shown in this
Figure 5. Time course of binocular rivalry reported by patient H.H., who
suffered a bilateral occipital lobe lesion resulting in tunnel vision (Figure 3,
panel on the right side).
Figure 6. Visual ﬁeld of the left and the right eye of patient H.P., who suf-
fered an incomplete left occipital lobe lesion in adulthood in addition to a
convergent squint of the left eye since birth. (Figure taken from Pöppel
et al., 1987.)
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case, and these results might have been anticipated at least
with respect to the visual ﬁeld representation (Rothschild &
Mizrahi, 2015; Wandell & Winawer, 2011), there was one
observation that appears to be rather paradoxical and which
raises new questions. At the position of the blind spot in
visual space of the squinting eye, the “good eye” showed a
signiﬁcant local decrease of sensitivity at the same position
in visual space (Figure 7). This means that in spite of the
rigidity of visual ﬁeld representation at the visual cortex,
local plasticity was also observed. The lack of visual input
in one eye (the squinting eye) modulates the sensitivity for
the same position in visual space for the other eye. Interest-
ingly, this modulation is of an inhibitory nature, as sensitiv-
ity is reduced. How might it be possible to have both a
rigid representation that is genetically determined and that
remains unaffected for decades, and at the same time to
have local plasticity? On the basis of the concept of diver-
gence of projection, as referred to above, one can suspect
that a modulation of local sensitivity far away from its pri-
mary target is possible. As the squint angle in this patient
was some 17-deg visual angle, it can be concluded that at
least up to such an angle of cortical representation of the
visual ﬁeld, divergence of projection may be observed. In
this case (patient H.P.), as in the case with tunnel vision
(patient H.H.), one is left, however, with the question as to
how far one has to “travel” laterally across the visual cortex
until one is no longer getting any direct input from a
deﬁned retinal area? One is furthermore confronted with
the puzzle in patient H.P. as to whether this local inhibitory
interaction for non-corresponding retinal points is of func-
tional relevance.
Interhemispheric control of spatial attention
at the midbrain level
It has been suggested previously that attentional control
might be mediated by neural mechanisms already at the
level of the superior colliculus in the midbrain (Singer
et al., 1977). The involvement of the superior colliculus is
an essential feature of a neural model explaining the eccen-
tricity effect in attentional control, that is, the stronger
inhibitory modulation of spatial attention for stimuli pre-
sented at the periphery relative to the perifoveal visual ﬁeld
is possibly mediated by the stronger representation of supe-
rior colliculus for peripheral stimuli via the retinotectal
pathway (Bao & Pöppel, 2007). The potential participation
of the superior colliculus has to be seen as complementary
to neural mechanisms explaining selective attention at the
cortical level, in particular in the parietal cortex
(Behrmann, Geng, & Shomstein, 2004; Krauzlis, Love-
joy, & Zénon, 2013). Because of the limited spatial resolu-
tion of imaging technology as in fMRI (Logothetis, 2008),
it still remains a technical challenge to demonstrate directly
the involvement of the superior colliculus in eccentricity-
dependent attentional tasks; thus, one has to rely on behav-
ioral observations with patients (Pöppel & Richards, 1974)
or on animal models (Sprague, 1966). How can the partici-
pation of attentional control on the collicular level be made
Figure 7. Increment threshold under photopic adap-
tation along the horizontal meridian in the foveal and
perifoveal region for the right and left eye of patient
H.P. (Figure 6). (Figure abstracted from Pöppel
et al., 1987.)
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plausible with a behavioral paradigm? It is suggested to be
possible by employing habituation and facilitation of visual
sensitivity and interhemispheric modulation of visual sensi-
tivity (Figure 8). We describe a sequence of experiments
with healthy subjects and patients who have suffered spe-
ciﬁc brain injuries, which support our hypothesis of a col-
licular mechanism, but which also raise new questions.
Continuous measurement of increment threshold for
instance in the temporal visual ﬁeld (TVF) of the left eye
results in reduction of sensitivity, which is probably related
to the Troxler effect (Troxler, 1804; Figure 8B, left column)
in which an unchanging peripheral stimulus fades away and
disappears if a steady ﬁxation has been maintained for sev-
eral seconds; this effect has been shown to have a central
component reﬂecting habituation, and it is not based on
local adaptation of receptors only (Hsieh & Tse, 2006).
Spontaneous recovery to original values (Figure 8B, right
column) takes approximately 20 min. In the second panel
from the top, a phenomenon is described which suggests
interhemispheric interactions. If after habituation of stimu-
lating the TVF (Figure 8B, left column), stimulation is
applied at a mirror-symmetric position in the nasal visual
ﬁeld (NVF; Figure 8B, middle column indicated with the
red dot), sensitivity in the TVF is reset instantaneously to
values prior to habituation (Figure 8B, right column) in con-
trast to a spontaneous recovery, which takes much longer.
In the third panel from the top in Figure 8, an equivalent
experiment is described with a patient (E.K.) who has suf-
fered a cortical injury in the left hemisphere resulting in a
scotoma in the right visual ﬁeld (Figure 8A, black area). In
this patient, the same instantaneous resetting of sensitivity
is observed, although the patient could not see the visual
stimulus in his NVF of the left eye. In the bottom panel of
Figure 8, a similar experiment is described with a patient
who has suffered an optical tract injury (F.F.). This time
the NVF is stimulated and a habituation is also observed.
However, no such resetting of sensitivity can be triggered
in this patient. Thus, the resetting of sensitivity after habitu-
ation is presumably mediated by midbrain mechanisms at
the collicular level. These observations conﬁrm on the
behavioral level the model of attentional control as for-
warded previously (Bao & Pöppel, 2007), but it still has to
be documented by sufﬁciently sensitive technology as to
whether this hypothesis will remain valid. Furthermore, it
has to be clariﬁed how the neural mechanisms at the sus-
pected collicular level and the parietal cortex (Behrmann
et al., 2004) interact.
Seeing with knowing: Conscious vision
requires the primary visual cortex
Motivated by research on the visual system of the Syrian
hamster (Schneider, 1969) and a case study in a monkey
without a striate cortex (Humphrey, 1974), Pöppel, Held,
and Frost (1973) investigated whether human patients who
have suffered a brain injury resulting in blindness still
exhibit some residual vision. This was in fact the case and
this phenomenon has also become known as “blindsight”
(Sanders, Warrington, Marshall, & Weiskrantz, 1974; Wei-
skrantz, Warrington, Sanders, & Marshall, 1974). Although
initially being counter-intuitive and intensely criticized that
one might deal perhaps with a stray-light effect (Campion,
Latto, & Smith, 1983), blindsight has been conﬁrmed by
independent research groups: Patients with an acquired
blindness due to cortical injuries affecting the visual cortex
still process visual information, even though the patients
are not consciously aware of the spared function
(Perenin & Jeannerod, 1975; Stoerig, Hübner, & Pöppel,
1985; Torjussen, 1976; Zihl & Werth, 1984).
The discovery of residual vision has been made possible
by detailed analyses of visual functions in single cases,
such as patient A.W., who had suffered a stroke in the left
hemisphere resulting in an incomplete hemianopsia in the
right visual ﬁeld of both eyes (Figure 9, black areas). The
right upper quadrants were affected completely with some
sparing of function in the right lower quadrants. Perimetric
visual ﬁeld measurements were repeated three times, indi-
cating the temporal stability of the cortical scotoma. It can
be noted that the area of blindness in the right lower quad-
rants is slightly larger in the left eye (NVF) compared to
the right eye (TVF); this corresponds to observations
referred to above (Engler et al., 1993) that retinal ﬁbers
from the nasal retina (TVF) may have a larger degree of
divergence of a central projection resulting in slightly smal-
ler areas of blindness.
Visual stimuli that were presented within the cortical
scotoma in no case resulted in a conscious percept. How-
ever, when the patient was asked to look at “unseen” visual
targets at different eccentricities along an oblique meridian
within the right upper quadrant, the amplitude of saccadic
eye movements correlated positively with target eccentric-
ity. As the patient could not see the visual targets, the pres-
entation of the visual stimulus was indicated by an auditory
stimulus, which did not provide a spatial cue. The
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Figure 8. Interhemispheric modulation of visual processing as demonstrated with habituation and facilitation of local sensitivity. (A) Schematic illustra-
tion of tested eyes. (B) Different experimental conditions; for details see text. (Figure abstracted from Singer et al., 1977). NVF = nasal visual ﬁeld;
TVF = temporal visual ﬁeld.
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experimental challenge in this case was to convince the
patient to look at a visual stimulus he could not “see.” This
observation, together with those on detection and discrimi-
nation of visual stimuli using different experimental para-
digms (Cowey, 2010) indicate that some visual processing
is still possible on an implicit level (Pöppel & Bao, 2011).
This capacity remains, however, undisclosed to the patients
on an explicit level; residual vision or blindsight is charac-
terized by “seeing without knowing.” One may also refer to
another relevant phenomenon of visual agnosia in which
the recognition of objects is impaired following the damage
of higher visual cortices in the extrastriate areas
(Behrmann & Nishimura, 2010). However, the “seeing
without knowing” in agnosia refers to the organizational
and semantic levels (Funnell, 2000; Vecera & Gilds, 1998),
unlike the blindsight, which loses “knowing” on the basic
level of visual consciousness. In prosopagnosia (Damasio,
Tranel, & Damasio, 1990), for instance, the perception of
faceness is preserved while the recognition of speciﬁc faces
(even one’s own) is profoundly impaired. A more appropri-
ate scenario can be proposed that the primary visual cortex
serves as the source of all inputs for conscious perception
and thus is the core and necessity, whereas the extrastriate
cortices provide important decorations for the elaboration
of visual inputs, thus contributing to visual recognition.
These observations in patients with circumscribed brain
injuries strongly support the notion that the visual cortex is
essential for conscious vision. We want to submit that “see-
ing without knowing” becomes “seeing with knowing” on
this level of neural processing. Thus, the visual cortex is
hypothesized to be located at a strategic crossroad. Infor-
mation within the ascending visual pathway is character-
ized by “seeing without knowing” as exempliﬁed by the
observations on brightness constancy throughout the visual
ﬁeld or color induction. This mode of “seeing” represents
logistical functions (Pöppel, 1989) that are necessary but
not sufﬁcient functions for visual percepts on a conscious
level. The information from the visual cortex is sent to a
large number of extrastriate areas and beyond, and many of
these areas project back to V1 (Felleman & Van Essen,
1991). These extrastriate areas independently do not medi-
ate conscious vision, as is demonstrated by patients with
lesions in the optic radiation (e.g., Stoerig et al., 1998). Of
course, a full emergence of conscious experience with vari-
ous properties requires the involvement of extrastriate areas
and their interactions with the primary and other brain cor-
tices. Thus, we are left with the conclusion, at the very
basic conscious level, that the striate cortex mediates “see-
ing with knowing.”
Necessary but not sufﬁcient conditions for
visual perception: A ﬁnal remark
In a taxonomy of function (Pöppel, 1989), content or
“what-functions” (like percepts in the different sensory
modalities, or memories in the semantic or episodic mne-
monic systems) has been distinguished from logistical
“how-functions” (like attentional control, activation of
functions as modulated, for instance, by the circadian
clock, or temporal organization of distributed neural activ-
ities). Logistical functions are necessary for the representa-
tion of content functions; a breakdown in the temporal
machinery of the brain, a failure in attentional control, or
switching off the activation system, results in a severe dis-
ruption or loss of perceptual or mnemonic content. As we
show in our analyses of visual processing, the concept of
logistical functions and its distinction from content func-
tions also applies to the early visual pathway.
In the perception of objects, homogeneity of brightness
of perceptual surfaces is implicitly assumed and taken for
granted; it is usually not even questioned that it could be
otherwise, because the spatial distribution of threshold sen-
sitivity under photopic conditions would predict an inho-
mogeneous brightness distribution (Figure 1). As we argue,
both constancy of brightness throughout the visual ﬁeld
Figure 9. Visual ﬁeld of patient A.W., who had suffered a stroke in the left
hemisphere resulting in an incomplete hemianopsia in the right visual ﬁeld of
the two eyes (black areas); the right upper quadrants were affected completely
with some sparing of function in the right lower quadrants. Perimetric visual
ﬁeld measurements were repeated three times indicating the stability of the
cortical scotoma. (Referred to in Pöppel et al., 1973, Figure 1.)
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and a functional equilibrium between the different color
channels (Figure 2) are already implemented at the retinal
level. It is suggested that this processing in the early visual
pathway is a necessary condition for visual perception and
results at later stages in effortless recognition of visual
objects.
Although the value of single case studies in patients
with circumscribed lesions of the brain is sometimes ques-
tioned, we want to submit on the basis of our analyses
that the unique patterns of neural systems after injury can
lead to new insights into the stream of information proces-
sing prior to those neural mechanisms that are responsible
for distinct percepts. On that basis, we can refer to early
processing stages as “pre-semantic” and that they repre-
sent logistical functions of the brain. Furthermore, we can
extract hypotheses about neuroanatomical characteristics;
as we suggest, recovery of function (Figure 3) implies a
special mode of retinofugal projection with a high degree
of divergence in central representation, and correspond-
ingly a substantial amount of convergence onto local neu-
ral nets. For recovery of function (which is a special mode
of visual learning), we suggest as a neural mechanism
short-term fatigue, which results in long-term functional
improvement (Figure 4). However, what remains an
enigma is how it is possible that, after functional recovery
as seen in the enlargement of the visual ﬁeld, the topologi-
cal relations between local stimuli are maintained. In spite
of the pre-wired representation of the visual ﬁeld at the
cortical level (Figure 6), it comes as a surprise that there
are also local interactions for non-corresponding retinal
points of the two eyes (Figure 7); this paradoxical obser-
vation may be explained on the basis of a substantial
degree of divergence of projection (Figure 3) at the corti-
cal surface allowing the establishment of new local
interactions.
Single-case studies are often characterized by surprising
observations that are not and cannot be anticipated. In one
patient, we observed an extreme slowing down in binocular
rivalry (Figure 5); this effect we use as a “temporal micro-
scope.” If we deal in this case with only a slowing down in
neural processing, and if we do not have to assume (as we
do) the implementation of an alternative neural strategy
triggered by the lesion, it can be argued or at least specu-
lated that the build-up of a visual percept is not an instanta-
neous and parallel process within a neural structure, but
that it is a fast sequential process sweeping across the parti-
cipating neural elements as in technological systems.
Although for control of visual attention, cortical mechan-
isms have been demonstrated with advanced imaging tech-
nologies, we present in our analyses cases that clearly
indicate the participation of sub-cortical structures
(Figure 8). Inter-hemispheric inhibitory mechanisms pre-
sumably at the level of the superior colliculus of the mid-
brain are suggested to be involved in spatial attention; thus,
cortical and sub-cortical mechanisms are involved in a
complementary way. In particular, the “eccentricity effect”
of spatial attention (Bao & Pöppel, 2007) suggests different
attentional mechanisms for the perifoveal and peripheral
regions of the visual ﬁeld, which are related to different
retinocentral projection systems.
It is of course a trivial statement that different extrastri-
ate areas are responsible for the richness of our visual
percepts, and that these structures, together with others at
the cortical mantle, provide the sufﬁcient conditions for
object and scene perception. We claim that the visual cor-
tex (area 17, V1) is the one and only structure that is
essential for conscious vision. If the integrity of the pri-
mary visual cortex is disrupted, if it does not receive
direct geniculate input, there is no longer conscious
vision (Figure 9). We cannot ﬁnd evidence that contra-
dicts this statement.
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Abstract The effect of covert attention in perifoveal and
peripheral locations has been studied extensively. How-
ever, it is less clear whether attention operates similarly in
the foveal area itself. The present study aims to investigate
whether the attentional orienting elicited by an exogenous
or endogenous cue can operate within the foveal area and
whether attentional orienting operates similarly between
foveal and perifoveal regions. By manipulating exogenous
orienting in Experiment 1 and endogenous orienting in
Experiment 2, we observed both forms of cueing in the
foveal area. Specifically, we observed a larger exogenous
cue-induced inhibitory effect (i.e., inhibition of return
effect) and a similar endogenous cue-elicited facilitatory
effect for the perifoveal relative to the foveal targets. We
conclude that exogenous and endogenous orienting subject
to two independent attentional systems with distinct mod-
ulation patterns in the foveal area.
Keywords Foveal processing  Eccentricity effect 
Endogenous attention  Exogenous attention
Introduction
Orienting attention toward specific locations covertly,
without any change in gaze direction, has been shown to
improve stimulus detection and discrimination in the cued
location compared with an uncued control condition
(Posner 1980). Furthermore, attention could be oriented
either exogenously and reflexively, using a spatially non-
predictive peripheral cue, or endogenously and voluntarily,
using a predictive central symbolic cue (Chica et al. 2013;
Klein 2009). Exogenous attention produces a biphasic
response pattern denoted by facilitation at short cue-target
interval (\200 ms) and inhibition of return (IOR) at longer
intervals, which presumably reflects a bias against reori-
enting attention to a location that has been previously
attended (Klein 2000). The effects of endogenous cues
usually show a comparatively delayed buildup of facilita-
tion peaking at 300 ms and then remain for a longer
duration (Mu¨ller and Rabbitt 1989). It has been considered
as a voluntary system that corresponds to our ability to
voluntarily monitor information at a given location.
Given that the properties of visual processing vary
widely across the visual field (Po¨ppel and Harvey 1973;
Strasburger et al. 2011), it might be possible that spatial
cuing effects also differ for different visual regions. Some
recent studies suggest that attentional orienting as studied
with the paradigm of IOR exhibits a functional dissociation
in the visual field, with larger inhibitory effects at periheral
(21) relative to perifoveal (7) regions (Bao and Po¨ppel
2007; Bao et al. 2012). This eccentricity effect of IOR is
independent of cortical magnification factor (Bao et al.
2013) and resistant to subjects’ practice (Bao et al. 2011).
These observations suggest different modes for modulating
stimulus processing in the perifovea compared to the
periphery of the visual field. An unanswered question,
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however, is whether attentional orienting also operates
inhomogeneously between our most effective system for
achieving high-resolution visual perception, i.e., foveal
processing, and the relatively lower-resolution perifoveal
vision. Attention allows to select locations around the
fovea, i.e., the central 2 of the retina (Lavidor and Walsh
2004). During active fixation when stimuli are presented to
the fovea, there is a strong incentive to hold attention at the
central location. From an evolutionary perspective, one
might expect that in this case, the shift of attention toward
incoming cues and targets around the fovea is not neces-
sary, since attention is already allocated to the fovea while
maintaining fixation. The aim of the present study is to
examine whether attentional orienting elicited by an
exogenous or endogenous cue operates differently in the
foveal and perifoveal visual field. Specifically, we con-
ducted two experiments with Experiment 1 using an
exogenous cue and Experiment 2 using an endogenous cue.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Nine right-handed students (three males, 20–25 years old)
from Peking University (PKU) participated in the study
after giving informed written consent. All had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and all were naı¨ve to the pur-
pose of the experiment.
Apparatus
Visual stimuli were generated using MATLAB 7.13 in
conjunction with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard
1997) and displayed on a 19-in CRT monitor (1024 9 768
resolution, 100 Hz refresh rate). The visual distance was
57 cm. Responses were collected through a keyboard.
Materials and procedure
Each trial started with a white cross subtending 0.2 visual
angle presented at the center of a dark computer screen.
Participants were instructed to keep fixation on the cross
throughout the experiment. After 500 ms, a white outline
box serving as the exogenous cue subtended a 0.4 visual
angle and appeared for 100 ms at 1 or 7 to the left or
right of the center. Following a 70 ms inter-stimuli interval
(ISI), the same outline box appeared at the center sur-
rounding the fixation cross for 100 ms. After another
interval of 70 ms, a white solid circle (0.3) serving as a
target appeared at either the cued location or the uncued
opposite location with the same eccentricity (see Fig. 1,
left). Participants were required to press a response key as
soon as they saw the target while maintaining fixation. On
catch trials, only the cue was presented and participants
were to withhold key pressing.
There were 384 target trials and 96 catch trials. All trials
were completely randomized and arranged into six blocks
with 80 trials in each block. The number of trials for targets
appearing in the left or right visual field and at 1 or 7
eccentricity was balanced in both cued and uncued
conditions.
Data analysis
The total error rate for each subject was lower than 2 %.
Correct reaction times (RTs) for each subject were first
submitted to descriptive statistics, and the RTs beyond 3
standard deviations were considered as outliers and exclu-
ded. Anticipations (\100 ms) and retardations ([800 ms)
Fig. 1 Sample trial sequence of
Experiment 1 (exogenous cue)
and Experiment 2 (endogenous
cue). In this example, the target
is presented in the cued location
at 1 eccentricity
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were further employed to exclude RTs. An analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with target location (cued location,
uncued location) and stimulus eccentricity (1, 7) as
within-subjects factors was conducted on the mean RT data.
Results
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of target location
[F(1,8) = 56.17, p\ 0.001, gp
2 = 0.88], with a longer RT
of cued trials than that of uncued trials, indicating an IOR
effect (Fig. 2). The main effect of eccentricity was signifi-
cant [F(1,8) = 7.11, p\ 0.05, gp
2 = 0.47], revealing a
slower RT for perifoveal locations. Furthermore, the
eccentricity effect significantly interacted with target loca-
tion [F(1,8) = 105.42, p\ 0.001, gp
2 = 0.93]. Further
paired t test for the IOR magnitude (IOR = RTcued -
RTuncued) at 1 and 7 indicated that the latter was signifi-
cantly larger (10 vs. 38 ms on average, p\ 0.001).
Experiment 2
Methods
Participants
Nine students (five males) aged from 19 to 25 from PKU
participated in Experiment 2. All of them were right-han-
ded and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus, materials and procedure
The apparatus were identical to the one used in Experiment
1. The initial display consisted of a 0.2 white fixation
cross at the center against a black background. After
500 ms, an arrow subtending 0.4 by 0.3 visual angle
appeared centrally for 150 ms, pointing to the left or right.
Participants were explicitly informed that the cue was
predictive. After a 300 ms ISI, the target was likely to
appear in the direction of the arrow on 80 % of the trials,
measuring 1 or 7 eccentricities, whereas it could appear
at the opposite location on 20 % of the trials (see Fig. 1,
right). Participants were required to keep their fixation at
the cross throughout each trial and detect the targets as
quickly and as accurately as possible.
There are 576 trials in total (384 valid, 96 invalid and 96
catch trials) and were divided into six blocks. Among the
480 target trials, targets were presented at 1 and 7
equally. The 96 catch trials were mixed with the other
target trials in a random sequence.
Results
All participants’ mean RTs were analyzed with a repeated-
measure ANOVA with target location (cued location,
uncued location) and stimulus eccentricity (1, 7) as two
independent variables. RTs were faster for cued targets
independent of whether they were presented at the foveal
or perifoveal location (see Fig. 3). This was confirmed in
the ANOVA results which showed a main effect of target
location ([F(1,8) = 12.11, p\ 0.01, gp
2 = 0.60]), but no
main effect of eccentricity ([F(1,8) = 2.66, p = 0.14,
gp
2 = 0.25]) or the target location 9 eccentricity interac-
tion ([F(1,8) = 0.25, p = 0.63, gp
2 = 0.03]).
Fig. 2 Reaction times as a function of target location (cued vs.
uncued) and stimulus eccentricity (1 vs. 7) in Experiment 1. Larger
IOR effect (RT difference between cued and uncued trials) was
observed for 7 relative to 1 stimulus eccentricity. Within-subject
error bars is calculated for each condition using Cousineau (2005)
Fig. 3 RT as a function of target location and stimulus eccentricity in
Experiment 2. Endogenous cuing effects (RT difference between
uncued and cued trials) are not different between 1 and 7
eccentricities. Within-subject error bars is calculated for each
condition using Cousineau (2005)
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Discussion
In the present study, effects of both forms of cueing (ex-
ogenous and endogenous) within the foveal area were
observed. When cues and targets were presented close to
the fovea during active fixation, as had been done in
Experiment 1, RTs were significantly longer for cued than
for uncued foveal targets, indicating an IOR effect. How-
ever, spatial cues can also lead to an apparent facilitation
effect in the foveal region, with shorter RTs for cued rel-
ative to uncued targets as observed in Experiment 2. It
appeared therefore that spatial cues engendered both
facilitatory and inhibitory effects at the fovea, even though
this region was continuously fixated and continuously
attended. Thus, processing of foveal stimuli can be further
influenced by spatial attention, i.e., above the inherent
advantage conferred by foveation of stimuli, the processing
of such stimuli can additionally be affected by spatial
attention. This observation contradicts our prediction that
no attentional modulation should be observed within the
foveal area. The reason for this unexpected effect could be
that the presence of rapidly changing and discrete stimuli to
the fovea presents an unusual experimental situation which
rarely occurs outside the laboratory. Under natural settings,
the visual and attention systems rely heavily upon organi-
zation of visual scenes. As long as the eyes focus directly
on an object or part of an object, attention should be
restricted to the spatial region within the object’s bound-
aries, and the shift of attention should hardly occur in the
foveal area. Presumably, the inclusion of foveal cues and
targets in a setting close to natural viewing conditions will
furnish information that cannot be obtained with experi-
ments which do not mimic ecological situations.
In spite of these limitations, the two experiments pro-
vided important information. In Experiment 1, we observed
a robust eccentricity effect of IOR, i.e., a stronger IOR
magnitude for the perifovea (7) relative to the foveal area
(1), showing a different cue-induced modulation of
detection RTs between these two regions. This indicates
that the interaction between target location and eccentricity
is not limited to perifoveal and peripheral regions, as
shown in previous studies (e.g., Bao and Po¨ppel 2007), but
can also be extended to the foveal and perifoveal visual
field. This might be related to the non-uniform distribution
of photoreceptors in the retina and the structural charac-
teristics of the visual cortex and other features of the
retinocortical pathway (cf. Handy and Khoe 2005). The
present finding is thus consistent with the hypothesis that
attentional control may operate differentially between
foveal and perifoveal visual processing.
We found from Experiment 2 that unlike exogenous
attention, directing endogenous attention via central
informative cues to the target location reduced RTs both at
foveal and perifoveal cued locations, and the cuing effects
were independent of stimulus eccentricities. These differ-
ent results might be due to the more flexible nature of
endogenous attention in comparison with exogenous
attention. As has been shown in previous studies, the shift
of attention induced by an exogenous cue is more resistant
to interference and can occur even when the cue is non-
predictive (Chica et al. 2013). Compared to exogenous
attention, endogenous attention is a more adaptive mech-
anism. When participants see an arrow indicating the likely
side (i.e., left or right) along the horizontal meridian for an
upcoming target, but are not told whether the target will
appear at a foveal or perifoveal location, they can effi-
ciently control and allocate attentional resources and uni-
formly prepare for the foveal and perifoveal target stimuli.
The differences between exogenous and endogenous ori-
enting may be due to the fact that endogenous attention is
cortical in nature, while exogenous attention is mediated by
both cortical and subcortical networks (Corbetta and
Shulman 2002). In the present study, we found yet another
differential aspect between endogenous and exogenous
attention via comparing the cueing effects at foveal and
perifoveal regions of the visual field.
In conclusion, selective allocation of visual attention can
operate in the immediate vicinity of the fovea. Although
the present study is not the first one to show an influence of
spatial attention on foveal processing, our data provide the
first behavioral evidence of different inhibitory processing
induced by exogenous orienting and similar facilitatory
processing elicited by endogenous orienting at foveal and
perifoveal regions. These observations suggest that atten-
tional orienting initiated by exogenous and endogenous
cues have to be considered as two different processes, with
distinct modulation patterns in the visual field.
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Abstract
The ability to perceive changes in motion, such as rapid changes of speed, has important
ecological significance. We show that exogenous and endogenous attention have different
effects on speed-change perception and operate differently in different regions of the visual
field. Using a spatial-cueing paradigm, with either exogenous or endogenous cues followed
by drifting Gabor patches of changing speed that appear at the cued or uncued location, we
measured participants’ thresholds for localizing both acceleration and deceleration of the
Gabor patches in different regions (5˚ and 10˚) of the visual field. The results revealed a
larger exogenous cueing effect, indexed by a lower threshold for the cued relative to the
uncued conditions, at 5˚ for perceiving acceleration and at 10˚ for perceiving deceleration.
Endogenous attention, in contrast, improved performance equally at both eccentricities. We
conclude that exogenous and endogenous spatial orienting constitute two independent
attentional systems, with distinct modulation patterns on speed change perception in the
visual field. While exogenous attentional modulation is eccentricity-dependent, endogenous
attention acts homogeneously in perifoveal and near-peripheral regions of the visual field.
Introduction
The role of covert spatial attention (i.e., the focusing of attention on a peripheral location with-
out change in gaze) has been well examined in a variety of visual tasks. Spatial attention allows
selective prioritization of stimulus processing at a given location, and selectively enhances,
amongst others, contrast sensitivity, spatial resolution, reaction time, two-pulse resolution,
and processing speed for stimuli at the attended location [1,2,3,4,5]. Besides effects of attention
on static stimulus properties, there is evidence that spatial attention also plays a role in the per-
ception of aspects of visual motion, such as motion coherence and the speed or the size of
moving stimuli [6,7,8]. These studies have mainly focused on how we perceive constant
motion, however, motion change, i.e., acceleration and deceleration, has not yet been studied
in detail. Given that objects under ecological conditions rarely move at constant speed, the
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ability to detect changes in our ever-changing environment is an important challenge for the
human visual system, e.g. perceiving transient changes of the speed of a moving object in a spe-
cific direction to avoid collision. One goal of the present study, therefore, is to explore the
effects of spatial attention on speed-change perception.
A sudden increase or decrease in speed represents an abrupt stimulus change and as such
resembles a stimulus onset or offset, where neurons typically respond by an increase or
decrease in firing rate [9]. However, unlike stimulus onset or offset, speed changes may require
integrating and comparing speed information over time. Thus, processes that mediate
responding to a stimulus change may differ from those for the response to stimulus onsets. In
addition, there is, (to the best of our knowledge), no unequivocal clear evidence as to whether
the brain has a direct representation of the extent of stimulus acceleration or deceleration
[10,11,12]. Even though single neurons in area MT apparently encode motion attributes like
the motion's direction and the speed of a moving target, and the neurons' activity pattern are
correlated with behavioral performance during motion detection and discrimination
[13,14,15], a similar cellular mechanism for coding acceleration and deceleration apparently
does not exist; single neurons in area MT do not seem to be sensitive to acceleration. Alterna-
tively, population pooling of neuronal responses could be a process underlying the representa-
tion of changes, and in particular speed changes over time [16,17,18]. Furthermore,
considering the aforementioned studies which show that spatial attention enhances several
aspects of visual processing, it is worthwhile to determine whether the mechanisms that are
possibly responsible for acceleration and deceleration could be modulated by spatial attention.
It has been well-established that covert spatial attention can be uncoupled from gaze [19]
often described with the spotlight metaphor [20], and it has been hypothesized since Wilhelm
Wundt [21] more than a hundred years ago that there are at least two ways of allocating spatial
attention. On the one hand, observers can voluntarily deploy attention to the spatial location
that is relevant for a current task. On the other hand, physically salient stimuli can involun-
tarily capture attention, even when they are unrelated to the current goal-directed task. In the
spatial cueing paradigms developed by Eriksen and Posner and colleagues [20,22,23,24] spatial
attention can be either attracted exogenously and reflexively, using a spatially non-predictive
peripheral cue, or directed endogenously and voluntarily, using a spatially predictive central
symbolic cue. Similar distinctions have been conceptualized as automatic vs. voluntary atten-
tion [25] or transient vs. sustained attention [26]. Attentional modulation of performance typi-
cally differs depending on the type of spatial attention deployed [25,26,27,28,29] (see [1] for
review). Thus, the present research asks further whether and how these two types of attention
affect speed-change perception.
It has become increasingly evident that attentional effects also show functional differences
in different regions of the visual field. That might not come as a surprise in light of the fact that
perceptual performance shows essential inhomogeneities in the visual field [30,31] most nota-
bly between the central region and the more peripheral visual field (see [32] for review). Using
a spatial cueing paradigm with inhibition of return (IOR, the inhibitory process setting-in
approximately 300 ms after the initial visual orienting at the cued location; cf. [33,34]), Bao
and colleagues found in a series of studies that spatial-cueing effects varied as a function of
stimulus eccentricity; more specifically, the inhibitory component of attentional control,
indexed by the magnitude of IOR, is much stronger at the periphery than the perifoveal
region suggesting different processing mechanisms for perifoveal and peripheral stimuli
[35,36,37,38]. This eccentricity effect is further found to be independent of cortical magnifica-
tion [39] and it is resistant to subjects' practice [40]. These findings provide support for the
hypothesis that attentional modulation in the visual field is not homogeneous. Therefore, it is
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reasonable to hypothesize that attentional control also operates differently on speed-change
perception in different regions of the visual field.
In the experiments presented here, we examined the possible attentional modulation of
both exogenous and endogenous attention in a speed-change detection task where targets
were presented in different regions of the visual field. It was expected that shifting attention to
a specific spatial location would affect the detection of a sudden speed change of moving sti-
muli at that location. Given the inhomogeneity of attentional control in the visual filed, it was
further anticipated that the attentional modulation on speed-change detection would depend
on the eccentricity at which the target appears. In Experiment 1, thresholds for localizing both
acceleration and deceleration of drifting Gabor patches were measured using a peripheral cue-
ing paradigm in which the Gabor patches that changed speed could appear at two eccentric (5Ê
or 10Ê), cued or uncued locations. Experiment 2 was designed to investigate whether endoge-
nous attention would affect speed-change perception, and if so, whether its effect would be
similar to that of exogenous attention.
Materials and methods
Participants
Thirty-six healthy right-handed students from Peking University (aged 18±28 years) partici-
pated in the study (Exp 1: 16 participants, 7 males; Exp 2: 20 participants, 10 males). All partic-
ipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and all were naïve with respect to the
purpose of the experiment. All participants gave written informed consent before the experi-
ments and they received moderate rewards for their participation. The experiments had been
approved by the Committee for Protecting Human and Animal Subjects in the School of Psy-
chological and Cognitive Sciences at Peking University and were in accordance with the Decla-
ration of Helsinki.
Apparatus
Visual stimuli were generated using MATLAB 7.13 (MathWorks, Natick, MA) in conjunction
with the Cogent toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/) and displayed on a gamma-
corrected 20-in CRT monitor with 1024×768 resolution at a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Responses
were collected on a keyboard.
Materials
In both experiments, stimuli consisted of two diagonally oriented Gabor patches (45Ê or 135Ê
orientation, spatial frequency:1 cyc/deg, Gaussian envelope in cosine phase with σ = 0.75Ê, cor-
responding to a visible grating diameter of ~ 4.5Ê; Michelson contrast 99.8%; background lumi-
nance 20 cd/m2), with its grating moving behind the Gaussian aperture orthogonally to their
respective orientation, either up-right or up-left. Motion, and motion direction, were clearly vis-
ible at all tested conditions. The fixation mark was a white cross subtending 0.8Ê visual angle. In
Exp 1, the spatial cue for attracting exogenous attention was a white dot, presented at 5Ê or 10Ê
eccentricity to the left or right of the center and subtending 1Ê visual angle. For Exp 2, a white
0.8Ê×0.6Ê arrow, presented in the center of the computer screen, served as endogenous cue.
Procedure
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. Subjects were seated at 57 cm distance from a
computer screen, with viewing distance kept constant by using an adjustable head-chin rest.
The stimulus sequence in a trial is illustrated in Fig 1. Each trial started with the presentation of
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a fixation point for 500 ms at the center of the screen. In Exp 1, the exogenous cue appeared for
70 ms left or right of the fixation point (50% validity, non-informative) at an eccentricity of
either 5Ê or 10Ê. An inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 50 ms followed the cue offset. This interval
was chosen short enough to prevent goal-directed saccades. In Exp 2, the endogenous cue was a
single arrow pointing either to the left or to the right, indicating the likely location of the chang-
ing-speed target (75% validity; that is, the target appeared in the direction of the arrow on 75%
of the trials). After the offset of the spatial cue (exogenous or endogenous) and the correspond-
ing ISI, two drifting Gabor patches with a base speed of 6 deg/s were presented, one to the left
and one to the right of fixation on the horizontal meridian, at either 5Ê or 10Ê of eccentricity.
After a fixed-speed period of 500 ms, one Gabor patch abruptly changed its speed, after which
the stimulus moved constantly at one of six different test speeds (plus a control) for another 500
ms while the other Gabor patch continued to move at the base speed of 6 deg/s. Speed changes
of 0%, ±10%, ±20%, ±30%, ±40%, ±50%, and ±60% relative to the base speed were used; for
example, 20% acceleration for 6 deg/s base speed resulted in 7.2 deg/s speed, and 20% decelera-
tion in 5 deg/s speed. Participants were asked to maintain fixation throughout the trial sequence
and to indicate, by pressing one of the two keyboard buttons, whether the right or the left stimu-
lus changed its speed. A training phase with neutral-cue trials preceded the experiments.
Design
The sign of the speed change, i.e., acceleration vs. deceleration, was designed as a between-sub-
ject factor; half of the subjects participated in the acceleration condition (8 in Exp 1, and 10 in
Fig 1. Sample trial sequences in Exp 1 (exogenous cue; left) and Exp 2 (endogenous cue; right). In this example, the target is presented in the cued
location at 5Ê eccentricity (Exp 1) and in the uncued location at 10Ê (Exp 2).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203024.g001
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Exp 2) and the other half in the deceleration condition. In Exp 1, all the other conditions (stim-
ulus eccentricity, left/right visual field, and cue validity) were within-subject factors and were
used equiprobably with each of the six speed steps. The resulting 48 different trials (6 speed
steps × 2 left/right visual field × 2 eccentricities × 2 cue validities) were repeated 20 times in
randomized order, for a total of 960 trials for each subject. In Exp 2, there were 1152 trials for
each subject, divided into 24 blocks of 48 trials, of which 36 trials were valid (target appeared
at the cued location), and the remaining 12 were invalid. In both experiments, the two eccen-
tricity conditions (5Ê and 10Ê) were completed in different sessions and on different days. The
condition order was randomized and counterbalanced across participants, i.e. half of the par-
ticipants performed the 5Ê condition first, and the other half the 10Ê condition first.
Data analysis
Speed-change detection thresholds were obtained by the method of constant stimuli. Psycho-
metric functions were fitted using the Palamedes toolbox for MATLAB [41,42], which imple-
ments maximum-likelihood estimation. We fitted the psychometric function with a Weibull
function:
pc  1   1   g  e
  xa
b
;
Where pc is percent correct of detecting the speed change, and x is speed-change extent (in
percent of the base speed). Parameters α and β determine the threshold and maximum slope
of the function, respectively [43]; γ is the performance expected at chance (0.5 in our case of a
2AFC). The lapse rate (upper asymptote) was constrained to be unequal to 0 and below 0.1, to
avoid a biased estimate of the threshold [44]. The value of α, i.e., the stimulus intensity that is
at the curve's point of inflection and predicts 81.6% correct performance, was defined as the
detection threshold [43].
Goodness-of-fit for the psychometric functions was estimated using the function in the
Palamedes toolbox, based on Wichmann and Hill [44]. The number of bootstrap simulations
performed to determine the goodness-of-fit was 500. To test for influences of attention on per-
formance, model comparisons were performed between the model based on the data of both
conditions (valid and invalid cue) and the one treating the two conditions separately, using the
Palamedes routine PAL_PFLR_ModelComparison. Transformed likelihood ratios of respective
pairs of models were taken to be significantly different if exceeding 95% of transformed likeli-
hood ratios obtained through Monte-Carlo simulations (10,000 simulations in each compari-
son). To quantify and further investigate attentional effects, subjects' speed-change detection
thresholds were submitted to a three-way mixed-design ANOVA (Variables: sign of speed
change, stimulus eccentricity, and cue validity). All standard statistical tests and descriptive sta-
tistics were performed with SPSS 18.0.
Results
Experiment 1
For each speed-change condition (acceleration and deceleration), a psychometric function was
fitted to the detection rates of each subject, for 5Ê and 10Ê eccentricity, resulting in a total of 72
psychometric function fits (64 at the individual level and 8 at group level). Of these, 68 fits
(94.4%) passed a goodness-of-fit test at the 5% level. Fig 2 shows the psychometric functions
measured for one subject in our speed change detection task. Trials were collapsed across loca-
tion (left and right) of the cue and target, and were classified as having a valid or an invalid cue
(depending on whether or not the Gabor patches that changed speed indeed appeared at the
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cued location). When the target was cued, the valid-cue curve shifted to the left of the invalid-
cue curve. Under the acceleration condition, the valid-cue and invalid-cue curves were signifi-
cantly different from each other at both 5Ê and 10Ê eccentricity, as assessed by model compari-
son statistics (both p< 0.05). With deceleration, in contrast, the difference between valid-cue
and invalid-cue curves did not reach significance at 5Ê (p = 0.34), whereas a significant differ-
ence was obtained at 10Ê eccentricity (p< 0.05).
Fig 3A and 3C plot the mean speed-change detection thresholds for the valid-cue and
invalid-cue conditions at 5Ê and 10Ê. The detection thresholds of the participants were ana-
lyzed using a 2×2×2 mixed ANOVA, with sign of speed change (acceleration or deceleration)
as a between-subject factor, and cue validity (valid or invalid) and eccentricity (5Ê or 10Ê) as
within-subject factors. Overall, there was a rather large and significant main effect of cue valid-
ity, F(1,14) = 17.538, p< 0.01, Z2p = 0.556. Detection threshold for the attended target was
much lower than for the unattended target, showing a facilitation effect of exogenous
Fig 2. Effects of exogenous attention on performance (percent correctness) as a function of speed change step in Exp1. Solid lines are curve fittings
for the valid-cue condition; dashed lines for invalid-cue condition. Acceleration is shown on top panels a and b, and deceleration in bottom panels c
and d.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203024.g002
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attention. The main effect of sign of speed change was also large and significant, F(1,14) =
14.691, p< 0.01, Z2p = 0.512. The threshold to detect a deceleration was higher than that of
acceleration (37.6% vs. 22.6%). Critically, a significant three-way interaction of sign of
speed change, cue validity and eccentricity was observed, F(1,14) = 13.710, p< 0.01, Z2p =
0.495. To further explore the interaction, we performed 2×2 ANOVAs for acceleration and
deceleration separately, with cue validity and eccentricity as independent variables. When
the speed change was positive, the speed-change detection thresholds for the attended and
unattended target, respectively, were 18.4% and 26.9% at 5Ê eccentricity, and 20.2% and
24.9% at 10Ê. In both pairs were the values significantly different (each p value < 0.01). Fur-
ther paired t tests for the detection-threshold difference (unattended±attended) at 5Ê and
10Ê eccentricity indicated a larger exogenous cueing effect at 5Ê eccentricity than at 10Ê
(p< 0.05; Fig 3B). In the deceleration condition, the difference between attended (35.9%)
Fig 3. Effects of exogenous attention as indicated by speed-change thresholds in Exp 1. (a) The mean speed-change detection thresholds for acceleration in the valid-
cue and invalid-cue conditions at 5Ê and 10Ê; (b) a larger exogenous cueing effect was observed at 5Ê under the acceleration condition; (c) the mean speed-change
detection thresholds for deceleration in the valid-cue and invalid-cue conditions at 5Ê and 10Ê; (d) a larger exogenous cueing effect was obtained at 10Ê when the speed
change was negative ( p< .05;  p< .01; Error bars represent the standard error).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203024.g003
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and unattended (38.0%) target was only 2.1% at the 5Ê condition, but was 9.3% at 10Ê eccen-
tricity (33.6% vs. 42.9%). Only the latter difference was significant (p< 0.05). Further com-
parison of these two speed-detection threshold differences (unattended±attended) at 5Ê and
10Ê eccentricity showed that the difference under the 10Ê condition was significantly larger
than that at 5Ê (p< 0.01; Fig 3D).
Experiment 2
Fitting the data to psychometric functions for the various conditions in Exp 2 followed the
same procedures as in Exp 1. Among a total of 88 psychometric function fits obtained in Exp
2, there were 80 (i.e., 90.9%) that passed the goodness-of-fit test at the 5% level. Fig 4 shows the
psychometric functions measured for one subject in the speed change detection task with
endogenous cues. Significantly differing fits of valid-cue curves as opposed to invalid-cue
curves by model comparison statistics were observed, both at 5Ê and 10Ê eccentricity (all
p< 0.05).
Fig 4. Effects of endogenous attention on the psychometric functions for speed-change detection in Exp 2. Solid lines are curve fittings for the
valid-cue condition, dashed lines for the invalid-cue condition. Acceleration is shown on top panels a and b, and deceleration on bottom panels c and d.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203024.g004
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Participants' detection thresholds (Fig 5A and 5C) were submitted to a three-way ANOVA,
with stimulus eccentricity (5Ê or 10Ê) and cue-target validity (valid or invalid) as within-sub-
jects variables, and sign of speed change (acceleration or deceleration) as between-subjects var-
iable. The ANOVA produced two significant main effects only: one for cue validity (F(1,18) =
21.541, p< 0.001, Z2p = 0.545), again showing the cue-induced decrease of threshold at
attended compared to unattended locations, and the other for sign of speed change (F(1,18) =
11.966, p< 0.01, Z2p = 0.399). The detection threshold for deceleration was significantly higher
than that of acceleration (32.2% vs. 20.9%). Since the sign of speed change is a between-sub-
jects variable, we further conducted two separate 2×2 ANOVAs, with eccentricity and cue
validity as variables, one for acceleration and one for deceleration. The results demonstrated
that the there was no two-way interaction between cue validity and stimulus eccentricity, nei-
ther for acceleration nor deceleration (ps> 0.05). The lack of interaction indicates that the
attentional modulation was independent of stimulus eccentricity. Nevertheless, the cueing
effects were reliably observed in both acceleration and deceleration conditions: when the
Fig 5. Effects of endogenous attention as indicated by speed-change thresholds in Exp 1. (a) Participants' speed-change thresholds for acceleration in
different cueing conditions (valid and invalid), at 5Ê and 10Ê eccentricity; (b) roughly equal amounts of endogenous cueing effects were observed for
acceleration at 5Ê and 10Ê; (c) speed-change detection threshold for deceleration in the valid and invalid cueing conditions, at 5Ê and 10Ê eccentricity; (d) there
was no difference between the cueing effects for deceleration at 5Ê and 10Ê eccentricities ( p< .05;  p< .01; Error bars represent the standard error).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203024.g005
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speed change was positive, the magnitudes of attentional effects (unattended±attended) were
7.5% for 5Ê, and 7.0% for 10Êeccentricity; when the speed change was negative, the cueing
effects were 15.7% for 5Ê and 13.1% for 10Ê. No significant difference across eccentricity was
obtained in either case (Fig 5B and 5D), which indicates endogenous cuing is not eccentricity-
dependent.
Discussion
The results of the present study revealed that participants performed better in detecting and
making decisions about the speed change when the target appeared in cued rather than uncued
locations with the exception of exogenous attention for deceleration in the perifoveal region. A
novel result of our study was that exogenous attentional modulation had differential effects at
the perifoveal compared to the near-peripheral regions of the visual field, whereas endogenous
attention enhanced performance to the same extent at the two eccentricities.
Our results are consistent with previous psychophysical studies demonstrating that spatial
attention enhances sensitivity for basic visual dimensions at the attended location, such as con-
trast sensitivity, spatial resolution, reaction time, two-pulse resolution, and many others
[1,2,3,4,5,45,46]. One might classify these dimensions into being of an either more static or
more dynamic nature [5]; the present study would then provide another example of attentional
modulation of perceiving dynamic stimulus information. Indeed, studies in monkeys and
humans have demonstrated a correlation between MT-neuron activity and performance dur-
ing detection of changes in motion attributes, suggesting that neurons in this brain area play a
key role in this type of task [47,48]. A recent study further provided evidence showing that the
population transients in area MT were tuned to represent the sign and magnitude of the corre-
sponding speed changes [11]. Moreover, attentional modulation of performance in motion
tasks and the motion-generated neural activity has been widely observed in psychophysical
and physiological studies [6,49,50]. Taken together, thus, one possible explanation for our
observed attentional effect on motion-change detection could be that responses of MT neu-
rons to a sudden speed change occur earlier and are stronger when the change is attended to
as compared to unattended, thus increasing the ability of neurons to signal those changes.
Indeed, recently it has been shown that attention can enhance the amplitude of the motion-
change-evoked response, and shorten response latencies, in area MT of the macaque monkey
[51]. Another study also reported that the response of MT neurons to the motion-direction
change occurred at a shorter latency when the change was attended to as compared to unat-
tended [52]. Thus, attention can modulate such change-evoked neuronal activities and thereby
influence behavioral change-detection performance. One alternative explanation for the lower
detection threshold at attended relative to unattended locations is that attention decreases
response variability and thus improves the signal-to-noise ratio of the change-induced
response [53,54]. Furthermore, it could also be possible that the decisional or response bias
towards reporting a change in the cued stimulus leads to a reduction of the threshold at these
locations. In order to dissociate different factors from sensitivity change leading to the
observed attentional cueing effect, future studies will be mandatory to expand the current find-
ings and provide better understanding on the mechanisms underlying the attentional modula-
tion on speed-change perception.
A central question in the current study was whether the attentional modulation is homoge-
nous across eccentricities. Here we used the magnitude of speed-change detection threshold as
index and found a novel differential effect of eccentricity for exogeneous attention modulation.
For detecting acceleration, a larger exogenous cueing effect indexed by a lower threshold for
the cued relative to the uncued conditions was observed in the perifoveal region (5Ê) relative to
Attentional modulation of speed-change perception
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203024 August 30, 2018 10 / 17
the near-periphery (10Ê). While for perceiving deceleration, the pattern was reversed. To be
precise, a large exogenous cueing effect was demonstrated in the near-periphery (10Ê), and no
attentional modulation was observed in the perifoveal (5Ê) visual field. Interestingly, a recent
psychophysical study also observed a similar differential effect for speed change itself, namely
a higher foveal sensitivity (lower threshold) for detecting acceleration and a higher peripheral
sensitivity for deceleration [12]. Thus, we speculate that there are differences in the way exoge-
nous cueing effects are propagated across the visual field when the speed change is positive vs.
negative, and that attention has a larger modulatory effect at spatial locations that are more
sensitive to speed changes. This link to sensitivity may reflect the importance of the goal of
attention, which is to improve estimates of stimulus properties.
But, how can the observed eccentricity effect of exogenous attention modulation be under-
stood within a general frame taking an ecological perspective also into account? We would like
to submit a speculative hypothesis which is based on some previous observations. It has been
shown that the visual field shows inhomogeneity with respect to sensitivity, i.e. a central cone
of foveal and perifoveal vision which is surrounded by a plateau of relatively constant sensitiv-
ity in the peripheral visual field [30]; this structural inhomogeneity is observed also under sco-
topic adaptation [55] when the central cone of foveal and perifoveal vision becomes less
sensitive compared to the plateau region. This structural inhomogeneity is also reflected in
attentional control as has been demonstrated with the eccentricity effect of IOR which has
been proven to be a stable phenomenon [35,39,40].
In spite of this inhomogeneity there are at least three mechanisms that guarantee homoge-
neity of visual processing, i.e. constancy of brightness throughout the visual field for supra-
threshold targets under photopic adaptation conditions [55,56], a common time window of
approximately three seconds when the time course of perifoveal and peripheral inhibitory
effects of spatial attention is investigated [57], and on a more theoretical level the integration
of sensory processing and motor control as it is hypothesized with the reafference principle
[58]. As has been stated previously, within this theoretical account, different attentional fields
represent service operations for an optimal processing of visuo-motor actions. Homogeneity
of visual space is a necessary condition for an unbiased selection of potential visual targets;
inhomogeneity of visual space reflects different mechanisms that are necessary for efficient
action.
In the experiments on speed change perception reported here stimuli were presented at 5Ê
or 10Ê eccentricities of the visual field. Based on the observations mentioned above it can be
assumed that stimuli in these two stimulus positions are predominantly processed in two pro-
cessing streams, i.e. one with the emphasis in the retino-geniculo-striate projection system (5Ê
eccentricity), and one with the retino-colliculo-extrastriate projection system (10Ê eccentric-
ity), although the latter is located in the border region of the two projection systems. However,
as the experiments were done with a viewing distance of 57 cm (see methods), the visual axes
of the two eyes had to converge by some degrees and also accommodation of the lenses were
necessary which contribute in the near-distance space to size constancy [59]; these factors have
been shown to modulate perifoveal sensitivity, i.e. modulating the transition zone between the
central cone of foveal and perifoveal vision and the plateau region. Thus, we believe that in our
experiments we are dealing with operational principles emphasizing the two anatomically dif-
ferent processing streams.
Embedded in the above general frame, how to understand the differential exogenous atten-
tion modulation in perifoveal and near-peripheral regions for detecting acceleration and decel-
eration respectively? Here we would like to further submit an ecological account with respect
to attentional control in the visual space. As the perifoveal region and the periphery are typi-
cally involved in different cognitive functions, namely, object perception vs. spatial navigation,
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acceleration and deceleration of moving objects might trigger very different attentional pro-
cessing modes. In the condition of acceleration, the speeded moving target might mimic an
escaping prey being chased after. Therefore, a focused allocation of spatial attention is typically
triggered, no matter where the target is. As attention can facilitate perception at the attended
location, it is not surprising that we observed exogenous cueing effects at both perifoveal and
peripheral locations. But why the cueing effect is larger at perifoveal relative to peripheral loca-
tions? This might be related to the different ªattentional fieldsº in the visual field.
In research on the structural involvement of midbrain mechanisms in attentional control
the size of attentional fields at different locations in the visual field could be inferred [60]. In
those experiments the paradigm of central fatigue or habituation was employed when measur-
ing light-difference thresholds at different locations in the visual field. It has been shown that
continuous measurement of thresholds at one location results in habituation, i.e. the sensitivity
decreases substantially and it takes ca. 20 minutes or so for spontaneous recovery. As habitua-
tion can be observed after monocular stimulation also in the non-stimulated eye, the habitua-
tion must be of central origin reflecting fatigue at the cortical level, and one is not dealing with
retinal adaptation. The surprising effect reported by Singer and colleagues [60] is that habitua-
tion can be cancelled instantaneously if a mirror-symmetric position is stimulated. As sponta-
neous recovery takes a much longer time (20 minutes or so), an inter-hemispheric interaction
has to be assumed. As the instantaneous resetting of threshold occurs also when an area is
stimulated in a blind region (scotoma) of the visual field in patients who have suffered an
injury in striate cortex, it can be concluded that the interaction between the two hemispheres
takes place at the midbrain level [61]. In these experiments on resetting of thresholds it was
possible to determine the spatial extent of the resetting area. It turned out that the retinal areas
which contributed to such resetting were not limited to the exact retinal position possibly
reflecting the diameter of receptive fields, but they were much larger and could be defined as
"attentional fields". At 5Ê eccentricity the diameter of the attentional field is approximately 6Ê
visual angle; at 40Ê eccentricity it is approximately 20Ê visual angle. Thus, a gradual increase of
the size of attentional field from the perifoveal region to the periphery can be assumed.
Although acceleration condition in the present study may trigger similar focused allocation of
spatial attention to the cued location, the size of attentional field might be smaller for the 5Ê
relative to the 10Ê eccentricity, thus leading to stronger attention power at the less eccentric
location. As a consequence, a larger attention effect was observed for 5Ê relative to 10Ê
eccentricity.
In the condition of deceleration, which perhaps signals potential danger such as a predator
approaching us in a natural environment, we would like to propose that a divided attention
mode is more likely to be triggered. However, divided attention to both visual fields is only
possibly within a relatively small visual space such as within the perifoveal visual field and not
beyond. This may explain why we did not observe any attention effect for the 5Ê eccentricity in
the deceleration condition, since subjects' attention were equally distributed to both the cued
and the uncued locations without any attentional bias. Since for 10Ê eccentricity the divided
attention mode is presumably not possible and the subjects still have to activate the focused
allocation of attention, the observation of an attention effect, i.e., a lower speed change thresh-
old at the cued relative to the uncued location, is consistent with the activated attentional
mode being triggered in such condition, as we speculate from an ecological perspective.
Note, however, that the sign of speed change was designed as a between-subjects factor,
such that eccentricity effects observed in acceleration and deceleration conditions for the same
stimulus eccentricity are not directly comparable. Future work using a full within-subject
design will be particularly informative in disentangling this differential eccentricity effect of
involuntary attention with respect to positive and negative speed changes.
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Results from Exp 2 showed that endogenous attention also affects speed-change perception,
but that, unlike in exogenous attention, the effects do not vary with eccentricity in the range
measured. Directing endogenous attention via a foveal, informative cue to the target location
improved speed change detection by the same amount at the two eccentric locations. This
result suggests that top-down modulation is organized similarly in these regions. A recent
study that manipulated either exogenous or endogenous attention in foveal and perifoveal
locations (1Ê vs. 7Ê) has shown that exogenous attention had a larger cueing effect on reaction
times for the perifovea than for the fovea, whereas endogenous attention improved perfor-
mance at both eccentricities equally [62]. In a study by Yeshurun and colleagues [63] exoge-
nous attention improved performance in a texture segmentation task at far eccentricities and
impaired it at near eccentricities, whereas endogenous attention improved performance at all
measured eccentricities. Together with the present findings, the most immediate inference
appears to be that endogenous attention, being of top-down nature, can be consciously con-
trolled and evenly distributed over the visual field, whereas exogenous attention relies on more
hardwired, low-level mechanisms that operate differently in different regions of the central
visual field. A next step will be to find out whether the observed dissociation between accelera-
tion and deceleration for exogenous, but not for endogenous, attention holds up for other,
more peripheral locations in the visual field.
In summary, while there is ample evidence for eccentricity-dependent modulation of spatial
attention, the present study represents the first investigation of the attentional effects on
speed-change perception in different locations in the visual field. The results suggest that exog-
enous attentional modulation has differential effects between the perifoveal and near-periph-
eral regions of the visual field, whereas endogenous modulation is homogeneous within the
central 10Ê-radius field. Since these two types of attention have distinct effects on performance,
they are most likely mediated by different mechanisms.
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Does cue processing modulate inhibition of return
in a detection task?
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Abstract: While the abrupt onset of a peripheral visual cue usually leads to speeded responses to following targets at the cued relative to
other positions, responses are slowed if targets lag behind the cue by more than ~200 ms. This response delay is termed inhibition of
return (IOR) and has been considered as a mechanism to orient behavior toward novel areas. IOR has been found in both detection and
discrimination tasks with later onset in discrimination tasks, probably due to a higher processing demand. Here we examined whether the
processing demand of cues can modulate IOR in the detection task. The task to the peripheral cues, either color or gap cues, was passive
viewing in one session (single task) and discrimination in another session (dual task). The results showed that the time course of IOR was
resistant to the cue processing, while the magnitude of IOR was increased when the processing load became larger in the dual task rela-
tive to the single task. These results indicate that IOR in target detection is both reﬂexive in that its temporal dynamics remain invariant,
and ﬂexible in that its magnitude is modulated by task requirement.
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When a peripheral cue appears abruptly, responses to a
following target at cued compared to uncued locations are
facilitated when the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA)
between cue and target is short. However, an inhibitory
effect can be observed if the SOA exceeds ~200 ms. This
latter response delay has been termed as inhibition of
return (IOR), which is assumed to reduce the probability
of the reorienting behavior to previously visited spatial
areas and objects, thus facilitating visual search to non-
inspected targets (Klein, 1988, 2000; Ogawa, Takeda, &
Yagi, 2002). Since its ﬁrst report (Posner & Cohen,
1984), IOR has been consistently observed in detection
and localization tasks (Bao & Pöppel, 2007; Bao et al.,
2011, 2013; Bao, Zhou, & Fu, 2004; Fischer, Pratt, &
Neggers, 2003; Hunt & Kingstone, 2003; Klein, 2000;
Tanaka & Shimojo, 1996; Tassinari & Berlucchi, 1995;
Zhou, 2008). With some exceptions (Tanaka & Shimojo,
1996; Terry, Valdes, & Neill, 1994), behavioral studies
have also conﬁrmed the presence of IOR in discrimination
tasks, but often with delayed onset (Cheal, Chastain, &
Lyon, 1998; Lupiáñez, Milán, Tornay, Madrid, & Tudela,
1997; Lupiáñez & Milliken, 1999; Lupiáñez, Milliken,
Solano, Weaver, & Tipper, 2001; Pratt, 1995; Pratt &
Abrams, 1999).
© 2018 The Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
PsyCh Journal (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/pchj.253
The different time courses of IOR in detection and dis-
crimination tasks are explained by different task require-
ments on target processing (Klein, 2000; Klein, Castel, &
Pratt, 2006; Lupiáñez & Milliken, 1999; Lupiáñez et al.,
2001). It has been further shown that depth of cue proces-
sing can modulate the onset time of IOR in localization and
discrimination tasks (Gabay, Chica, Charras, Funes, &
Henik, 2012). However, there have been controversial evi-
dences on the susceptibility of IOR to perceptual and cogni-
tive inﬂuences from previous studies. On the one hand, IOR
in detection tasks is resistant to modulations by temporal
preparation (Milliken, Lupiáñez, Roberts, & Stevanovski,
2003) or cue predictability (Gabay & Henik, 2008); on the
other hand, it is sensitive to cue-target similarity and cue-
target overlap (Collie, Maruff, Yucel, Danckert, & Currie,
2000). Detection tasks, where only stimulus onset is pro-
cessed, and discrimination tasks, which require detailed anal-
ysis of stimulus features, may employ different mechanisms
(Srinivasan & Brown, 2006; Willis & Anderson, 1998).
Therefore, it is interesting to ask whether the cue processing
can also modulate IOR and its time course in detection tasks
as it does in discrimination tasks (Gabay et al., 2012). Here,
we addressed this issue by employing a detection task to tar-
gets while manipulating the cue processing demand by ask-
ing observers to either ignore or identify cue features. The
relevant feature of peripheral cues was color in one session
and orientation of a Landolt gap in another session. Our
results showed a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of cue processing
demand on the magnitude of IOR but not on its time course,
indicating that the development of IOR in target detection is
relatively reﬂexive but its magnitude is subject to the task
manipulation of cue processing.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four observers participated in the experiment
(11 females; age range: 18–38 years, median
age = 23.5 years), and all had normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity and normal color vision. All partici-
pants gave written informed consent before the experiments
and they received moderate rewards for their participation.
The experiments had been approved by the Committee for
Protecting Human and Animal Subjects in the School of
Psychological and Cognitive Sciences at Peking University
and were in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and procedure
All stimuli were generated by a PC running MATLAB 7.0
with Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997) and
were presented on a CRT monitor (Iiyama HM204DT, Vision-
Master Pro514) with a refresh rate of 100 Hz. The background
was set to black, and the ﬁxation cross (0.2 × 0.2) was set to
gray (Figure 1A). Each trial began with an 800-ms display of a
ﬁxation cross and two gray placeholders (square rings with a
size of 1 × 1) followed by a 40-ms presentation of a periph-
eral cue. In the COLOR condition, the peripheral cue was a
color change of one of the placeholders from gray to red or
green, while in the GAP condition, one of the placeholders
changed to a bright Landolt square ring with a 0.1 gap facing
upward or downward. After the offset of the peripheral cue,
there was an interval with variable durations (30, 60, 160, 310,
560, and 960 ms) in which only the ﬁxation mark and the
placeholders were presented, which was then followed by a yel-
low target disc (0.4 × 0.4) presented within one of the place-
holders until the observer responded. The target appeared with
equal likelihood within the same (cued) or the opposite
(uncued) placeholder as did the peripheral cue. Thus, the cue
did not convey any information about where the target would
appear. The placeholders were positioned symmetrically at 5
left and right of the ﬁxation cross.
Each observer ﬁnished two task sessions successively. The
ﬁrst task was to detect the occurrence of the target by pressing
a button using the left hand while ignoring the peripheral cue
(SINGLE task). The second task was to both detect the target
and discriminate the peripheral cue (DUAL task), where
observers ﬁrst made a quick response to the onset of the target
using the left hand, and then judged the color in the COLOR
condition or the gap position in the GAP condition of the
peripheral cue by pressing one of two buttons using the right
hand, in a manner counterbalanced across observers. In catch
trials in each condition of each task, no target was presented
and observers were instructed to withhold their responses, and
the trial ended automatically after 1000 ms. A warning beep
(1000 Hz) appeared for 100 ms whenever observers pressed
the button before the target onset or during the catch trial. The
inter-trial interval was randomly set to 1000–1400 ms.
Observers were seated in front of the screen with head
on a chin rest and with a viewing distance of 57 cm. Each
task session contained one block of COLOR cue and one
block of GAP cue in an order counterbalanced across
observers. Each block consisted of 192 target trials and
32 catch trials in random sequence. At the beginning of
each block, observers performed 30–40 practice trials to
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get familiar with the task. Observers were instructed to ﬁx-
ate on the central cross during the task and take a short
break after every 56 trials.
Results
Trials with response times (RTs) outside of 2 standard
deviations of the mean or with physiologically impossible
RTs (<120 ms) were excluded from further analysis. These
trials accounted for 5.4% of the data. All observers suc-
cessfully withheld their responses in catch trials of different
tasks with different cue types (false alarm rate < 16%)
except three males, whose data were thus excluded from
further statistical analysis.1 Accuracy of cue discrimination
in the COLOR and GAP conditions in the DUAL task is
shown in Figure 1B. Mean RTs were then calculated for
each condition in each task, which are illustrated in
Figure 2. The IOR effect (RT at cued location − RT at
Figure 2. Mean response times (RTs) for cued
(solid lines) and uncued (dashed lines) trials across
stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) for different cue-
processing conditions: (A) SINGLE (squares) and
DUAL (triangles) tasks with COLOR cues; and
(B) SINGLE (squares) and DUAL (triangles) tasks
with GAP cues.
Figure 1. Illustration of the experimental procedure and performances of cue discrimination. (A) Following the display of a ﬁxation cross and place-
holders, a peripheral cue was presented (a red or green square ring in the COLOR condition and a Landolt square with a gap facing upward or downward in
the GAP condition). After a variable interval, a yellow disc appeared in one of the placeholders until response. In SINGLE task, observers responded to the
onset of the target; in DUAL task, observers ﬁrst detected the target and then judged the color or the gap position of the cue. (B) Accuracy of cue discrimi-
nation in COLOR and GAP conditions in DUAL task. The performance was signiﬁcantly better in the COLOR than in the GAP condition. ***p < .005.
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uncued location) for each experimental condition is shown
in Table 1.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with factors of task
(SINGLE and DUAL), cue type (COLOR and GAP), cue
validity (cued and uncued), and SOA (70, 100, 200, 350,
600, and 1000 ms) was performed on the RT data.2 There
was a main effect of task, F(1, 20) = 60.8, p < .001,
η2p¼ :75, indicating faster responses in the SINGLE com-
pared to DUAL tasks; a main effect of cue validity,
F(1, 20) = 9.9, p < .01, η2p¼ :33, revealing longer RTs for
cued than uncued targets (IOR effect); and a main effect of
SOA, F(2.2, 44.0) = 52.0, p < .001, η2p¼ :72, showing a
gradual decrease of RT with SOA. Consistent with previ-
ous ﬁndings of IOR (Klein, 2000; Tassinari & Berlucchi,
1995), cue validity interacted with SOA with an increased
RT for cued relative to uncued targets at longer SOAs,
F(5, 100) = 33.3, p < .001, η2p¼ :63 (Figure 2). The
change of RT along SOA was also affected by cue type
and task, as indicated by interactions of Cue Type × SOA,
F(5, 100) = 3.3, p < .01, η2p¼ :14; Task × SOA,
F(2.2, 44.9) = 13.2, p < .001, η2p¼ :40; and Cue Type ×
Task × SOA, F(5, 100) = 6.9, p < .001, η2p¼ :26. More
interestingly, the interaction between task and cue-validity
reached signiﬁcance, F(1, 20) = 7.6, p < .05, η2p¼ :28,
showing that the increased RT to cued compared to uncued
targets was larger in the DUAL relative to SINGLE task.
There was also a triple interaction among cue type, cue
validity, and SOA, F(5, 100) = 2.7, p < .05,η2p¼ :12, sug-
gesting that the cueing effect along SOA appeared different
between COLOR and GAP cue conditions. To further clar-
ify this triple interaction, we ﬁrst pooled data from SIN-
GLE and DUAL tasks and then calculated cueing effect by
subtracting RT to cued targets from RT to uncued targets
for different cue type and SOA conditions. Paired-samples
t tests revealed signiﬁcantly different cueing effects
between COLOR and GAP conditions at short SOA of
100 ms, t(20) = 4.1, p < .005, but not at other SOAs
(ps > .2), indicating that the cue type can modulate the
facilitatory effect at short SOAs but not IOR at longer
SOAs. These analyses suggest that cue processing can
modulate the magnitude of IOR but has little inﬂuence on
the onset time of IOR (around 200–350 ms, Figure 2).
We further examined the details of this modulation by
dividing the data into three groups: short SOAs (70 and
100 ms), median SOAs (200 and 350 ms), and long SOAs
(600 and 1000 ms). It is obvious in Figure 2 that the cueing
effect for short SOAs is more facilitative, that for long
SOAs is inhibitory, and that for median SOAs reﬂects the
transition from facilitation to inhibition. Separate ANOVAs
were then conducted on three SOA groups with factors of
task, cue type, cue validity, and SOA. For short SOAs,
Task × Cue Validity, F(1, 20) = 4.4, p < .05, η2p¼ :18,
Cue Type × Cue Validity, F(1, 20) = 23.3, p < .001,
η2p¼ :54, and Task × Cue Type × Cue Validity,
F(1, 20) = 4.4, p < .05, η2p¼ :18, reached signiﬁcance, and
post-hoc t tests revealed clear facilitation in the COLOR
and GAP conditions with SINGLE task for both SOAs
(ps < .05) and in the GAP condition with DUAL task for
SOA of 100 ms (p < .005) but neither facilitation nor inhi-
bition in the COLOR condition with DUAL task (ps > .1).
For long SOAs, only task interacted with cue validity,
F(1, 20) = 5.0, p < .05, η2p¼ :20, indicating larger inhibi-
tory effect (IOR) in the DUAL relative to the SINGLE task.
Finally, for median SOAs, no signiﬁcant interaction involv-
ing cue validity was found except the interaction of Cue
Validity × SOA, F(1, 20) = 11.7, p < .005, η2p¼ :37,
which demonstrated the transition of cueing effect from
facilitation to inhibition.
It is worth noting that the increase of processing demand
from SINGLE task (passive viewing) to DUAL task (dis-
crimination) is larger for Gap cues than for COLOR cues,
which could be explained by the pre-attentive nature of
color discrimination (Treisman, 1988; Treisman & Gelade,
1980) and the resource-dependent nature of gap judgment
(Montagna, Pestilli, & Carrasco, 2009; Woodman & Luck,
1999). Our analysis of discrimination accuracies of periph-
eral cues also supported this discrepancy with respect to
the processing demand in that lower performance values
were obtained for GAP cues compared to COLOR cues
Table 1
Mean IOR (RTcued − RTuncued) Effect (ms) for Each Experimental
Condition
SOA
(ms)
Single task Dual task
Color
condition
Gap
condition
Color
condition
Gap
condition
70 −18 (5) −20 (4) 3 (5) −6 (8)
100 −13 (6) −22 (4) 6 (9) −30 (8)
200 −4 (5) −5 (4) 4 (8) −3 (7)
350 4 (5) 10 (4) 15 (8) 10 (5)
600 21 (7) 26 (5) 39 (7) 30 (7)
1000 21 (5) 18 (5) 30 (8) 29 (9)
Note. Standard errors of means are depicted in parentheses. IOR = inhibition of
return; RT = response time; SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony.
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(Figure 1B). However, IOR magnitude was modulated by
task (passive viewing vs. discrimination) instead of cue
type (COLOR vs. GAP cues) in the current study, which
might be explained by the processing-demand increase
from COLOR discrimination to GAP judgment being not
as strong as that from the SINGLE to DUAL tasks.
Discussion
By manipulating the task for the peripheral cues (passive
viewing vs. discrimination) and their relevant features
(color vs. gap position), the current study provided direct
evidence for the relationship between the cueing effect and
the cue processing demand. The results showed clear IOR
in both the tasks with and without judgment of peripheral
cues, as well as in both the conditions with color and gap
cues, replicating previous ﬁndings (Gabay et al., 2012;
Klein, 2000; Lupiáñez et al., 2001; Tassinari & Berlucchi,
1995). More interestingly, the processing level of cues
(e.g., discrimination vs. passive viewing) modulated the
magnitude of IOR but not its time course, contrary to pre-
dictions from previous observations (Gabay et al., 2012;
Klein, 2000). Although a separate analysis revealed better
discrimination performance for color cues than that for gap
cues in the DUAL task, the difference of processing
demands between judgments of color and gap position of
cues was not as big as that between passive viewing and
discrimination of cues to evoke signiﬁcantly larger IOR in
the GAP than in the COLOR conditions. Nevertheless, our
results clearly demonstrate that the time course of IOR in
target detection elicited by the abrupt onset of peripheral
cues happens relatively reﬂexively and is difﬁcult to be
altered unlike the magnitude of IOR under situations with
different cue processing levels. In the current study, with
different tasks to cues and targets, the competition
decreased and the RT cost would be alleviated or even
reversed by attentional effect leading to facilitation
(Figure 2). Also noticed in Figure 2 is the lack of facilita-
tion at short SOAs for COLOR cue with DUAL task,
which is probably due to confusion/cost by the color
dimension of both cue (red or green) and target (yellow)
with the task requirement of judging cue color. With a gap
cue, there was less overlap between the features of cue and
target and hence less cost, leading to manifest facilitation
effect at short SOAs both in SINGLE and DUAL tasks.
Compared to detection tasks, IOR in discrimination tasks
has been observed to be delayed (Cheal et al., 1998;
Lupiáñez & Milliken, 1999; Lupiáñez et al., 1997, 2001;
Pratt, 1995; Pratt & Abrams, 1999). Attentional dwell time
(Klein, 2000), object integration window (Lupiáñez & Milli-
ken, 1999; Lupiáñez et al., 2001), and the association between
the locus coeruleus–norepinephrine system and selective
attention (Gabay et al., 2012) have been attributed to the
delayed onset of IOR in discrimination tasks, and suggest that
the processing level of cues can modulate the time course of
IOR (Gabay et al., 2012). However, we did not ﬁnd similar
modulation of the onset time of IOR by cue processing
demand in the detection task, which was employed in the ﬁrst
demonstration of IOR (Posner & Cohen, 1984) and has been
widely examined in more recent studies (Bao et al., 2011;
Fischer et al., 2003; Hunt & Kingstone, 2003; Klein, 2000;
Tassinari & Berlucchi, 1995). The lack of a cue processing
effect on the time course of IOR in detection tasks likely
reﬂects different attentional mechanisms involved in detecting
and discriminating targets. As documented for decades, differ-
ent aspects of a visual stimulus, such as luminance, form, and
color, are processed by separate, parallel neural channels,
from retina to higher visual cortical areas (Kaplan, 2004; Liv-
ingstone & Hubel, 1988). Such independent visual pathways
could also activate different attentional mechanisms (Morrone,
Denti, & Spinelli, 2002), modulating the neural activities in
different regions of the cortex that are specialized for proces-
sing the selected features (Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shul-
man, & Petersen, 1991). With respect to the signal
processing, transient versus sustained attentional mechanisms
have been conceptualized for some time (Jonides, 1981;
Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989). Transient onset signals of
stimuli are critical in target detection, whereas sustained sig-
nals encoding task-relevant features are important in target
discrimination. This different emphasis of signal processing,
homologous to the information processing along magnocellu-
lar and parvocellular pathways of the primate visual system
(Kaplan, 2004), may also activate separate attentional orient-
ing systems with different levels of reﬂexiveness. It is highly
possible that target detection and target discrimination are
modulated by attentional systems activated by transient and
sustained signals, respectively, regardless of the task on cue
being detection or discrimination. As a support for the disso-
ciation of target detection and discrimination, IOR in detec-
tion tasks has been observed to be reﬂexive and not
modulated by higher volitional processes, such as temporal
preparation (Milliken et al., 2003) or cue predictability
(Gabay & Henik, 2008). The absence of inﬂuence on the time
course of IOR in the current study is also well in line with
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those observations, which are in contrast to the susceptibility
of IOR in discrimination tasks inﬂuenced by temporal expec-
tancy (Gabay & Henik, 2010) and cue processing level
(Gabay et al., 2012). These ﬁndings together may reveal the
distinct mechanisms responsible for IOR, at least for its time
course, in detection and discrimination tasks, with the former
being reﬂexive and the latter being subject to modulation. It
will be an interesting topic to unveil the detailed neural path-
ways involved in IOR effect in detection and discrimination
tasks in future studies.
The magnitude of IOR in the current study was indeed
modulated by task requirement on peripheral cues, echoing
previous ﬁndings that cue target similarity and cue target
overlap could affect IOR in detection tasks (Collie et al.,
2000). When a cue needs deeper processing, for example, in
the task of discrimination compared to detection, more
resources of spatial attention are allocated to the cue (Chen
et al., 2008), which in turn increases the IOR effect when
attention ﬁnally moves away from the cued position at long
SOAs. In this regard, another dissociation of mechanisms
underlying the IOR effect in detection tasks is hypothesized
besides the separate IOR mechanisms for target detection
and discrimination. One is for controlling the amount of
attentional resources and is subject to the modulation by per-
ceptual load or perceptual processing demand; the other is
responsible for attentional allocation in time and is relatively
reﬂexive. Although the dependence of IOR on cue target
similarity and cue target overlap can also be explained by an
altered IOR time course in detection tasks (Collie et al.,
2000), our results conﬁrmed the dissociated effects of cue
processing on the magnitude and on the time course of IOR.
Taken together, the current study provides evidence that
the task demand of a peripheral cue has little effect on the
onset of IOR but can profoundly modulate the magnitude
of IOR. We believe it is the ﬁrst study in which the inﬂu-
ence of cue processing on IOR in a detection task has been
directly measured by manipulating the processing demand
of the cue. The result has important theoretical implications
and points to a dissociation of attentional mechanisms for
target detection and discrimination as well as a disentangle-
ment of mechanisms controlling attentional resources and
attentional allocation in time.
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Abstract Previous studies have shown that music is a
powerful means to convey affective states, but it remains
unclear whether and how social context shape the intensity
and quality of emotions perceived in music. Using a
within-subject design, we studied this question in two
experimental settings, i.e. when subjects were alone versus
in company of others without direct social interaction or
feedback. Non-vocal musical excerpts of the emotional
qualities happiness or sadness were rated on arousal and
valence dimensions. We found evidence for an amplifica-
tion of perceived emotion in the solitary listening condi-
tion, i.e. happy music was rated as happier and more
arousing when nobody else was around and, in an analo-
gous manner, sad music was perceived as sadder. This
difference might be explained by a shift of attention in the
presence of others. The observed interaction of perceived
emotion and social context did not differ for stimuli of
different cultural origin.
Keywords Emotion  Music perception  Social context 
Attention  Sadness  Happiness
Introduction
Music has often been referred to as the ‘‘language of
emotion’’, and some empirical studies have reported that
listeners make similar ratings of musically expressed
emotions, thus suggesting that music conveys emotional
meaning (Gabrielsson and Juslin 1996; Juslin and Sloboda
2010; Park et al. 2014, 2015). Basic emotions like happi-
ness or sadness in a piece of music are conveyed by means
of acoustic and musical features (Gabrielsson and Lind-
stro¨m 2010) such as pitch level (e.g. a higher pitch for
expressing joy), tempo (e.g. a slower tempo being related
to sadness), or tone (e.g. ascending tones for a more
pleasing experience). These observations suggest that
emotional meaning of music is partly based on anthropo-
logical universals, which are shared across cultures and
presumably controlled by common temporal mechanisms
(Bao et al. 2015; Po¨ppel 1989).
Many studies using categorical or scalar measurements
emphasize a distinction between one’s perception of
musical emotion and the emotion evoked by music (Gab-
rielsson 2002; Scherer and Coutinho 2013). Perceived
emotion is the emotion recognized in the music, thus cor-
responding to an external locus (Evans and Schubert 2008),
whereas induced emotion (also known as felt emotion) is
the emotion experienced by the listener, thus corresponding
to an internal locus. Although perceived and felt emotions
coincide in most cases (Evans and Schubert 2008; Schubert
2013), they may differ in certain circumstances. In this
regard, listeners may sometimes experience more positive
or even pleasant than negative emotions when listening to
sad-sounding music (e.g. nostalgia, tenderness, wonder,
peacefulness, and transcendence; see Garrido 2017;
Kawakami et al. 2014; Taruffi and Koelsch 2014; Sachs
et al. 2015; Schubert 2016). Perceived emotions refer to a
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rather objective apperception, while felt emotions are more
relevant to the subjective nature of personal experience
with music (Park et al. 2013). We chose to investigate
perceived emotions in music rather than felt emotions for
two reasons. The first is that perceived emotions are less
influenced than felt emotions by short-term factors (Slo-
boda 1991); the second is that responses of perceived
emotion are more consistent than responses of felt emotion
(Eerola and Vuoskoski 2013; Gabrielsson and Juslin 1996).
Perceived musical emotion is not entirely encapsulated
within a musical structure. The experience of music, like
aesthetic experiences in general, is based on a comple-
mentarity of ‘‘bottom-up’’ sensory information processing
and ‘‘top-down’’ mechanisms, which are shaped and
modulated by memory (Silveira et al. 2012), expectations
(Silveira et al. 2014, 2015), and situational factors like the
social context. Most of the time, people are exposed to
music in the company of others. Being surrounded by
others is common during various activities of every day’s
life, e.g. at work, at a store, and in public transportation.
The presence of others not necessarily involves social
interaction and connection. With regard to music listening,
there are different types of group settings, e.g. the presence
of others while listening together with direct interaction,
the presence of others while listening together without
direct interaction (e.g. music in public), and the presence of
others without listening together and without direct inter-
action (e.g. music on headphones in public). The present
study was designed to mimic situations of the second case;
these situations are characterized by an engagement in
similar activities without direct or explicit interaction.
While some experiments in social psychology provide
theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence to explain
how people affect and influence one another in various
domains (e.g. Allport 1985; Cialdini and Goldstein 2004;
Echterhoff et al. 2009; Zajonc 1965), group-level phe-
nomena of an individual’s perception of musical emotion
are still unclear. Previous research has only been con-
ducted on felt musical emotions, showing that the expe-
rience of music does differ when it is heard privately
versus in a group setting, in particular with regard to
valence (Juslin et al. 2008, Taruffi and Koelsch 2014),
arousal (Egermann et al. 2011), and intensity (Gabrielsson
and Wik 2003; Liljestro¨m et al. 2013). Also social context
has been found to take influence on arousal and valence
dimensions of induced emotions. Social feedback, i.e.
positive or negative evaluations of the music by others,
led to upward or downward manipulation of appraisals
(Egermann et al. 2009). Given that perception and evo-
cation of emotion are interconnected processes, social
context may also affect perceived emotion. Thus, the
current study aims at a deeper understanding of whether
and how social context affects the perception of musically
expressed emotions.
Emotions can be defined in a two-dimensional space by
the independent axes valence, i.e. happy–sad continuum,
and arousal, i.e. excited–relaxed continuum (Russell 1980;
Russell and Barrett 1999). In the past two decades, about
one-third of music and emotion studies have used a
dimensional model (Eerola and Vuoskoski 2013). While
the discrete emotional space has shown to be too limited to
fully capture the complexity of emotional reactions to
music (Larsen and Stastny 2011), the validity of the two-
dimensional representation of emotions in music has been
confirmed in many studies (Juslin and Sloboda 2001;
Zentner et al. 2008). We therefore used a self-report
measure of valence and arousal while listeners heard
musical excerpts that represent one of two emotions,
respectively (happiness and sadness). Deploying a valence
dimension, we aimed at investigating whether the per-
ceived quality of musical emotion is modulated in a social
context. We tested two alternative hypotheses. In case
subjects rate happy music happier and sad music less sad in
one of the conditions, i.e. valence-ratings are generally
more positive, this result would suggest that listening to
music in a particular social context shifts people’s per-
ceptions of musically expressed emotions to more pleas-
antness. However, if participants report that happy music
sounds happier and sad music sadder in a certain condition,
i.e. ratings are closer to the poles on the valence dimension,
this result would indicate that this setting amplifies per-
ceived emotions in music.
Music perception is not only embedded in a proximal
social context, but also in the context of culture. There is
evidence for cultural variations in music perception, in
particular with regard to pleasantness ratings for consonant
and dissonant note constellations (McDermott et al. 2016).
Besides, particularly prevalence as well as appreciation of
sad music is not given in all cultures. It has previously been
found in cross-cultural studies that some basic emotions in
music appear to be universally perceived in music from a
different culture, including joy and sadness (Balkwill and
Thompson 1999; Balkwill et al. 2004; Fritz et al. 2009).
These comparisons use a discrete model of emotion in
music, yet a within-subject comparison of perceived
emotion in music from ones own or a different culture
using a dimensional model of affect has not yet been
studied. Thus, we selected musical stimuli from two dif-
ferent cultures, i.e. Western and Eastern, to explore asso-
ciations or dissociations in the perception of emotions
expressed by music from one’s own or a different culture.
This will give further insights into anthropological uni-
versals and cultural specifics (Bao and Po¨ppel 2012)
underlying perception of emotions in music.
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Methods
Participants
Sixteen Chinese students (7 males, mean age = 24.1 years,
SD = 3.4 years, age range = 18–31 years) of Peking
University, Beijing, China, participated in the experiment
after giving written informed consent. All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, were right-
handed, and reported to have normal hearing. In order to
minimize the confounding effect from musical education
(Bigand et al. 2005), we defined previous formal musical
training or art expertise as exclusion criteria. To keep
differences between subjects to a minimum, we also
defined the preference for a specific music genre as an
exclusion criterion.
Materials and Apparatus
Eighty musical excerpts of 30 s each (40 traditional Chi-
nese music pieces and 40 Western classical music pieces)
served as experimental stimuli. All excerpts were taken
from non-vocal music, and music genres were kept con-
sistent. This choice was based on previous research, which
suggested that musical emotions may differ across genres
due to their inherent musical differences (Kreutz et al.
2007). Besides, lyrics may add some semantic meaning for
perceived emotion in music. The focus on classical music
serves the purpose of comparability as this is the genre
predominantly used in previous studies. All musical
excerpts were selected by the authors in consultation with
an expert musicologist. They were tested in a pre-study on
a 9-point Likert scale regarding valence (from 1 = sad to
9 = happy), arousal (from 1 = calm to 9 = excited),
familiarity (from 1 = unfamiliar to 9 = familiar), and
aesthetic appeal (from 1 = not aesthetically pleasing to
9 = aesthetically pleasing). Fifteen subjects (6 males,
mean age = 22.7 years, SD = 2.0 years, age ran-
ge = 19–26 years) participated in the pre-study. Stimuli
were selected based on mean ratings of valence and were
categorized into two emotional qualities: happiness
(M = 6.40, SD = 0.68) and sadness (M = 4.08,
SD = 0.71). Selection criterion for stimuli was a mean
rating within a confidence interval (95%) established for
the particular type of emotion. We avoided selecting well-
known pieces as well as pieces of high social preference to
eliminate the possible confound from personal memory
(see Table 1 for a list of selected musical excerpts’ mean
ratings and standard deviations associated with those
means).
The musical stimuli were played on a PC (DELL Vos-
tro420) and presented via Harman-Kardon multimedia
speakers at a comfortable volume level that was kept
constant between all participants.
Procedure
All participants listened to the 80 music excerpts in a
solitary and a group setting. Thus, the study was conducted
in two testing sessions at different days. Condition order
was randomized and counterbalanced across participants,
i.e. half of the participants came in for the solitary session
first and the other half for the group session. Also the
presentation order of the musical excerpts was randomized
for both the solitary and the group listening conditions for
each participant.
In the solitary listening condition, participants sat 1.4 m
in front of a pair of loudspeakers. During the presentation
of stimuli, participants were instructed to listen carefully to
the music. After each excerpt, participants assigned ratings
on a 9-point Likert scale for valence from one (completely
sad) to nine (completely happy), and for arousal from one
(completely calm) to nine (completely excited). The
increment of the scale was 0.5. Participants were asked
‘‘How would you describe the emotional content of the
music itself?’’. They were given instructions to make an
assessment of the emotions expressed by the music, rather
than the emotion felt by themselves, i.e. ‘‘How HAPPY/
SAD did the music SOUND?’’, rather than ‘‘How HAPPY/
SAD did the music make YOU feel?’’. There was no time
limitation for evaluating the stimuli. In the group listening
condition, participants were seated in a semicircle facing
forward. This allowed each of them to be quite aware of the
other’s presence without enabling them to communicate
with each other (i.e. visually, verbally, or by seeing the
other’s ratings). This setting was chosen to prevent direct
social interaction and feedback that is known to influence
music perception (Egermann et al. 2009). The procedure
was kept constant with the solitary condition, except of a
fixed inter-stimulus interval of 40 s. Participants also made
Table 1 Means and standard
deviations for stimuli selected
based on pretest ratings for each
music type and cultural style
Cultural style Music type Valence value Arousal value Aesthetic value Familiar value
Eastern Happy 6.43 (0.69) 6.06 (0.61) 6.14 (0.76) 4.97 (0.93)
Sad 4.05 (0.57) 3.87 (0.63) 6.22 (0.77) 4.99 (0.78)
Western Happy 6.38 (0.68) 6.13 (0.74) 6.54 (0.61) 4.51 (0.51)
Sad 4.12 (0.86) 5.02 (0.96) 6.21 (1.06) 4.35 (0.67)
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the same set of interpersonal ratings as in solitary listening
condition.
Data analysis
We conducted a 2 9 2 9 2 repeated measures ANOVA
with the three independent variables: music type (happy vs.
sad), social context (solitary vs. group), and cultural style
(Chinese vs. Western). The dependent variables of interest
were ratings of arousal and valance given by participants
after the presentation of each music excerpt. The descrip-
tive data analysis and ANOVA were performed using SPSS
for Windows (version 21.0).
Results
The three-way ANOVA on valence-ratings revealed a
significant main effect for music type, F(1,15) = 74.99,
p\ .001, g2p ¼ 0:83, and a significant interaction between
music type and social context, F(1,15) = 9.32, p\ .001,
g2p ¼ 0:38. Further analyses using Bonferroni procedure
indicate that mean scores on the valence dimension were
higher during the solitary condition (M = 6.14,
SE = 0.143) compared to the group condition (M = 5.63,
SE = 0.195, p = 0.019) for happy musical excerpts. For
sad music, a significantly lower mean score was observed
for solitary listening (M = 3.99, SE = 0.148) relative to
group listening (M = 4.32, SE = 0.181, p = 0.025) (see
Fig. 1a). There was also a significant interaction between
music type and cultural style, F(1,15) = 9.32, p\ .001,
g2p ¼ 0:305. Participants tended to give higher scores to
Chinese happy music (M = 6.01, SE = 0.168) compared
to Western happy music (M = 5.76, SE = 0.141,
p = 0.070), and lower scores to Chinese sad music
(M = 3.99, SE = 0.187) compared to Western sad music
(M = 4.32, SE = 0.154, p = 0.063); however, those con-
trasts only reached marginal significance levels (Fig. 1b).
The mean arousal-ratings were analysed using a
2 9 292 repeated measures ANOVA. Critically, we
observed a significant interaction between music type and
social context, F(1,15) = 5.65, p = 0.031, g2p ¼ 0:27.
Further analyses to decompose this significant two-way
interaction displayed that the arousal-ratings for happy
music were significantly higher during the solitary condi-
tion (M = 6.30, SE = 0.119) as compared to the group
setting (M = 5.90, SE = 0.161, p = 0.007) (Fig. 2a).
There was no significant difference between solitary and
group listening for sad music (M(solitary) = 4.76,
SE(solitary) = 0.165; M(group) = 4.90, SE(group) =
0.182, p = 0.161). There was a significant main effect for
music type, F(1,15) = 25.66, p\ .001, g2p ¼ 0:63, and
cultural style, F(1,15) = 47.64, p\ .001, g2p ¼ 0:76.
These two factors significantly interacted with each other,
F(1,15) = 69.50, p\ .001, g2p ¼ 0:82. Further analysis
Fig. 1 a Mean valence-ratings
for happy and sad music across
listening situations (solitary vs.
group); b Mean valence-ratings
for happy and sad music from
different cultural styles (Eastern
vs. Western). Note. Asterisks
indicate significant effects:
*\.05
Fig. 2 a Mean arousal-ratings
for happy and sad music across
listening situations (solitary vs.
group); b Mean arousal-ratings
for happy and sad music from
different cultural styles (Eastern
vs. Western). Note. Asterisks
indicate significant effects:
**\.01; ***\.001
Cogn Process
123
showed that the ratings of perceived arousal were higher in
Chinese music (M = 6.24, SE = 0.142) compared to
Western music (M = 5.85, SE = 0.124) for happy musical
excerpts (p = 0.006). When participants listened to the sad
music, perceived arousal was lower in Chinese music
(M = 4.36, SE = 0.175) relative to Western music
(M = 5.29, SE = 0.149, p\ .001) (see Fig. 2b).
Discussion
In the current study, we investigated the effect of social
context on the perception of musically expressed emotions.
Our results support the notion that social settings as defined
by the mere presence of others alter the perceived emotion,
which is conveyed by music. More specifically, in terms of
valence, happy music was rated less joyful and less
arousing when experienced in a group setting. For sad
music, listeners perceived musical excerpts as less sad in
the presence of others. While limited in generalizability
with regard to music genres, cultural samples, and type of
group setting, the results suggest that perception of both
musical valence and arousal is subject to social influences.
Participants converged on a polarized pattern towards
happy for happy music and towards sad for sad music
during the solitary listening condition. The observations
support the hypothesis that listening to music privately
amplifies perceived emotional valence and do not support
the alternative hypothesis that solitary listening shifts those
perceptions positively in that happy pieces of music are
experienced as more happy and sad pieces as less sad. The
design of our study suggests that these changes in per-
ceived emotion are not based upon social feedback, i.e. not
the valence that others attribute to the musical piece
modulates the subject’s appraisal of emotional valence.
This provides a new perspective on social effects when
evaluating musically expressed emotions, indicating that
the mere presence of others might generally diminish the
quality of perceived musical emotion.
With regard to arousal, our results show that the emotion
perceived in happy music was rated as more arousing when
heard alone. For sad music, no significant differences were
found between the two conditions for the arousal-ratings.
This indicates that arousal levels perceived in music, i.e.
how exciting or relaxing a piece of music is perceived, are
more stable for sad than happy music. Eventually, certain
musical characteristics of sad music, e.g. tempo or loud-
ness, are related to this phenomenon; however, this inter-
pretation remains speculative and needs further testing.
One possible explanation for the present results is that
solitary and group settings facilitate different modes of
attention. It might be assumed that self-focused attention
has a larger scope to operate on evaluations of musical
emotions in a solitary listening condition. Complementar-
ily, in a group setting, attention is additionally focused on
the presence of others. Therefore, being alone might give
the listener a better opportunity to turn focus inwards,
given that there is no division of attentional resources
between processing the thoughts and feelings of oneself
and others. In line with this, solitude could provide a
suitable environment for reflecting on musical emotion.
Previously, self-focused attention has been used to explain
modulations of felt musical emotions (Scheier and Carver
1977, Ziv 2004) within a culturally imprinted frame
(Chentsova-dutton and Tsai 2010). Given that attention and
perception are bidirectionally interconnected in bottom-up
and top-down processes as represented in brain activations
(Vuilleumier 2005), we assume that a shift of attention
might be underlying modulations of perceived musical
emotion. In this regard, it is possible that the group setting
diminishes attention not only to the self, but also to the
music. The mode of attention when alone allows us to enter
more deeply into the idiosyncratic world when exploring
perceived emotions, leading to amplified ratings of musi-
cally expressed emotions with happy music appearing
more happy and sad music appearing more sad. Future
research is needed to clarify whether the relation of
affective perception and attentional focus explains the
modulation of rating scores by social context.
It is worth noting that the participants did not receive
any explicit social feedback from group members in our
experimental setting. Thus, they did not know about the
ratings given by other study participants, i.e. any form of
social feedback that might influence the evaluation of
stimuli, nor were they encouraged to think and feel about
one another, which may increase the feeling of together-
ness and render the experienced stimulus more intense
(Egermann et al. 2009; Salganik et al. 2006). The relatively
little information regarding the others may make it less
likely that direct social appraisal took place. We expect that
social influence on the perception of musical emotions in a
natural group music listening setting (such as a live con-
cert) is far stronger than in our study, because visual input
is more direct and explicit, e.g. by rhythmic body move-
ments. Yet, our findings nevertheless suggest that a social
context defined as the presence of others listening to the
same music without direct interaction exerts an effect on
the emotions perceived in music. This might be understood
with regard to the notion of embodied cognition (see for an
overview Wilson 2002), i.e. the way the body is situated in
a certain situation exerts effects on cognition, perception,
and emotion. This highlights the role of the body, not only
in affective responses towards a musical piece, but also in
decoding the emotional content of it. A methodological
shortcoming of the experimental manipulation is the lack
of time limitation in the solitary listening condition, which
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might have led to differential decision-making processes.
Yet, we consider a time window of 40 s in the group
condition long enough to potentially enable reasoning,
changes, and adjustments in ratings.
A significant interaction between music type (happy or
sad) and cultural style (Western or Eastern) was only
observed for the arousal dimension. With participants of
our study being born and raised in an Eastern culture, this
indicates that listeners’ arousal-ratings displayed a polar-
ized pattern corresponding to their own dominant cultural
background. Perceived arousal was higher for happy music
and lower for sad music of the own compared to a different
culture. While for sad music this effect might be con-
founded by the selected stimulus material (see Table 1), at
least for happy music this effect might be indicative of
cultural imprinting. The classification of emotions in joyful
or sad was found to marginally differ for musical pieces of
different cultures: perception of positive and negative
affective qualities in music was amplified for pieces of
one’s own culture. While both familiarity and preference of
the specific musical excerpts were controlled in our
experiment, it might be that these interactions are related to
familiarity with music of one’s own culture in general.
Interestingly, however, there was neither a two-way inter-
action between cultural style of the musical excerpts and
our experimental manipulation (solitary or group listening)
nor a three-way interaction between cultural style, music
type, and experimental manipulation. Thus, the effect of
social context on perceived emotions in music is similar for
musical excerpts from different cultures.
Given that communication of emotional expression in
music may transcend cultural boundaries (Balkwill and
Thompson 1999; Fritz et al. 2009), it is reasonable to argue
that the categorization of basic emotions (such as happy or
sad) applies in a similar manner to musical expressions
from different cultures. This indicates an understanding of
emotions communicated by acoustic and musical features,
which is universal, but it still leaves room for differences in
perceived emotional intensity. In our study, cultural con-
text is represented in the stimulus material, and not in
variations of cultural group settings. Due to cultural dif-
ferences in social behaviour, our results cannot be gener-
alized to other cultural groups. Future cross-cultural
investigations will be mandatory to expand these prelimi-
nary findings and further test anthropological universals as
well as cultural specifics in musical emotion perception.
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Western and Chinese artists have different traditions in representing the world in
their paintings. While Western artists start since the Renaissance to represent the
world with a central perspective and focus on salient objects in a scene, Chinese
artists concentrate on context information in their paintings, mainly before the mid-
19th century. We investigated whether the different typical representations influence
the aesthetic preference for traditional Chinese and Western paintings in the different
cultural groups. Traditional Chinese and Western paintings were presented randomly for
an aesthetic evaluation to Chinese and Western participants. Both Chinese and Western
paintings included two categories: landscapes and people in different scenes. Results
showed a significant interaction between the source of the painting and the cultural
group. For Chinese and Western paintings, a reversed pattern of aesthetic preference
was observed: while Chinese participants gave higher aesthetic scores to traditional
Chinese paintings than to Western paintings, Western participants tended to give
higher aesthetic scores to traditional Western paintings than to Chinese paintings. We
interpret this observation as indicator that personal identity is supported and enriched
within cultural belongingness. Another important finding was that landscapes were more
preferable than people in a scene across different cultural groups indicating a universal
principle of preferences for landscapes. Thus, our results suggest that, on the one
hand, the way that artists represent the world in their paintings influences the way that
culturally embedded viewers perceive and appreciate paintings, but on the other hand,
independent of the cultural background, anthropological universals are disclosed by the
preference of landscapes.
Keywords: beauty, culture, aesthetics, visual perception, Chinese painting, Western painting
INTRODUCTION
The concept of beauty is a complex topic since antiquity, and this is especially true when tracing the
cultural trajectory of our relationship with beauty. Western and Eastern artists tend for instance to
use different perspectives to represent the visual world, both in the geometric and in a metaphorical
sense. Viewers from different cultures and social groups may have distinct aesthetic experiences to
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the same visual displays (Palmer et al., 2013). Cultural differences
might explain why beauty is attributed to some things, but not
to others (Jacobsen, 2010). Aesthetic processing can only be
understood, if it is also seen as being embedded in cultural
contexts and being modulated by social conditions.
Unlike Western painters who since the Renaissance tried
to create an exact view of a visual environment, Chinese
painters never developed a notion of space as a measurable
geometrical entity by developing mathematical rules to organize
space and create precise spatial relations (Delahaye, 1993).
Instead, the Chinese outlook emphasizes a dynamic structure for
human relations with the environment, even with the universe,
independent of exact physical representations or the proper
imitation of objects (Sullivan, 1984; Cameron, 1993). Pictorial
perspectives employed in Western and Chinese paintings are,
thus, fundamentally different. Western painters tried to create
an exact view of what they see (or what they believe to see);
the geometric perspective was developed to create the illusion of
three-dimensionality by means of a single-point or convergent
perspective (Kubovy, 1986). It should, however, be pointed
out that the central perspective in Western art is already an
abstraction (Worringer, 1908), and it is not at all a geometrically
correct representation of what we see. Mechanisms of size
constancy (Pöppel, 1988) recalibrate the projection of visual
stimuli on the retina at the cortical level, and thus distort what is
mathematically defined. This neural operation in the early visual
pathway (Zhou et al., 2016) serves the purpose to maintain the
identity of the perceived object. Thus, the different trajectories
of abstraction in the Eastern and Western cultural environments
have created unique conceptual frames.
Chinese painters have employed specific ways of emphasizing
spatial information compared to Western painters. Besides a
typical arrangement of spatial information in a vertical manner
(i.e., far objects appear in the upper part while close objects
appear in the lower part of a scroll painting), a most common
means of suggesting distance was perhaps the use of a perspective,
where parallel diagonal lines strike off from the plane of the
picture. The distinctive characteristics of parallel projections is
that lines parallel in fact are also parallel in the drawing. The
angles of these obliques are coherent throughout the plane (Tyler
and Chen, 2011). Moreover, Western artists are inclined to
capture a specific moment in a visual scene and fix the physical
position of the viewer. In contrast, when looking at a Chinese
landscape painting, there is no distinct point to guide viewers.
The Chinese outlook has a dynamic quality that integrates
successive time windows (Bao et al., 2015), and encompasses
a panoramic view of the visual scene, which can be perhaps
associated with a floating view (Tyler and Chen, 2011).
Another concept with respect to differences between Eastern
and Western landscapes (Pöppel, 2006) distinguishes on the
psychological level between an internal view (“Ich-Nähe” in
German) and an external view (“Ich-Ferne” in German); (it
should be mentioned in passing that in this area of research
many publications are available in other languages that remain
mute for the only English-speaking scientific community). The
central perspective in Western art (with its misunderstood
geometrical law) represents an external point of view, and it
is characterized by its own aesthetic values; the visual world
is expanding in front of the eyes of the viewer (Ich-Ferne).
Other than implied by Masuda et al. (2008) who refer to this
view as “insider perspective,” we characterize this external view
as “Ich-Ferne.” In Eastern landscapes a completely different
psychological mechanism is initiated when viewing a picture
from a floating perspective. Because of the multi-layer viewpoints
on top of each other on a scroll form, the spectator has the
impression being invited to shift one’s position dynamically,
sometimes being located in the air (e.g., looking downward from
above), sometimes being located on the ground (e.g., looking at
scenes straight ahead), and sometimes being located at a lower
land (e.g., looking upward at faraway mountains); much more
importantly, however, is the psychological consequence of this
shifting position that the viewer becomes subjectively a part of the
scene. The multi-layer perspectives can be considered to simulate
a three-dimensional space resulting in a virtual circle or ellipse
vertical to the picture; within this imaginary circle or ellipse the
viewer becomes part of the scene depicted in front of the eyes.
This implicit construction of subjective space creates the feeling
of belongingness or “Ich-Nähe.” Thus, we want to submit that the
floating perspective does not represent an “outsider perspective”
(Masuda et al., 2008).
Another interesting difference with respect to perspective in a
more general sense is related to the pictorial subjects of Western
and Chinese paintings. Western artists favor object-centered
scenes, whereas Chinese artists prefer context-oriented scenes.
Paintings in the West typically seek to make the object salient,
i.e., to distinguish the object from the background (Masuda et al.,
2008). In China it has been otherwise; Chinese artists put great
emphasis on the context, often with a meditative theme showing
small human figures, as if humans are embedded in a natural
environment and awed or inspired by a mountainous landscape
(Turner, 2009), or even overwhelmed by the sublime (Burke,
1757).
Previous research on culture and aesthetics has demonstrated
indeed substantial cultural variations in artistic expressions,
such as in drawings, photography, city design, product design,
or else (for a review, see Masuda et al., 2012). By analyzing
the ratio of the horizon drawn to the frame and the number
of objects used in 15th to 19th century paintings from East
Asian and Western countries, Masuda et al. (2008) provided
evidence showing that the East Asian artists placed horizon
lines higher than Western artists, and that the size of models
in East Asian masterpieces was smaller than that in Western
ones. Furthermore, this cultural variation in artistic expressions
persisted in landscape drawings of contemporary adult members
of North American and East Asian cultures. This pioneer study
and subsequent research (Wang et al., 2012; Ishii et al., 2014;
Nand et al., 2014; Senzaki et al., 2014) have shown that cultural
variations in artistic expressions are empirically testable and
robust from a methodological point of view.
However, with respect to this methodological point, another
critical factor has to be considered when comparing artifacts from
different cultures. According to the theory of mutual constitution
between culture and the mind (Shweder, 1991; Morling and
Lamoreaux, 2008), people should prefer artistic expressions
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which reflect their own cultural systems. This prediction is based
on the idea that people who are exposed to different types of
cultural artworks could internalize their preference for them.
To date, several studies have documented cultural influences
on a wide range of psychological processes, notably attention,
motivation, reasoning and self-concept (Markus and Kitayama,
1991; Nisbett et al., 2001; Han and Northoff, 2009).
In spite of the vast knowledge already gathered (e.g., Masuda
et al., 2008; Ishii et al., 2014; Senzaki et al., 2014), we believe that it
is still useful to look at one more detail when comparing Eastern
and Western art, and possibly evaluating the results within a
different frame of reference. Thus, the present study addresses
one central question: Are different representations as expressed
in typical traditional Chinese and Western paintings appreciated
differently by people from different cultural groups? To answer
this question, we explored the possibility of cultural differences
in aesthetic preferences of contemporary members from the two
cultural groups: Chinese and Westerners. We hypothesized that
Western and Chinese subjects would show distinct aesthetic
preferences due to the implicit application of cultural patterns
of artistic expression from their own cultures. This hypothesis
on “cultural imprinting” is in line with previous observations
(Bao et al., 2013b, 2014) in which it was shown that the language
environment shapes temporal processing when a tonal and a
non-tonal language are compared; this process is suspected to
take place on an implicit level by informal learning (Pöppel and
Bao, 2011). It is furthermore suggested that the analytic and
holistic strategies are employed also in cognitive processes when
representatives from the Eastern and Western cultures evaluate
visual artwork validating previous work (e.g., Masuda et al.,
2008).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-six university students (23 Chinese and 23 international
students from Western countries) participated in the experiment.
The Western students were from US, Canada and Europe with
15 males and 8 females. They were aged from 18 to 31 years
old with an averaged age of 23.74 years. None of the Western
participants had lived in China for more than 4 years. The
Chinese subjects consisted of 9 males and 14 females, aged from
19 to 30 years old with an averaged age of 23.35 years. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity
and color vision, were right-handed, and had no history of
neurological disease. None of them were specialists in art history
or art theory. Participants were asked before the experiment
about their preference on painting style. They generally did not
show any specific interest in a certain painting style. All subjects
were given informed written consent before the experiment. The
study was approved by the departmental ethical committee of
Peking University.
Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a dimly illuminated room
to reduce visual distraction. Picture presentation was controlled
by the E-prime software system (Schneider et al., 2002a,b) and
displayed on a 19-in CRT monitor (1024∗768 resolution, 100 Hz
refresh rate). Responses were collected through a keyboard.
Materials
Sixty traditional Chinese paintings and 60 Western classicist
paintings were selected from the archives of http://www.artc
yclopedia.com and http://www.namoc.org by the authors in
consultation with an art specialist. Both Chinese and Western
paintings included two categories, namely, landscapes, and
people in a scene. The category “landscapes” refers to depictions
that treat nature as the primary topic, and mainly includes sky,
mountains, rivers, trees, flowers, meadows, houses, and boats.
The category “people in a scene” depicts more than one person
engaged in activities, coexisting with backgrounds of the land,
thus distinguishing it from portraits. The paintings were chosen
from a variety of historical periods (from the 9th to the 18th
century). We trust to have selected an appropriate sample of
pictures, but we are aware of the fact that some hidden bias
may have remained uncontrolled; one has to acknowledge that
it is impossible to draw in a statistical sense a “true” random
sample from artwork, because the population from which to draw
the sample is not definable due to the cultural and historical
complexity. In spite of these constraints we believe to have
chosen a fair sample of typical pictures from the two cultural
environments. To come closer to the goal of an appropriate
comparison, all paintings were low in emotional intensity, that
is, they did not depict sexual, aggressive, or religious themes.
All paintings were prepared in uncompressed bitmap file format,
and the image dimensions varied. Graphic manipulation of
stimuli was done using Photoshop (Adobe). Each combination of
cultural style (Chinese vs. Western Painting) × pictorial subject
(landscape vs. people in a scene) includes 30 images. Another 40
images (with 10 images in each condition) were selected from the
same database (from which the images for the main experiment
were selected) and used in the practice session before the main
experiment.
Procedure
All paintings were presented in random order. Each picture was
presented once during the experiment. After viewing each picture
subjects were asked to judge its beauty on an 8-Point Scale by
pressing one of eight buttons on a keyboard, where 1 indicated
very ugly and 8 indicated very beautiful. We also recorded
reaction time (RT), but stimulus presentation was self-paced
and participants were instructed to approach the paintings in a
subjective and engaged manner. Before the main experimental
trials, subjects were given 10 practice trials under each condition
so they could establish a general impression of the stimuli to be
presented. The images used in the practice trials were not used in
the experiment.
RESULTS
The beauty-rating data were subjected to a three-way mixed
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Cultural Style (Chinese vs.
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Western Painting) and Pictorial Subject (landscape vs. people in
a scene) as two within-subjects variables and Participant Group
(Chinese vs. Westerner) as one between-subjects variable. The
ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between Participant
Group and Cultural Style {[F(1,44) = 9.247, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.174]}, while both main effects of Participant Group
and Cultural Style were not significant {[F(1,44) = 2.597,
p = 0.114, η2p = 0.056] and [F(1,44) = 0.010, p = 0.919,
η2p = 0.000] respectively}. Further analysis of this interaction
displayed interesting beauty-rating patterns between the two
participant groups: for the Chinese group, a significantly
higher score was observed for Chinese paintings relative
to Western paintings (5.18 vs. 4.72, p < 0.05). For the
Westerner group, a reversed pattern was observed, i.e., a
significantly higher score was demonstrated for Western painting
as compared to Chinese painting (4.78 vs. 4.36, p < 0.05)
(Figure 1). This double dissociation result pattern suggests
that Chinese and Western participants prefer paintings that
correspond to the background within which they were culturally
imprinted.
The ANOVA produced only one significant main effect for
the Pictorial Subject [F(1,44) = 37.478, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.502];
this factor interacted with Cultural Style [F(1,44) = 19.338,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.305]. For both Chinese and Western paintings,
participants gave higher scores to landscape than to the category
“people in a scene” (Figure 2). Further analysis revealed that
the difference in scores between Western landscape and figure
paintings was significantly larger than that for the Chinese ones
(1.20 vs. 0.60, p < 0.001) (Figure 3). No other main effects
or two-way interaction reached significant level. The three-way
interaction was also not significant [F(1,44) = 0.549, p = 0.463,
η2p = 0.012].
FIGURE 1 | The significant interaction between Cultural Style (Chinese
vs. Western Painting) and Participant Group (Chinese vs. Westerners)
on beauty rating. Chinese and Western participants showed preferences for
their own culture’s paintings: Chinese participants gave higher aesthetic
scores to traditional Chinese paintings than Western paintings, whereas
Western participants did the opposite. ∗p < 0.05.
FIGURE 2 | Beauty rating of paintings as a function of Cultural Style
(Chinese vs. Western Painting) and Pictorial Subject (landscape vs.
people in a scene). Both Chinese and Western participants gave higher
aesthetic scores to landscape than the people in a scene. ∗∗p < 0.01.
FIGURE 3 | The difference in aesthetic scores (landscape – people in a
scene) was significantly larger for Western paintings than that of
Chinese paintings. ∗∗p < 0.01.
DISCUSSION
Research in the past has shown that by using stimuli from the
arts, i.e., from music, poetry or visual arts, one can obtain new
insight into cognitive mechanisms which may remain undetected
if one focuses only on simple stimulus configurations as have
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been employed in the tradition of classical psychophysics (e.g.,
from our own research environment: Silveira et al., 2012; Avram
et al., 2013; Lutz et al., 2013; Pöppel et al., 2013; Zaytseva et al.,
2014; Park et al., 2015). With the study reported here, we want
to further contribute to this research paradigm by comparing
the appreciation of art in subjects from the East and the West
with its challenging differences (Pöppel and Bao, 2016). The
present study investigated aesthetic preferences of two cultural
groups using pictorial representations from the different cultures
as stimuli. Our results showed that subjects prefer paintings that
correspond to their own cultural traditions, i.e., each cultural
group evaluated the paintings from their own culture as more
beautiful.
This result at first sight might not at all be surprising as
it might simply reflect the well-known “in-group bias” or “in-
group favoritism” effect (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971). One could
argue that the subjects immediately recognize whether they are
confronted with a picture from the East or from the West,
and Eastern subjects feel more familiar with pictures from their
cultural background whereas the contrary is true for the Western
subjects. If the in-group bias applies in this case, one has to add,
however, further arguments, which explain the direction of the
bias, because such a bias cannot be anticipated with respect to
“aesthetic evaluation.” In the case that Eastern subjects would
have evaluated Western pictures as more beautiful, and Western
subjects would have preferred Eastern pictures (which also could
have happened), one would also deal with in-group bias, but with
a reversed direction. Thus, it is necessary to find a reason for
the direction of the observed bias in our study. With respect
to this question we want to return to one hypothesis outlined
above that Eastern and Western pictures create a different
psychological state of involvement or “belongingness“ (Ich-Nähe
vs. Ich-Ferne). It is argued that the pictures trigger a culturally
specific feeling of identity (Pöppel, 2010). A Western subject
looking at a Western picture is supported in his feeling of cultural
identity, and the same is true for an Eastern subject when looking
at an Eastern picture. We want to submit that the creation
and maintenance of identity is one of the most fundamental
challenges of the human mind (Zhou et al., 2014), and artwork
of one’s own cultures may serve as an important psychological
mechanism.
Our analysis may be supported by a recent study in
which it was reported that when viewing traditional Chinese
landscape paintings, Chinese subjects experienced a greater
level of relaxation and mind-wandering, and a lower level of
object-oriented absorption than when viewing Western realistic
landscape paintings (Wang et al., 2014). With respect to cultural
identity, the study by Masuda et al. (2008) may also support our
viewpoint; they reported that East Asian subjects were more likely
to include great details and background when drawing a scene or
taking photographs of a model compared to Western subjects.
Some further points have to be appreciated: It has been
argued that Westerners apply more rational or logical methods
to a wide range of intellectual and artistic pursuits, in which a
mathematical orientation plays an important role (Kline, 1964).
Western paintings, hence, emphasize the creation of realistic
scenes as much as possible. In contrast, Chinese artists place more
faith on intuitive and aesthetic knowledge about nature (Golas,
2014). This faith is bolstered by considerable reliance on personal
feelings and emotions embedded into the image, rather than the
details and exact appearance provided by sensory modalities.
Members of different cultural groups are repeatedly exposed to
various examples of visual images from their respective cultures,
and they may implicitly gain knowledge (Pöppel and Bao, 2011)
about the dominant aesthetic representation of the world; thus,
the appreciation of paintings that obey aesthetic principles within
their culture is facilitated.
Consistent with Shweder’s (1991) argument that psychological
processes and cultural products represent two sides of the same
coin, Morling and Lamoreaux (2008) further suggested that
culture and the mind are mutually constructed. A given cultural
meaning system is internalized by members of the culture,
and those who internalize that system display habitual ways
of thinking and acting. A recent study by Ishii et al. (2014)
showed that European Americans preferred unique colorings and
Japanese preferred harmonious colorings, and these preferences
were positively associated with cultural values, i.e., uniqueness
among European Americans and harmony among Japanese
participants. Another study (Wang et al., 2012) found that
East Asians were more likely than their European Canadian
counterparts to prefer the moderately complex webpage to the
simple portal page, and the results could be explained by the
fact that the Western way of thinking is more self-contained
and independent, while most East Asians are more holistic
and context oriented. These previous findings, combined with
the present results, provide supportive evidence that people
indeed prefer artistic expressions which reflect dominant cultural
meaning systems.
A surprising result in our study is that both Western and
Chinese subjects prefer landscapes compared to the category
“people in a scene.” This observation suggests that in spite of
the cultural frame of aesthetic appreciation as noted above there
may exist an overriding principle with respect to the sense of
beauty reflecting an anthropological universal (Bao and Pöppel,
2012). Such an overriding principle at a lower perceptual level is
for instance observed in color preferences. Komar and Melamid
systematically examined the artistic preferences of people in ten
countries, and found that the most preferred painting was an
idealized blue landscape (Wypijewski, 1997). There is indeed
evidence that color preferences are universal across cultures
(e.g., Eysenck, 1941), although later research revealed that both
similarities and differences may exist (Taylor et al., 2013).
A strong case, however, for a universal color preference has been
made for blue (Saito, 1996; Ou et al., 2004).
From the viewpoint of Darwinian aesthetics (or “evolutionary
aesthetics”), it has been suggested that humans may be
biologically primed to find particular features more beautiful,
because these features may have been selected for optimal
survival, for instance allowing better decisions about when to
move, and where to settle, and what activities to engage in
(Thomhill, 1998; Zaidel, 2010). However, evolutionary theorists
have been criticized for regarding art only with respect to adaptive
preferences (Plotkin, 2004). Apart from ultimate adaptive
valence, we are given no criteria by evolutionary aesthetics
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theories for explaining why some objects are generally perceived
as aesthetically superior. Here we suggest that the present finding
that landscape is aesthetically more appreciated is not only
because it signals restfulness or safety, but also because its restful
or safe features carry added emotional significance.
It is worth noting that the difference between the preferences
of landscape and people in a scene was higher for Western
paintings compared to Chinese paintings. The aesthetic basis
of Chinese paintings is deeply affected by the philosophy of
Chinese Taoist ideas that emphasize the harmonious relationship
between human beings and the cosmos (Law, 2011). In the eyes
of Chinese artists, natural scenes have the power to suggest the
very essence of life to human beings, and in unobtrusive ways,
may therefore act as inspirations to virtue. Indeed, in Chinese
landscape paintings we can find tiny human figures, such as
a fisherman on a lonely boat, a man following a mountain
path, or a man meditating in a cottage. Here the relationship
between man and the natural world is the reverse of the case
of Western paintings. Thus, one possible explanation for the
smaller difference in the preferences of Chinese paintings is that
Chinese landscape paintings are focusing on the natural scenes
with human figures embedded, although small and not very
prominent optically, whereas in Western landscape pictures this
is rarely the case.
One important aspect which should not be overlooked is
the fact that pictures in both cultures elicit the attention of
the viewer. In this case we are confronted with a surprising
paradox which mainly applies to Western pictures. With the
central perspective in landscape paintings a wide area of the
environment is represented which in reality would cover the
entire visual field. In the picture, however, the visual angle is
much smaller being limited to the perifoveal region. It has
been shown, however, that attentional control is different for
the perifoveal region and the periphery of the visual field
(Bao and Pöppel, 2007); this eccentricity effect of attentional
control has been well documented with a number of different
experimental paradigms (e.g., Lei et al., 2012; Bao et al., 2013a).
Given this situation we are confronted with a paradox: What
corresponds to the visual environment in reality, and triggers the
two different attentional systems, is contracted in a picture into
a much smaller visual representation. This spatial contraction
results in a mismatch between the natural perceptual process
and its pictorial representation. What should represent physical
reality, does not do it at all. On the basis of this paradoxical
situation we submit the hypothesis that such a mismatch by
itself leads to an external point of view. It enforces “Ich-
Ferne” as this artificial perspective does not match reality.
The viewer has to deal with an abstraction in the pictorial
representation as has been pointed out a long time ago by
Worringer (1908). Quite the contrary, the floating perspective
in Eastern pictures supports “Ich-Nähe,” and belongingness or
embeddedness as indicated above. These different perspectives in
a general sense also correlate with different cognitive strategies.
The more analytical strategy corresponds to the external point
of view, as the viewer is forced to take a position from
the distance; the more holistic approach as has been pointed
out previously (Masuda et al., 2008; Senzaki et al., 2014) is
typical for the Eastern perspective, and as we want to submit
being the consequence of the feeling of belongingness and
the validation of personal identity. It is interesting to note
that such different cognitive strategies have also been observed
on a very basic level in auditory processing (Bao et al.,
2013b).
Taken together, our study shows both cultural specifics
and anthropological universals. Different perspectives presented
in traditional Chinese and Western paintings are appreciated
differently by Chinese and Westerners, showing a cultural
difference in aesthetic preference. The way that artists represent
the visual world in their paintings influences the way that viewers
perceive their paintings. We suggest that the cultural difference
in aesthetic preference is correlated with cultural and social
practices in everyday life. Our aesthetic sense is to some extent
modulated by the cultural environment in which we grow up.
At the same time, however, results in this study indicate an
overriding principle that independent of the cultural background
pictorial representations of landscapes compared to people have
a higher aesthetic value.
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Compared with traditional Western landscape paintings, Chinese traditional landscape
paintings usually apply a reversed-geometric perspective and concentrate more on
contextual information. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we
discovered an intracultural bias in the aesthetic appreciation of Western and Eastern
traditional landscape paintings in European and Chinese participants. When viewing
Western and Eastern landscape paintings in an fMRI scanner, participants showed
stronger brain activation to artistic expressions from their own culture. Europeans
showed greater activation in visual and sensory-motor brain areas, regions in the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and hippocampus when viewing Western compared
to Eastern landscape paintings. Chinese participants exhibited greater neural activity
in the medial and inferior occipital cortex and regions of the superior parietal lobule
in response to Eastern compared to Western landscape paintings. On the behavioral
level, the aesthetic judgments also differed between Western and Chinese participants
when viewing landscape paintings from different cultures; Western participants showed
for instance higher valence values when viewing Western landscapes, while Chinese
participants did not show this effect when viewing Chinese landscapes. In general, our
findings offer differentiated support for a cultural modulation at the behavioral level and
in the neural architecture for high-level aesthetic appreciation.
Keywords: beauty, cultural identity, aesthetics, visual perception, fMRI, Western painting, Eastern paintings
INTRODUCTION
Neuroscientific research on aesthetic processes in the visual system has offered evidence for a
correspondence between certain properties of artworks and organizational principles in the brain
(Zeki, 1999; Kawabata and Zeki, 2004; Chatterjee, 2011; Chatterjee and Vartanian, 2014; Bao
et al., 2017a). Aesthetic experience partly relies on a visual analysis of an artwork based on
distinct and specific visual attributes in color, line, texture, and form (Cinzia and Vittorio, 2009;
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 April 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 798
fpsyg-10-00798 April 15, 2019 Time: 17:38 # 2
Yang et al. Aesthetic Experiences Across Cultures
Palmer et al., 2013). Indeed, some researchers (e.g., Latto, 1995;
Bao et al., 2017b) have argued that artists implicitly tap into
propensities of the human nervous system when generating
aesthetic appeal. Piet Mondrian’s paintings are exemplary of
visual art that excites orientation-selective neurons in the primary
visual area. These neurons respond selectively to dots and
straight lines, especially horizontal and vertical ones. Zeki’s
(1999) principal idea is that different kinds of artworks excite
different groups of neurons in the brain, leading to differential
bottom-up processes.
Drawing upon complementarity as a basic principle of
biological functions (Bao et al., 2017a), aesthetic experience
relies both on higher-level cognitive processes and lower-level
visual analyses to enable object identification, which is necessarily
both bottom-up and top-down (Zhou et al., 2016). Some of the
most studied modulators of the top-down system are individual
expectations, prior knowledge, social context, and cultural
background (Silveira et al., 2012, 2015b,c; Graupmann et al.,
2013; Leder, 2013), which also applies to other cultural domains,
like poetry (e.g., Zhao et al., 2018) or even religious beliefs
(Silveira et al., 2015a). It has recently been suggested that aesthetic
experience is partially top–down and varies between individuals
according to their cultural experience (Redies, 2015). A match of
internal and external information as represented in feedforward
and feedback signals of the two complementary systems plays
an important role in creating perceptual stability and even
pleasure (von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950). Human cognitive
architecture is presumably built to predict representations of the
world and efficiently minimize prediction errors (Clark, 2013).
Conceptually overlapping with this notion, art theory describes
an aesthetic experience as an interplay between internal and
external perspectives (Bao et al., 2017a), i.e., by dissolving the
subject/object dichotomy, the observer experiences a sense of
immersion (Heidegger, 1986).
In an attempt to resolve this bi-directionality or
complementarity (Bao et al., 2017a), one approach is to define
an artwork as a medium capturing both an artist’s understanding
of a viewer’s experiences and a viewer’s understanding of an
artist’s intentions (Jucker and Barrett, 2011; Tinio, 2013). This
perspective considers aesthetic appreciation to be an interaction
between an artwork’s objective properties and the viewer’s
processing characteristics of those properties. This idea is
consistent with suggestions that beauty is not “put in” the
artwork by the artist as a distinct entity (Zaidel, 2015), but rather
“an emergent property in the brain of the beholder,” where the
beholder can include the artist, as well as the viewer (Redies,
2015). From a neuroimaging perspective, this phenomenon
might be related to brain activation, which corresponds to the
so-called mirror-neuron system and embodied simulations of
emotions and actions (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007). It has
repeatedly been found that positive aesthetic appreciation goes
along with neural activation in parietal and sensory-motor brain
regions (e.g., Lutz et al., 2013), which has been interpreted as
either an empathic resonance with the painting’s content or
imagery and mimicry of artistic gestures. Referring back to
early psychological theories, Helmholtz (1868/1995) combined
the ideas that artists test and explore the visual system with a
theory of vision. Artists, he claimed, are particularly good at
observing their sensuous impressions (data of sensation) and
at figuring out which patterns trigger which interpretations.
Although many visual scientists have given up Helmholtz’s
theory of vision, the idea that artists test and explore the visual
system has not really been abandoned (Pöppel et al., 2013). On
the contrary, it allows for a more detailed and discriminating
version of the same idea.
At the neural level, a considerable number of brain imaging
studies on aesthetic experience demonstrate the involvement of
brain regions, like the ventral striatum and medial prefrontal
cortex, which are activated by reward and positive emotion
(Cinzia and Vittorio, 2009; Chatterjee, 2011; Nadal and Pearce,
2011; Pearce et al., 2016). The default-mode network (DMN)
is also involved when processing paintings of high aesthetic
preference (Vessel et al., 2012) or of higher predictability in
inferring meaningful content (Silveira et al., 2012) and has
been proposed as a delayed aesthetic network (Cela-Conde
et al., 2013). The DMN displays the highest activation during
the resting state and task-dependent, lower activation levels
(Raichle and Snyder, 2007). Overlapping with the cortical
midline structures, parts of the DMN may be neural correlates
for self-relevant processes. Particularly posterior parts, i.e.,
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and adjacent precuneus,
supposedly correspond to mental processes while integrating
external information into a self-referential context (Northoff
and Bermpohl, 2004). These processes seem to be culturally
sensitive (Han and Northoff, 2008). According to recent
enactive accounts of aesthetic experience (Xenakis and Arnellos,
2014, 2015), aesthetic experience arises as a result of the
interaction between the viewer and the object. Aesthetic
experience is also an embodied phenomenon directly linked
to adaptation and aesthetic perception and helps cope with
the environment. Aesthetic experience arises when the viewer
interacts with both uncertain physical and cultural contexts.
A more inclusive understanding of aesthetic experiences in
diverse cultures has to be developed. Cultural aesthetics requires
an empirical inquiry into the kinds and varieties of experiences
associated with artistic activities as they are understood in
different cultures.
Regarding cultural aspects, Western and Eastern artists tend to
use different perspectives to represent the visual world. Western
landscape paintings have been rather precise reproductions
of visual surroundings since the Renaissance (Kubovy, 1986),
while Eastern landscape paintings, such as Chinese paintings,
have a dynamic quality that integrates successive time windows
(Bao et al., 2015) and are expected to convey the experience
of “being in nature” rather than “seeing nature.” This has
led to an arrangement of spatial information in a vertical
manner with multi-layers on top of each other in a scroll
form (Sullivan, 1984; Cameron, 1993; Law, 2011; Tyler and
Chen, 2011). Considering cultural and historical contexts in
which painting styles evolved, Western artists applied more
logic and mathematics (Kline, 1964), like geometric perspective.
Prevailing Buddhist and Taoist influences among Chinese artists
could adequately explain the emergence of landscape painting
in the Southern Song period and its persistence throughout
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the Ming dynasty (Golas, 2014). Besides the different artistic
approaches employed by Western and Eastern painters, viewers
from these two cultural groups also have distinctly different
aesthetic reactions to the same artistic visual representations.
Both Western and Chinese participants gave higher aesthetic
ratings to paintings from their own compared to the other
culture (Bao et al., 2016). One explanation might be that repeated
exposure to artworks (Zajonc, 2001) promotes the development
of concepts of beauty, but also of culturally transmitted values
and beliefs. A given cultural value system is internalized by
members of the culture, and those who internalize that system
display habitual ways of thinking and behaving. Certain artworks
can trigger a culturally specific feeling of identity (Pöppel,
2010). We suggest that the cultural environment in which the
individual is socialized can account for the production and
appreciation of art.
The current study aimed at further investigating aesthetic
processes in the context of culture. We used cross-cultural
neuroimaging to measure neural activity in native Chinese and
Europeans living in Germany while they viewed Western and
traditional Chinese landscape paintings. Based on behavioral
findings of cross-cultural differences, we predicted that distinct
brain-activation patterns can be observed which correspond to
aesthetic preference of one’s own vs. the other culture.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-one volunteers, including 16 Europeans (7 females; mean
age = 24.45 years, SD = 4.51 years) and 15 Chinese (8 females;
mean age = 27.38 years, SD = 1.78 years) from the Ludwig-
Maximilian University in Munich (LMU), took part in the
experiment after giving informed written consent. The Chinese
students are from mianland China. None of them had studied
in Germany for more than 4 years when they participated in
this study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity and color vision, and had no history of neurological
disease. To minimize the confounding effect of art education,
we defined previous formal art training or art-expertise as an
exclusion criteria. None of these volunteers was an art expert.
Participants were asked about their preferred painting style
before the experiment. They generally did not show any specific
interest in a certain painting style. The study was approved
by the Ethics Committee of the LMU in agreement with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
Twenty-one Western oil landscape paintings and 21 traditional
Chinese landscape paintings were selected from the stimuli set
used by Bao et al. (2016). The stimuli set was assembled by the
authors in consultation with an art specialist and was completed
by using http://www.artcyclopedia.com as a search engine and
was then directed to Wikimedia Commons. The contents of
the landscapes mainly included the sky, mountains, rivers, trees,
flowers, meadows, houses, and boats. The paintings were chosen
from a variety of historical periods (from the 9th to the 18th
centuries). We believe to have chosen a representative sample
of paintings from the two cultural environments. All paintings
were prepared in uncompressed bitmap file format, and the image
dimensions varied. These paintings are referred to as Western
or Eastern originals. For visual baseline, a scrambled version
for each original landscape painting was created in MATLAB
by dividing the original paintings into10∗10 pixel units and
then randomly shuﬄing the units to produce the scrambled
stimuli. The paintings that were created using this process are
referred to as Western and Eastern scrambled control condition,
as they retained the overall colors of the original paintings while
lacking perceptual/visual recognition. Each original painting
was inverted to create an upside-down version of Western
and Eastern landscape paintings. The inversion was meant to
disrupt the content-related perception of the paintings. Six
types of paintings were created, resulting in 126 paintings in
all (see Figure 1A).
Procedure
All stimuli were projected onto a translucent screen through
a video projector that participants could view from inside the
scanner via a head-coil-compatible mirror system. A classic
block design was utilized as the experimental procedure. The six
types of paintings constituted six experimental conditions, each
including 21 paintings separated into seven blocks. Each block
consisted of three paintings of the same type; there were 42 blocks
altogether. The order of all blocks was pseudo-randomized. Each
block started with a fixation cross lasting for 6 s, followed by
the successive presentation of three paintings. Each painting was
framed on a black background and presented for 4 s followed
by a 1 s interval of black screen (see Figure 1B). In a previous
behavioral study conducted by our research group which asked
participants to give ratings on beauty of Western and Chinese
paintings (Bao et al., 2016), 4 s was long enough for participants
to give reliable responses. Participants were instructed to view
the paintings in a subjective and engaged manner, without giving
any explicit response. The instruction was, “Please pay attention
to the paintings shown on the screen, experience the mood of
the work and the feelings it evokes, and focus on its colors,
tones, composition, and shapes.” To ensure sufficient attention to
these paintings, participants were informed they had to fill out a
questionnaire after the functional-imaging session. The decision
not to collect behavioral responses in the scanner was made to
facilitate maximal concentration on viewing the paintings. After
the completion of the scans, each subject viewed the original
paintings presented in the same block structure as in the scanner;
stimulus presentation was self-paced. Participants were required
to give ratings on a Likert-type Scale ranging from 1 to 7. The
questions were as follows:
1. I find this painting calming (1).
I find this painting exciting (7).
2. This painting makes me feel negative (1).
This painting makes me feel positive (7).
3. I do not like this painting at all (1).
I like this painting very much (7).
4. This painting is very ugly (1).
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Examples of the six types of stimuli used in the experiment. From left, original Western landscape painting, upside-down Western landscape
painting, scrambled Western landscape painting, original Eastern landscape painting, upside-down Eastern landscape painting, scrambled Eastern landscape
painting. (B) A Sample block in original Western painting condition. The image stimulus duration was 4 s, with an interstimulus interval (ISI) of 1 s. A fixation cross
was shown during the intervals between the blocks when no image was displayed.
This painting is very beautiful (7).
5. In the hospital, I would not like to hang this painting on
the wall (1).
In the hospital, I would like it a lot to hang this painting on
the wall (7).
6. I haven’t seen this painting before, and it feels
unfamiliar (1).
I have seen this painting before, and it feels familiar
to me (7).
7. I don’t have any feelings about this painting (1).
I have strong feelings about this painting (7).
8. I feel like I have a distance to this painting (Outsider
perspective) (1).
I feel like I belong in this painting. (Insider perspective) (7).
The above eight questions are associated with the
following mental processes, respectively: arousal, valence,
preference, beauty, relaxation, familiarity, empathy, and object-
related absorption. All instructions, stimulus materials, and
questionnaires were given in German and then back-translated
from German into Chinese by a bilingual speaker (Brislin, 1970).
Image Acquisition
Brain imaging data was obtained with a 3T MRI scanner with
a standard head coil at the university hospital of the LMU in
Munich. For BOLD signals, T2∗-weighted EPI sequences were
used [repetition time (TR) = 2500 ms; echo time (TE) = 30 ms; flip
angle = 90◦; acquisition matrix = 80× 80; slice thickness = 3 mm,
no gap between slices]. In total, one run of 358 functional
volumes was acquired for each subject. Structural data was
acquired with a T1-weighted scan of each participant’s brain
anatomy (1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm; 240 × 240 matrix, field-
of view = 220 mm).
Data Analysis
The behavioral data analysis was performed using SPSS for
Windows (version 21.0). Paired t-tests were calculated for
each question to compare the ratings on Western and Eastern
paintings in European and Chinese groups separately. All
neuroimaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using
SPM12 (Statistical Parametric Mapping V121). For each
participant, the first eight volumes were removed to allow for
T1-equilibration effects. The remaining 350 functional scan
volumes were subjected to spatial realignment to correct for
head motion. In further preprocessing analysis, the mean
functional image was co-registered to the anatomical image,
normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
template provided in SPM12, and spatially smoothed with an
8 mm Gaussian kernel.
The task was modeled as a block design. Using a two-level
procedure, we conducted a random-effects fMRI data analysis.
First, individual events were modeled by a hemodynamic
response function. By using the general linear model, we
obtained parameter estimates for each condition and each
subject and then acquired statistical parametric maps of the
t-statistic resulting from linear contrasts of the original and
up-side-down conditions compared with their corresponding
control conditions (original Western – scrambled Western,
original Eastern – scrambled Eastern, upside-down Western –
Scrambled Western, upside-down Eastern – Scrambled Eastern).
Next, for the group analysis these individual contrast images
were entered in a second-level analysis treating subjects as a
random effect. The average BOLD response across the brain
while viewing Western paintings was compared to Eastern
paintings in both original and up-side-down conditions with
paired t-tests. Reversed comparisons (Eastern paintings –
Western paintings) were also conducted. For these t-tests,
significant voxels initially passed a voxel-wise statistical threshold
of p ≤ 0.01, and a cluster-level threshold was obtained at
the family-wise-error (FWE)-corrected statistical significance
level of p< 0.05.
1http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
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RESULTS
Behavioral Results
For the European group, ratings for each question are shown
in Table 1. Paired t-tests revealed that there was no significant
difference between original Western and Eastern landscape
paintings in average familiarity: t(15) = 1.07, p = 0.301, ES = 0.214.
However, compared with Eastern paintings, Western paintings
were rated significantly higher on valence [t(15) = 4.01, p = 0.001,
ES = 1.276], preference [t(15) = 3.75, p = 0.002, ES = 1.036],
beauty [t(15) = 3.62, p = 0.003, ES = 0.938], relaxation
[t(15) = 4.18, p = 0.001, ES = 0.842], empathy [t(15) = 4.84,
p = 0.001, ES = 1.093], and object-related absorption [t(15) = 4.01,
p = 0.002, ES = 0.968], but lower on arousal [t(15) = 2.63,
p = 0.019, ES = 0.703].
Ratings from the Chinese group are shown in Table 2.
Paired t-tests indicated that preference levels and beauty levels
were not significantly different between traditional Chinese and
Western landscape paintings [t(14) = 0.55, p = 0.58, ES = 0.037;
t(14) = 1.36, p = 0.18, ES = 0.097]. However, traditional Chinese
landscape paintings had significantly higher ratings in relaxation
[t(14) = 2.50, p = 0.01, ES = 0.169] and familiarity [t(14) = 2.48,
p = 0.014, ES = 0.143], but lower ratings in arousal [t(14) = 3.54,
p < 0.001, ES = 0.226] and valence [t(14) = 5.58, p = 0.001,
ES = 0.407] compared with Western landscape paintings. There
was also a marginally significant effect on empathy [t(14) = 1.89,
p = 0.059, ES = 0.145], but object-related absorption did not reach
a significant level [t(14) = 0.84, p = 0.403, ES = 0.061].
We performed an additional two-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with gender as a between-subject variable for each
question in both cultural groups. There was no interaction of
gender by question, nor a main effect of gender (all p> 0.1).
fMRI Results
For each cultural group, we created whole-brain activation
maps by contrasting the group-level brain response to viewing
Western landscape paintings with the responses to Eastern
landscape paintings both in original and in upside-down
versions. European and Chinese participants exhibited distinct
neural response patterns. For the European group, the analysis
of original Western paintings vs. original Eastern paintings
revealed a network of regions distributed across the calcarine
sulcus, i.e., the primary visual area, the supplementary motor
area (SMA), the PCC, the hippocampus, and the fusiform gyrus
(see Table 3 and Figure 2). The reverse comparison (original
Western paintings vs. original Eastern paintings) revealed no
significant activation. For the Chinese group, greater neural
activity was observed in the right cuneus, the bilateral calcarine
cortex, the left lingual gyrus, the right postcentral gyrus, and the
right superior parietal lobule in response to Eastern paintings
compared to Western paintings (Table 4 and Figure 3). No
significant activation was found in the reverse comparison
(original Western paintings vs. original Eastern paintings). When
comparing the upside-down Western paintings vs. upside-down
Eastern paintings or upside-down Eastern paintings vs. upside-
down Western paintings, there were no significant differences
detected in either cultural group.
To exclude the possible confounding factor of gender, a single
regressor representing the gender was added to the design matrix
used in the fMRI data analysis. This revealed no statistical
significance (p > 0.1); our data do not support that gender is
correlated with BOLD responses. The differences observed in
brain activations are not explained by gender.
DISCUSSION
We investigated the neural correlates of viewing Western and
Eastern landscape paintings in Western and Eastern participants
with fMRI. We demonstrated a cultural difference in neural
responses underlying aesthetic appreciation; participants showed
stronger brain activation to artistic expressions from their
own cultural systems. On the behavioral level, participants
from the different cultural groups expressed distinct aesthetic
judgments from the two different cultures. The behavioral results,
however, did not support our expectation that participants
would show an overall more positive aesthetic appreciation
for landscape paintings from their own culture. European
TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations of ratings on each question for Western and Eastern landscape paintings by European participants.
Arousal Valence Preference Beauty Relaxation Familiarity Empathy Object-related absorption
Western 3.20 5.00 4.95 5.00 4.01 2.20 4.35 3.86
(0.21) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.28) (0.27) (0.20) (0.28)
Eastern 3.72 4.17 4.19 4.32 3.05 1.94 3.32 2.79
(0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.22) (0.30) (0.33) (0.26) (0.27)
TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations of ratings on each question for Western and Eastern landscape paintings by Chinese participants.
Arousal Valence Preference Beauty Relaxation Familiarity Empathy Object-related absorption
Western 3.73 4.39 4.47 4.61 4.03 2.73 3.80 3.68
(0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Eastern 3.32 3.73 4.52 4.73 4.31 2.98 4.00 3.78
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
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TABLE 3 | Location of brain regions that respond to comparison of original
Western paintings vs. original Eastern paintings by European participants.
Brain regions MNI coordinates Z scores Number of
voxels
x y z
Western – Eastern original paintings
L Calcarine Sulcus −9 −88 −1 4.42 246
R Calcarine Sulcus 12 −85 2 3.98
R Paracentral Lobule 9 −28 62 3.89 442
L Paracentral Lobule −15 −22 80 3.77
Posterior Cingulate 0 −52 11 3.67 616
L Hippocampus −18 −28 −10 3.67
L Fusiform Gyrus −30 −43 −19 3.65
The reverse comparison (original Eastern vs. Western paintings) did not reach
significance. Regions are designated using the MNI coordinates. L indicates the
left hemisphere.
FIGURE 2 | In the European group, comparisons of the original Western vs.
original Eastern paintings revealed activation in the calcarine sulcus, the
paracentral lobule, the posterior cingulate cortex, the hippocampus and the
fusiform gyrus.
participants rated Western landscape paintings when compared
to Eastern landscape paintings higher on valence, preference,
beauty, relaxation, empathy, object-related absorption, and lower
on arousal. Chinese participants did not express a general
preference for Eastern landscape paintings; they gave compared
to Western paintings only higher ratings in the domain of
relaxation. Despite the absence of a behavioral evidence of
reversed aesthetic preference patterns (which does not prove the
evidence of absence), we observed greater brain activation in
participants for landscape paintings from their own culture. The
absence of an effect when comparing the upside-down versions
of the paintings highlights the content dependency of the viewed
paintings. One can conclude that the observed differences are not
based on bottom-up processing of the physical properties of the
paintings, but that pictorial properties of the paintings extracted
on a level of higher cognitive processing are responsible.
TABLE 4 | Location of brain regions that respond to comparison of original
Eastern paintings vs. original Western paintings by Chinese participants.
Brain regions MNI coordinates Z scores Number of
voxels
x y z
Eastern – Western original paintings
L Lingual Gyrus −3 −85 −7 4.99 1168
R Calcarine Sulcus −3 −94 −1 4.82
R Cuneus 9 −94 17 4.75
R Postcentral gyrus 33 −31 47 3.53 187
R Superior parietal lobule 33 −49 59 3.40
The reverse comparison (original Western vs. Eastern paintings) did not reach
significance. Regions are designated using the MNI coordinates. L indicates the
left hemisphere.
FIGURE 3 | In the Chinese group, comparisons of the original Eastern vs.
original Western paintings revealed activation in the right cuneus, the bilateral
calcarine sulcus, the left lingual gyrus, the right postcentral gyrus, and the
right superior parietal lobe.
When the European participants viewed original Western as
compared to Eastern landscape paintings, the analysis revealed
higher BOLD activation levels in the primary visual cortex, the
SMA, the PCC, and the hippocampus. The SMA, which has
motor and sensory functions (Jeannerod, 2001), counts as one of
the commonly activated brain structures when viewing artworks
(Vartanian and Skov, 2014; Boccia et al., 2016). Our results
correspond to previous evidence relating exposure to aesthetic
vs. non-aesthetic visual stimuli to sensory-motor processes
(Freedberg and Gallese, 2007; Lutz et al., 2013) and may well
indicate empathic resonance with paintings from one’s own
cultural background. An enactive understanding of perception
(Xenakis and Arnellos, 2014, 2015) suggests aesthetic behavior
as emerging from the structural coupling of the viewer with
his/her environment. The higher neural activation when viewing
Western paintings is related to the viewer’s embodiment, as
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posited by enactivists, and to the whole spectrum of abilities
available in human socio-cultural practices.
The most likely explanation for why Western paintings elicited
higher activation in the fusiform gyrus in the European group
is that this structure is known to mediate object recognition.
When observers view a work of art, they do not see, for
instance, a canvas or a statue on an abstract level; rather,
they react to what it represents (e.g., a seascape, a tower).
Compared to traditional Chinese landscape paintings, Western
landscape paintings have clear-cut shapes similar to hard-edge
paintings. In Chinese paintings, an object’s edge is ill-defined and
disappears or fades into another object or into the background
(Cahill, 1960; Zong, 2007). According to Wölﬄin (1950), soft-
edge paintings involve blurred boundaries and ill-defined forms,
whereas hard-edge paintings involve well-defined forms and
rich narrative details. Since the left fusiform gyrus probably
plays a role in shape processing (Starrfelt and Gerlach, 2007),
viewing Western landscape paintings invoked more fine-grained
shape analysis than Chinese paintings, thus causing greater
activation in the fusiform gyrus. This explanation is consistent
with previous observations that activation in the fusiform gyrus
can be attributed to object recognition in realistic paintings,
including faces (Grill-Spector and Malach, 2004) and pictorial
scenes (Siebörger et al., 2007).
The right cuneus, the bilateral calcarine cortex, and the left
lingual gyrus were activated in the comparison of aesthetic
appreciation of Eastern paintings vs. Western paintings by
Chinese participants. Activation of the lingual gyrus has been
linked to the encoding of complex images. Chatterjee et al.
(2009) argued that activation of the lingual gyrus represents
its sensitivity to “beauty,” which corresponds with the present
findings. Mizokami et al. (2014) showed that the left lingual
gyrus and the bilateral cuneus may be associated with aesthetic
judgments of representational paintings, which also supports
our findings. Previous studies have related the cuneus to
the aesthetic appreciation of beauty (Cupchik et al., 2009;
Mizokami et al., 2014). The stronger activation in these brain
structures may be explained by higher aesthetic sensitivity
to stimuli with high visualization demands. Of particular
interest is activation specific to the Chinese paintings localized
within the calcarine sulcus corresponding to the primary
visual cortex. More specifically, activation was localized to the
mid- to anterior parts of the calcarine sulcus, corresponding
to the mid-level and peripheral visual field representations
(Sereno et al., 1995).
The higher activation levels in the primary visual cortex in
both cultural groups not only indicate stronger bottom-up visual
processing of paintings from one’s own culture. The simultaneous
involvement of the PCC in the European group, which has
cortical connections to visual areas in feedforward, as well as
feedback projections (Keil et al., 2009), also suggests stronger
top-down processing, i.e., higher-level cortical areas modulate
neural activity on the sensory-input levels. For the Chinese group,
stronger activation was localized in the superior parietal lobule, a
neural region known to support the manipulation of information
in working memory (Koenigs et al., 2009). Top-down processes
originating in superior parietal areas may contribute to the
aesthetic perception of paintings and their maintenance in the
“mind’s eye” (Mechelli et al., 2004).
Previous studies suggested that aesthetic experience is a
function of the interaction between top-down and bottom-up
processing (Leder et al., 2004; Cupchik et al., 2009; Redies,
2015). However, it is difficult to delineate the exact projecting
pathway of feed-forward and feedback signals with the current
experimental settings. Support for a stronger involvement of
top–down information processing for paintings from one’s
own cultural background is the additional engagement of the
hippocampus, a region that has consistently been related to
episodic memory retrieval (Eichenbaum et al., 1996, 2007; Brown
and Aggleton, 2001). Paintings from one’s own culture might
be integrated into a frame of prior experiences or expectations
to a higher degree due to their fit with culturally imprinted
cognitive schemata, thereby linking aesthetic appreciation to
one’s own previous experiences. This could determine the
relationship between cognition and action, thereby generating
a value-oriented experience of high complexity (e.g., aesthetic
appreciation), which motivates human social behavior to be
related to certain types of socio-cultural expressions (e.g.,
appreciating or even creating/producing artworks).
We observed activation in the PCC in European participants
when comparing Western to Eastern landscape paintings. This
region has emerged as a key component of the DMN (Mason
et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010), a highly interconnected network of brain regions that
has been associated with self-referential mental processing
(Northoff et al., 2006). More specifically, the PCC is active
during tasks that involve integrating external stimuli in a self-
referential manner (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004), as well as
jn autobiographical memory (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). The
PCC responds to self-relevant information even when there is
no explicit requirement to evaluate self-relevance (Moran et al.,
2009; Reniers et al., 2012). In aesthetic experiences, individual
taste in art can be considered as highly subjective, connected
with personal pleasure, and can be considered a part of the
personal self (Zaytseva et al., 2014). Previous research also
provides evidence of higher activation levels within the DMN
associated with intense aesthetic experience and interpreted
as personal relevance of these stimuli (Vessel et al., 2012).
When analyzing temporal dynamics of aesthetic appreciation,
it has been suggested that the DMN involvement is a core
part of general aesthetic experience, as represented in a delayed
aesthetic network (Cela-Conde et al., 2013). The current study
demonstrated that an inclusion of a cultural context was a
modulator of these processes. Our results support previous
findings of culturally sensitive information processing within the
DMN (Han and Northoff, 2008). In Chinese group, we found
evidence for increased activation in the right postcentral gyrus.
This is noteworthy given that previous studies revealed the right
postcentral gyrus to be activated in response to self-vs. other-
perspective taking in social cognition (Ruby and Decety, 2004;
Adams et al., 2010). Because the postcentral gyrus mediates
somatosensory experience, the results might be explained by
motor resonance created in the viewer when viewing paintings
from his/her own culture. This activation, however, was not
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in a common area found in the previous tests of aesthetic
appreciation and requires further empirical corroboration before
firm conclusions can be drawn.
Why didn’t Chinese participants show any activation related
to self-referential information processing? There are two possible
explanations. Our experimental paradigm was comparatively
subtle. Pronounced cultural differences in the neural processing
may emerge under more demanding conditions, verifying the
expected bias of the Eastern cultural group to show preferential
processing of artworks in self-related brain regions similar to the
Western groups. An alternate explanation is that Asian societies
are changing rapidly, and that the young Chinese participants
have internalized Western values up to the point that they no
longer display behavioral patterns which are characteristic for
Asian cultures. Even if this is the case, the neuroimaging results
clearly demonstrate different patterns for Eastern and Western
participants, with a bias toward higher brain activation for one’s
own cultural artworks, a finding supporting the cultural/aesthetic
framework proposed by Bao et al. (2016).
Our findings provide neuroimaging evidence for cultural
biases in the processing of visual artworks. Visual aesthetic studies
make us aware that “seeing” has a history; sensory experiences
are socially, culturally, and historically embedded. It is not
possible to speak of pure perception as sensation untouched
by past experiences, education, and cultural background. Since
our self-identity is influenced by the cultural background we
inhabit, the “belonging” moments should occur with greater
frequency when artists of the presented paintings and viewers
who appreciate the paintings share the same cultural background.
Members of different cultural groups are repeatedly exposed
to various examples of visual images from their respective
cultures, and they may implicitly gain knowledge (Pöppel and
Bao, 2011) about the dominant aesthetic representation of the
world. As mental representations of the world influence the
perception of visual information, a cultural framing effect is
probably implemented on the neural level and determines the
implicit information processing of visual stimuli in particular
and sensory stimuli in general. In this way, different cultural
groups produce a “sensory model” of the meanings and values
associated with their sensory perceptions. We propose that
culturally distinct behaviors and thoughts can be construed as
differences in aesthetic appreciation that affect neural functions.
The authenticity of aesthetic experience, through its directness
and immediacy, provides a powerful means of reappraising
cultural experience by digging beneath the layers of accrued
meanings and cognitive habits.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our results highlight culture as a modulating
factor in the visual perception of aesthetic stimuli. Aesthetic
experiences are aligned with the human cognitive architecture
which is based on the principles of efficiency and prediction.
This indicates a cultural framing effect, which corresponds to
the mind, as well as to brain states, and determines implicit
information processing. Our findings support the notion that
visual experiences are biased by cultural factors. We engage
aesthetically with artwork in its different expressions (e.g., visual
art, poetry, music) and also with different physical environments
(e.g., untouched nature, architecture, or different kinds of urban
surroundings). Environments define specific perceptual features
as characteristic for a particular human culture at a given time
resulting in typical aesthetic appreciation. Beauty really is in the
“eye” of the beholder.
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Abstract: The eminent Chinese artist LaoZhu has created a homogeneous set of abstract pictures that are referred to as the “third
abstraction.” By deﬁnition, these pictures are meant to be representations of the artist’s personal involvement and as such to create an
internal point of view in the observer on an implicit level of processing. Aiming at investigating whether the artist’s choice of a speciﬁc
color is experienced in a speciﬁc way in the recipient, we assessed both explicit and implicit (i.e. neurocognitive) correlates in naive view-
ers of LaoZhu’s pieces. The behavioral results reveal a preference of the original red paintings over color-changed counterparts in green
or black. Paradoxically and inconsistent with predictions, we found higher levels of neural activation in several brain regions (predomi-
nantly in the frontal and parietal cortices) for the color-changed compared to the original red conditions. These observations add empiri-
cally to the complementarity of early visual pathways and higher-order cognition as well as of explicit and implicit information
processing during aesthetic appreciation. We discuss our ﬁndings in light of processing effort and top-down control of the color-changed
paintings. With regard to the third abstraction as deﬁned by LaoZhu, in particular to the distinction between an external and internal point
of view when viewing abstract art, our results contribute to an understanding of “abstraction and empathy” as a fundamental part of aes-
thetic appreciations.
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Single case studies are usually associated with research on
a single subject, in particular patients with brain injuries or
other pathologies, or a group of subjects with speciﬁc char-
acteristics; such single case studies with patients or healthy
subjects have often provided unique insights into neural
and psychological processes (e.g., Bao et al., 2015; Luria,
1968; Pöppel, Brinkmann, von Cramon, & Singer, 1978;
Silveira, Bao, et al., 2015; Strasburger & Waldvogel, 2015;
Wang et al., 2016; Zaytseva et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2016)
and have often opened new ﬁelds of research, for instance,
with respect to memory research, the famous case H.M.
(Scoville & Milner, 1957). Here we expand this experimen-
tal paradigm by adopting a new strategy in relating a single
person with his creative achievements in a complementary
way. The artwork of the eminent Chinese artist LaoZhu on
the “third abstraction” (Sun, 2011) provides a unique
opportunity to follow this new line; some of his artwork is
characterized by a surprising homogeneity (see his pictures
© 2017 The Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
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from the series Zhu Mo in Figure S1 of the Supporting
Information). This unique constellation of art and artist
invites us to treat the artwork and the artist together as a
“single case.” Considering that paintings are the artist’s
expressions of inner states, the use of this strategy provides
insights into common responses in several subjects and the
success in transferring artistic content and meaning.
It has been suggested by LaoZhu himself that, histori-
cally, abstract art can be divided into three periods: The art-
works of Wassily Kandinsky (1912/2009), Kazimir
Malevich, and Piet Mondrian represent the ﬁrst phase; and
the cubism of Pablo Picasso and the abstract expressionism
of Jackson Pollock stand for the second phase. In these ﬁrst
two phases, speciﬁc shapes or colors in the pictures are
emphasized, forms or unique compositions with deﬁned
optical elements are dominant, and emotions may be
expressed. For these two phases, one experiences or views
(or even inspects) pictures preferentially with an external
point of view, whereas pictures of the “third abstraction”
create an internal point of view in which the personal
involvement of the artist and the identiﬁcation with his
work is experienced by the viewer without explicit reﬂec-
tion but rather on an implicit level of sensory and cognitive
processing (Pöppel & Bao, 2011). Art of the third abstrac-
tion as it is created and also understood by LaoZhu is
strongly inﬂuenced by the typical brushstrokes from tradi-
tional Chinese art reﬂecting the spiritual state of the callig-
rapher. It captures the open-minded viewer who may feel
and enjoy becoming a part of the picture; such an experi-
ence of being embedded in a picture has also been sug-
gested when viewing Chinese landscapes, and it has been
argued that such an identiﬁcation with a piece of art sup-
ports personal and cultural identity (Bao et al., 2016).
What may be some critical factors that contribute to the
differentiation of external or internal points of view? Such
criteria may be found in “what” is represented in the pic-
ture, but also “how” the “what” is represented. We consider
this distinction between the content (the what) and the way
the content is represented (the how) to be crucial for a dee-
per understanding of an external or internal point of view
and aesthetic appreciations; this conceptual (even logical)
difference has been emphasized for cognitive processes in
general (Bao & Pöppel, 2012; Pöppel, 1989). Without
much reﬂection, one might assume that the content of a
picture has to be dominant with respect to this question;
however, a closer look at the pre-semantic level of proces-
sing appears also to be useful. In fact, substantial evidence
has already been gained about aesthetic appreciations on
this operational level, which may contribute also to a better
understanding of these different perspectives. Not surpris-
ingly, visual features of an artwork—such as symmetry—
matter in aesthetic appreciations. Spectral analyses of dif-
ferent classes of visual stimuli have indicated that speciﬁc
visual features of an artwork correspond to the sensory and
perceptual processing in the visual stream (Graham &
Redies, 2010); higher-order statistics for natural images
and their usefulness for understanding visual processing in
general has been demonstrated previously by Zetzsche and
Krieger (2001), which may be relevant also for artwork.
But simpler stimulus characteristics are also important; by
swapping the colors in the tri-color compositions of Piet
Mondrian’s original abstract paintings, Locher, Overbeeke,
and Stappers (2005) showed that manipulating the colored
regions inﬂuenced the viewer’s perceived weight of the
areas and the judgment of the balance centers of the com-
positions. Thus, aesthetic appreciations of a painting may
have their source in extracting basic elements of stimuli
already in the early visual pathway (Cinzia & Vittorio,
2009; Zhou et al., 2016). The sensory information, derived
from early and intermediate visual processing, includes
color, tone (dark–light range), texture, symmetry, and con-
trast (Berlyne, 1971; Cupchik & Winston, 1996). But aes-
thetic appreciations of pictures are also controlled by top-
down mechanisms, often on an implicit level (Pöppel &
Bao, 2011), such as prior experiences (Silveira et al.,
2012), expectations (Silveira, Fehse, Vedder, Elvers, &
Hennig-Fast, 2015; Silveira et al., 2014), or the historical,
cultural, and economical background in general
(Jacobsen & Wolsdorff, 2007; Ritterfeld, 2002).
With respect to neural mechanisms, important observa-
tions have been made by Thakral, Moo, and Slotnick
(2012), who showed that when subjects viewed paintings
of van Gogh, the motion experience was associated with
activity in motion-processing regions of the brain; the expe-
rience of pleasantness was associated with neural activa-
tions in the anterior prefrontal cortex, which implies that
aesthetic experiences depend both on sensory processing
and conceptual processing. In another study using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Cupchik, Var-
tanian, Crawley, and Mikulis (2009) observed that
representational paintings containing ill-deﬁned forms eli-
cited higher activation of the left superior parietal lobe than
“hard-edge” paintings (containing well-deﬁned forms),
especially when subjects were requested to approach the
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paintings in a subjective and engaged manner, rather than a
detached and objective manner.
Compared to representational art, abstract artwork does
not consist of clearly and distinctly characterized visual
objects. While the “what” diminishes in signiﬁcance in
most abstract artwork, the “how” rises in strength, presum-
ably causing a perceptual bias towards basic visual ele-
ments (Aviv, 2014). Interestingly, the distinction between
content (or what-functions) and logistical (or how-func-
tions) on the neural level (Bao & Pöppel, 2012; Pöppel,
1989) ﬁnds its analogue in the historic development of pic-
torial art in the last 100 years. In our view, abstract art is
well suited for investigating aesthetic appreciations. Partic-
ular techniques of an artist, like the manipulation of tex-
ture, color, shape, or composition, in abstract pictures can
stimulate different aesthetic experiences. The present study
was designed to address the modulation of aesthetic appre-
ciation by basic visual features, focusing on LaoZhu’s
abstract art. The speciﬁc choice of the color red for the
brushstrokes that are meant to represent LaoZhu’s inner
states was investigated in its function to transfer aesthetic
appeal and artistic meaning. We examined aesthetic appre-
ciations of LaoZhu’s original abstract paintings and color-
manipulations in naive viewers, both on behavioral and
neural levels. According to LaoZhu’s theory on the third
abstraction, his original choice of color should lead to
higher aesthetic appeal than color-changed conditions. This
is assumed to be accompanied by higher neural activation
in reward-related brain regions for the original color condi-
tion. A further exploratory question (which, however, can
only be reﬂected on a speculative level) was whether the
choice of a speciﬁc color as a basic sensory feature of
LaoZhu’s pictures contributes to the creation of an internal,
as compared to an external, point of view, thus, providing
perhaps a scientiﬁc perspective to the third abstraction.
Method
Subjects
Sixteen healthy right-handed German subjects (mean
age = 24.45 years, SD = 4.51; seven females) took part in
the experiment after giving informed written consent. All
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and color
vision, and had no history of neurological disease. None of
them was an art specialist. This study was approved by the
ethical committee of Ludwig-Maximilian University
(LMU) in Munich, in agreement with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Materials
Twenty-one pictures were selected from LaoZhu’s painting
series Zhu Mo with the artist’s permission. All pictures were
prepared in bitmap ﬁle format, and the image dimensions
were 700 × 700 pixels. These paintings are referred to as
the “original paintings.” Then we constructed the RGB
image and swapped the red and green channels or removed
color; the 42 paintings (21 green and 21 black) that were
created through this process are referred to as the “color-
changed paintings.” Scramble versions for each original
and color-changed painting were created in MATLAB by
dividing the picture matrix into non-overlapping blocks
with the size speciﬁed by S (10 × 10 pixels), and randomly
shufﬂing these blocks. Scramble paintings served as a con-
trol condition. The above process resulted in 126 paintings
that varied along the dimensions of color (red, green, or
black) and their corresponding scrambled versions
(Figure 1A).
Procedure
All stimuli were projected onto a translucent screen through
a video projector that subjects could view inside the scan-
ner via a head coil-compatible mirror system. Subjects par-
ticipating in the imaging study were instructed to carefully
watch the paintings without giving a response. To ensure
sufﬁcient attention to these paintings, subjects were
informed of the requirements of ﬁlling out a questionnaire
after the functional imaging session. The decision not to
collect behavioral responses in the scanner was made to
facilitate maximal concentration on viewing the pictures.
Paintings were presented in a block design. There were six
conditions, each including seven blocks and 21 paintings;
this way, each block included three paintings. The order of
stimuli and blocks was pseudo-randomized. The duration
of each block was 15 s. Each painting was presented for
4 s, followed by a 1-s blank screen. The inter-block interval
was 6 s (Figure 1B). After the scanning session, each sub-
ject viewed the same paintings presented in the same
sequence as in the scanner; stimulus presentation was self-
paced. The subjects were asked “How much do you like
this painting?” to which they responded using a 5-point
scale ranging from 1 (no feeling) to 5 (I like it very much).
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Data acquisition
Brain-imaging data were obtained with a 3T MRI scanner
with a standard head coil at the university hospital of
LMU, Munich. For BOLD signals, T2*-weighted echo pla-
nar imaging was used (repetition time/echo time = 2500/
30 ms; ﬂip angle = 90; acquisition matrix = 80 × 80;
slice thickness = 3 mm, no gap between slices). One run
consisting of 358 functional volumes was acquired for each
subject. A high-resolution T1-weighted scan of each parti-
cipant’s brain anatomy was acquired with a 240 × 240
matrix, ﬁeld-of-view = 220 mm, covering the brain with a
slice thickness of 1 mm.
Data preprocessing and analysis
The behavioral data on liking or not liking the pictures
were subjected to a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with color (red, green, or black) as the variable.
The data analysis was performed using SPSS for Windows
(version 21.0). The MRI data were analyzed with Statistical
Parametric Mapping V12 (SPM12; http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm). The preprocessing procedure included removal
of the ﬁrst eight volumes to allow for T1-equilibration
effects, 3-D motion correction by applying an afﬁne rigid
registration as part of the realignment procedure built in
SPM12, and spatial smoothing with an 8-mm Gaussian ker-
nel. In further preprocessing analysis, the mean functional
image was co-registered to the anatomical image and nor-
malized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) tem-
plate provided in SPM12. Individual events were modeled
by a hemodynamic response function. By using the general
linear model, we obtained parameter estimates for each
condition and each subject, and then acquired statistical
parametric maps of the t-statistic resulting from linear con-
trasts between the three experimental conditions (original
red, green, or black) compared with their corresponding
control conditions (scrambled red, scrambled green, or
scrambled black). For the group analysis these individual
contrast images were entered in a second-level analysis
treating subjects as a random effect. The average BOLD
response across the brain in viewing original red paintings
was compared to that in the other two, the color-changing
conditions, with paired t-tests. For these t-tests, signiﬁcant
voxels initially passed a voxel-wise statistical threshold of
p ≤ .01, and a cluster-level threshold was obtained at the
family-wise-error (FWE)-corrected statistical signiﬁcance
level of p < .05.
Results
Behavioral results
The responses to the questions showed that the experimen-
tal manipulation by changing the colors had some impor-
tant consequences. Average preference ratings for the
original red paintings and their color-changed counterparts
(green or black) were 4.04 (SE = 0.11), 3.53 (SE = 0.09),
and 3.63 (SE = 0.13). The one-way ANOVA demonstrated
that there was a main effect of color, F(1, 15) = 19.648,
Figure 1. (A) Examples of the stimulus material used in the experiment. From left, original red, scrambled red, green, scrambled green, black, and
scrambled black. (B) Experimental paradigm. Stimulus presentation was 4000 ms followed by a 1000-ms blank screen. The inter-block interval was
6000 ms.
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p < .001, η2p = :496, indicating a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
changed colors on the aesthetic appreciations of the paint-
ings. Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc tests revealed that red
was more preferable than green or black (p = .002 and
p = .011, respectively), whereas the difference between
green and black (p = .561) was not signiﬁcant. This sug-
gests that the subjects did not discriminate in their affective
responses to the two color-changed conditions.
fMRI results
The comparison of the BOLD responses in the viewing of
green paintings versus original red paintings revealed
greater activations to green in several brain regions. The
main clusters of an increased green-related activation were
located in the left precuneus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and
the inferior parietal lobules. These results are summarized
in Table 1 and Figure 2. The reverse comparison revealed
no signiﬁcant activation.
There was also a greater activation in response to black
paintings compared to the original red paintings in several
brain areas, particularly in the supplementary motor area
and the medial frontal gyrus. The lower parts of Table 1
and Figure 3 show a summary of these results. There was
no signiﬁcant activation for the reverse comparison.
Discussion
In the present study, we report the inﬂuence of color on the
aesthetic appreciation of paintings by the Chinese artist
LaoZhu representing the third abstraction. Both behavioral
and brain-scanning methods were employed to identify
potential neural correlates. The behavioral results showed
that the original paintings were preferred when compared
with their color-changed counterparts; surprisingly and
contrary to expectation, neural activities in several brain
regions which are known to be involved in aesthetic appre-
ciations were greater when subjects looked at the color-
changed paintings compared to viewing the original red
paintings. Despite this discrepancy, our ﬁndings support the
hypothesis that color information itself (or certain regions
of the electromagnetic spectrum) can generate differential
effects on neural activities when viewing abstract paintings.
This may not be too surprising since speciﬁc pathways
within the visual system are devoted to the processing of
colors (e.g., Gegenfurtner, 2003). This functional segmen-
tation may already be implemented at the retinal level, as
experiments on color induction would suggest (Pöppel,
1986; Zhou et al., 2016). Any visual experience requires an
initial analysis of optical features in the early visual path-
way, and this applies also to aesthetic appreciations when
viewing artwork (i.e., speciﬁc stimulus properties of per-
ceptual objects have to be extracted). Our results add to the
body of evidence stressing the importance of such primary
features on the aesthetic appreciation of paintings (for a
review, see also Palmer, Schloss, & Sammartino, 2013).
For example, by displacing an object within original paint-
ings, Vartanian and Goel (2004) showed that the originals
were preferred compared to the changed paintings, and this
comparison of original and changed pictures revealed sig-
niﬁcant activations in several relevant brain areas. Further-
more, the effects of symmetry and complexity of the
stimulus conﬁgurations on aesthetic judgments have been
shown to be robust in several studies (Jacobsen, Schubotz,
Höfel, & Cramon, 2006; Tinio & Leder, 2009).
As indicated, our observations that color-changed art-
works evoked higher neural activations are not in line with
previous ﬁndings that showed higher aesthetic preferences
together with higher neural activity as judged from neural
processing in the reward circuitry and those neural areas
assumed to be involved in the aesthetic assessment of
Table 1
Location of Brain Regions that Respond to Comparison of Color-Changed Conditions Versus Original Red Condition.
Brain regions
MNI coordinates
Z-scores Number of voxelsx y z
Green–red
L precuneus –9 –64 35 4.68 1,092
L inferior frontal gyrus –36 4 27 4.00 449
L inferior parietal lobule –60 –46 38 3.94 687
Black–red
L supplementary motor areas –6 2 62 4.38 1,011
L medial frontal gyrus –33 11 44 3.21
Note. None of the reverse comparisons (red vs. green, or red vs. black) reached signiﬁcance. Regions are designated using the MNI coordinates. MNI = Montreal
Neurological Institute; L = left hemisphere.
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stimuli (Lacey et al., 2011; Montague, Harvey, & Kirk,
2014). In those studies, the less preferred artworks led to
less reward, less emotional valence, and less attentional
orienting, all of which correlated with reduced neural activ-
ities in different brain areas. One possible explanation of
our contradictory result might be that the red paintings of
LaoZhu are experienced as being more natural or harmoni-
ous; the subjective experience viewing the original red
paintings may require less processing effort on the neural
level; such different processing effort has been suggested
already in a previous study when beautiful and non-
beautiful environments being stored in episodic memory
were compared (Vedder et al., 2015). The color-changed
versions of the pictures may result in an experiential incon-
sistency or a violation of a good gestalt; such a subjective
inconsistency may well be implemented on an implicit level
(Pöppel & Bao, 2011). The higher neural activation at the
cortical level whenever a psychological mismatch, as sug-
gested here, takes place may reﬂect an enhanced top-down
inﬂuence. Indeed, unusual or unnatural stimuli may lead to
more neural activity; for example, Kirk (2008) found that
objects viewed in unexpected or abnormal ﬁgure–ground
combinations led to signiﬁcantly more activations
compared to normal contextual conditions. More support
for this notion comes also from studies when viewing
abnormally colored objects (Zeki & Marini, 1998), novel
stimuli (Cardillo, Watson, Schmidt, Kranjec, & Chatterjee,
2012), or irregular temporal patterns (Zeki, Hulme, Roul-
ston, & Atiyah, 2008). Furthermore, activations were
mainly lateralized to the left hemisphere in the present
study, which may relate to complex, effortful processing of
color-changed paintings.
In detail, the green–red contrast revealed neural activa-
tions in the precuneus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the
inferior parietal lobule. These areas are often observed as
being activated in the aesthetic evaluation of artworks
(Boccia et al., 2016; Vartanian & Skov, 2014). Speciﬁcally,
activation of the inferior frontal gyrus may be involved in
the decoding of stimuli (Kirk, 2008), whereas the precu-
neus, when related to vision and imagery, has been
involved in voluntarily guided attention and manipulation
of mental images (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). As part of
the associative cortices, the precuneus is in general related
to rather abstract higher cognitive functions, in particular to
an integration of external and self-generated information,
which is why it has previously been linked to (1) the
Figure 2. The green–red contrast revealed
activation in the left precuneus, inferior fron-
tal gyrus, and inferior parietal lobule.
Figure 3. The comparison of black and red
conditions resulted in activations in supple-
mentary motor areas and medial frontal
gyrus.
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integration of external information in a self-referential con-
text (Northoff et al., 2006), (2) the integration of egocentric
and allocentric spatial relations (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006)
and (3) the differentiation of ﬁrst-person and third-person
perspective (Vogeley et al., 2001). Thus, differential
involvement of the precuneus might indicate that color
modulates the strength of creating an internal point of view
when observing LaoZhu’s artwork.
The direct comparison of black and red conditions
resulted in activations in the supplementary motor area and
the medial frontal gyrus; this observation can be related to
the commonly activated brain structures when viewing art-
works (Boccia et al., 2016; Vartanian & Skov, 2014). The
medial frontal gyrus is likely to be engaged in higher men-
tal functions involving executive control (Talati & Hirsch,
2005). Thus, taken together, the paradoxical result that the
processing of green and black paintings compared to the
original red paintings required more neural effort in the
participating networks may not be at all paradoxical.
In summary, on this more technical level of analysis, the
behavioral results indicate that the original red paintings of
LaoZhu are preferred when compared with their color-
changed counterparts, and on the neural level, higher acti-
vations for the color-changed conditions have been uncov-
ered. These observations suggest that on the one hand,
lower-level visual properties modulate the aesthetic appreci-
ation of abstract art, but that on the other hand, higher-level
neural mechanisms are also involved. This latter point
invites speculation about some further aspects of our study,
such as reﬂecting the concept of “abstraction and empathy”
(Worringer, 1908/2007; i.e., the internal point of view in
comparison to the external point of view) when one is
exposed to pictures of the third abstraction by LaoZhu.
One question that is related to this antinomy of perspec-
tives is why red in the pictures of LaoZhu is preferred on
the subjective level than green or black. We suggest that
the color red is more deeply rooted in the neural systems of
humans than the other colors. Such a hypothesis is moti-
vated, for instance, by a single case study with a patient
who had suffered a bilateral occipital lobe infarction
(Pöppel et al., 1978). This patient with an extremely
restricted visual ﬁeld had suffered a complete loss of color
perception after a stroke; however, he could still differenti-
ate between light and darkness. After some time, color per-
ception returned to his visual world, and it was the color
red that was perceived again at ﬁrst. Gradually, the other
colors on the perceptual level came back too; however,
surprisingly green and blue could not be discriminated ini-
tially. This return of seeing colors by the patient was unre-
lated to retinal mechanisms that had remained intact after
the stroke. This speciﬁc temporal sequence of seeing colors
again after their loss emphasizes the higher importance of
red, and that, indeed, red is more deeply rooted in the neu-
ral machinery of the visual system. Thus, we speculate that
LaoZhu was drawn to express the third abstraction in the
color red for reasons related to an ease of processing; the
artist himself claims no alternative seemed suitable. This
selection of the right color does not have to take place on
an explicit level of rational conjecture; it happens as a self-
evident process on an implicit level without necessary
reﬂection (Pöppel & Bao, 2011). As the artist identiﬁes
himself with his own artwork, the viewer is similarly
affected by the choice of “the right color.” An internal view
is automatically created, and one may feel being part of the
abstract scene when viewing a picture.
In fact, the viewer sees a scene and not a meaningless
picture, and this makes the third abstraction of LaoZhu
very different from the earlier phases of abstract art. Most
of the pictures of the series studied in our experiment are
characterized by a visual duality stretching along the hori-
zontal meridian. Whatever the accidental priming of a
viewer might be in a given moment, one is mentally forced
(or perhaps seduced) to impose meaning onto the picture
either on a concrete or a conceptual level. One person may
see a landscape that might be reminiscent of a landscape
picture in Eastern art (Bao et al., 2016); such “internal
landscapes” may create the feeling of belongingness, again
supporting and even verifying the internal point of view.
Another situational priming may result in seeing red clouds
in the evening sky; or one may see blood spread over a sur-
face. On a more conceptual level, the duality of many pic-
tures initiates a thought process about the ambivalence of
life, being separated from the other and longing for
togetherness.
All of these internal scenes arise automatically and with-
out mental effort, and they touch on a fundamental princi-
ple of human knowledge systems. Other than is often
implied, we do not possess just one knowledge system,
which is traditionally referred to as being rational, explicit,
and semantic (Descartes, 1637/1990): We possess two
additional knowledge systems (Pöppel & Bao, 2011). In
addition to explicit knowledge, we are in fact dominated by
an implicit knowledge system that is, for instance, activated
when viewing the art of the third abstraction by LaoZhu.
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And we have to add a third knowledge system, which is
the visual (or sensory in general) experience itself as has
been stressed in particular by Zeki (1999). Seeing is know-
ing. Thus, when we are exposed to the third abstraction, all
three knowledge systems are activated; automatically and
without mental effort, both the visual and implicit knowl-
edge systems are entrained. Then, when we reﬂect on what
we see, or what we have seen, and when we visit our “inner
museum” (i.e., the pictures that are stored in our episodic
memory), we activate the explicit knowledge systems. The
question remains as to whether our knowledge systems are
independent of each other, or whether they are bound
together in a complementary way by a common principle.
It has been argued that on a conceptual level, two such uni-
fying principles can be localized (Pöppel & Bao, 2011). In
a nutshell, all knowledge obeys the mimetic principle
(i.e., that knowledge is always the representation of some-
thing as something, whatever the mode of neural represen-
tation may be). Furthermore, on a formal level, the
knowledge systems obey the aesthetic principle (i.e., in
whatever way knowledge is represented in our neural sys-
tems or on the behavioral level, it has to please our aes-
thetic sense).
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One challenge for the human brain to understand 
speech is to extract the temporal order of speech 
sounds like different consonants and/or vowels, thus 
providing the operative basis for identifying pho-
nemes, syllables, words and sentences (Pöppel 2009, 
Bao et al. 2013). The close link between temporal pro-
cessing and language comprehension has been sug-
gested on a theoretical level quite some time ago 
(Pöppel 1971, Martin 1972), and it is well established 
by a number of studies (e.g. Albert and Bear 1974, 
Tallal 2004, Szelag et al. 2011a). Evidence for such a 
link comes for instance from clinical studies in which 
parallel deficit in language and timing were reported. 
Deficits in speech perception at the phoneme level 
such as in patients with left-hemispheric lesions and 
aphasia (von Steinbüchel et al. 1999, Wittmann et al. 
2004, Sidiropoulos et al. 2010), in children with spe-
cific language impairment (Tallal et al. 1998, Fitch and 
Tallal 2003), and in children and adults with dyslexia 
(Fink et al. 2006, Vandermosten et al. 2011, see also 
Szelag et al. 2010 for a review) are often associated 
with difficulties in processing rapidly changing audi-
tory signals as indexed by an increased temporal order 
threshold (TOT) for discriminating the sequence of 
successively presented acoustic stimuli.
In addition to the evidence showing the connection 
between speech processing and temporal perception, it 
is also suggested that native language experience may 
influence auditory information processing at both 
behavioral and neuronal levels. Compared with English 
subjects, Chinese subjects who are embedded in the 
tonal language environment perform significantly bet-
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ter in frequency-modulated identification task (Luo et 
al. 2007). Furthermore, native Chinese speakers are 
found to be more sensitive to tone contours while 
native English speakers are more sensitive to early 
pitch differences in discriminating lexical tones (Kann 
et al. 2007). Brain stem responses also revealed that 
pitch-tracking accuracy of whole tones and pitch 
strength of 40-ms tonal sections were generally higher 
in subjects with the tonal language experience (Chinese 
and Tai) compared to subjects with non-tonal language 
experience (English) (Krishnan et al. 2010). 
In a recent study (Szelag et al. 2011b) on cross-lin-
guistic comparisons of TOTs for two monaurally pre-
sented clicks, no difference between Polish and German 
subjects was found across the life span from 20 to 69 
years. This study seems to suggest that auditory per-
ception of temporal order is independent of language 
experience. However, the absence of evidence does not 
prove evidence of absence; not having observed a 
potential language effect on temporal order perception 
in monaurally presented click tasks does not ensure 
that no such an effect can be observed in other tempo-
ral order tasks such as binaurally presented tone tasks. 
In addition, although German and Polish languages are 
different from each other, they both fall into the same 
category of non-tonal languages. 
Unlike non-tonal languages such as English, 
German, Polish or Russian, the meaning of a Chinese 
word cannot be solely defined by phonemes without 
any lexical tone. For example, the Chinese syllable /fa/ 
has four distinct lexical meanings when spoken with 
different global pitch contours. It can mean ‘becoming 
rich’ when pronounced with a high level tone, the 
action of ‘punishment’ with a high rising tone, the 
‘law’ with a low dipping tone, or the ‘hair’ with a high 
falling tone. Therefore, to extract the meaning of 
Chinese words, the pitch contour which features small 
changes in frequency range plays a crucial role. In 
contrast, non-tonal languages only have one single 
lexical meaning in one syllable regardless of some pos-
sible tone variations; thus, it is the pitch height, not the 
pitch contour, which is important in decoding semantic 
information. In other words, non-tonal languages are 
characterized by the large changes in frequency range, 
and the pitch contour plays barely any role in decoding 
lexical meanings. 
Considering the significant difference between tonal 
and non-tonal languages, the present study aimed to 
address whether language experience influences tem-
poral order processing by comparing the temporal 
order thresholds (TOTs) between tonal language speak-
ers (Chinese) with and without a secondary non-tonal 
language (English) experience. In order to capture the 
possibly higher sensitivity of Chinese subjects to small 
changes in frequency range featured by pitch contour, 
we applied not only monaurally presented clicks as 
stimuli but also binaurally presented two different 
types of tone pairs as stimuli. One is “close frequency” 
tone pairs using 600 Hz and 1 200 Hz tones as stimuli; 
the other is “distant frequency” tone pairs using 400 
Hz and 3 000 Hz tones. If a common temporal mecha-
nism exists for click TOT as suggested by Szelag and 
coauthors (2011b), then no difference on click TOTs 
should be observed between the two subject groups. 
Since monaurally presented clicks might not be appro-
priate for capturing a potential language effect on 
temporal order perception as has been shown previ-
ously (Bao et al. 2013), the main focus of the present 
study is to possibly reconfirm the previous observa-
tions and to further examine whether the experience of 
a secondary non-tonal language (i.e., English) may 
improve the TOT performance on the “distant fre-
quency” tone task. As a selective impact of tonal and 
non-tonal language environment on TOT performance 
of tones has already been demonstrated (Bao et al. 
2013), i.e., Chinese subjects tend to show lower TOT 
for close frequency relative to distant frequency tones, 
while Polish subjects demonstrate the opposite, we 
expected in the present study that Chinese subjects 
without English proficiency would show a lower TOT 
only for close frequency and not for distant frequency 
tones as compared to click TOT, while Chinese sub-
jects with English proficiency would show lower TOTs 
for both close frequency and for distant frequency 
tones. 
Eighteen native Chinese speakers without profi-
ciency of a non-tonal language (NC group) and 18 
native Chinese speakers with proficiency of English 
(NCE group) participated in the present study. All sub-
jects were college students. They speak standard 
Mandarin as well as one local Chinese dialect and have 
no experience of other languages except English. The 
subjects of the NCE Group had passed the formal 
College English Test 4 (CET, Band IV) at the National 
Ministry of Education in China. All participants were 
right-handed (Oldfield 1971) and had no history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders, or any indication 
of cognitive impairment. None of the participants had 
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received a formal musical education, which possibly 
could increase the sensitivity of auditory perception of 
acoustic stimuli.
To ensure normal hearing for all participants, pure-
tone audiometry screening was assessed (Audiometer 
GSI 17). Participants with hearing thresholds higher 
than 30 dB HL and differences of more than 20 dB HL 
between the two ears were excluded from the study 
(ANSI 2004). In all participants intellectual abilities 
were assessed (nonverbal Mosaic Test, see Tewes 
1994) and matched scores were obtained for the two 
groups. Detailed descriptive data of the participants 
are listed in Table I.
The stimuli were paired sounds presented in rapid 
succession with varied inter-stimulus-intervals (ISI, 
i.e., the time distance between the offset of the first 
stimulus and the onset of the second stimulus). Three 
types of paired stimuli were used in the study: paired 
clicks, paired close frequency (600 Hz and 1 200 Hz) 
sinusoidal tones, and paired distant frequency (400 Hz 
and 3 000 Hz) sinusoidal tones. The clicks were 1 ms 
rectangular pulses presented in an alternating monau-
ral stimulation mode, i.e., one click was presented to 
one ear, followed by another click to the other ear. 
Subjects were asked to indicate the sequence of the 
two clicks by pointing to one of the two response 
cards: “left-right” or “right-left”. The tones were gen-
erated with the program Cool Edit 2000 (sampling rate 
44 100 Hz, 16-bit), and each tone lasted 10 ms with 
1-ms rise-and-fall time. The paired two tones in each 
trial were presented in a binaural stimulation mode, 
i.e., each tone was presented to both ears with a short 
gap in between. The subjects had to indicate the tem-
poral order of the two tones by pointing to one of the 
two response cards: “low-high” or “high-low”.   
In all measurement, the stimuli were presented via 
headphone (SONY MDR-CD 480) at a comfortable 
listening level which is well above threshold. The 
inter-stimulus intervals between the two acoustic 
stimuli were controlled by a maximum-likelihood 
based algorithm – YAAP procedure (Treutwein 1997). 
According to the subjects’ previous responses, the ISI 
of the present trial was set at the current best estimate 
of the threshold corresponding to 75% correct respons-
es based on a logistic psychometric function. The main 
measurement for each type of stimuli was preceded by 
a practice session in which participants reported the 
temporal order of the two acoustic stimuli presented 
with a constant, relatively long ISI of 160 ms. The 
practice was continued until a criterion of 11 correct 
responses in a series of consecutive 12 presentations 
was reached.
The sequencing ability was indexed by the temporal 
order threshold (TOT) which was defined as the mini-
mum time interval required for correctly identifying 
the temporal order of two successively presented 
stimuli. To obtain individual values of TOT, a logistic 
psychometric function was fitted to the subject’s data, 
using MATLAB toolbox psignifit version 2.5.41 (see 
http://bootstrapsoftware.org/psignifit/), a software 
package which implements the maximum-likelihood 
method described by Wichmann and Hill (2001). This 
procedure estimates an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) 
corresponding to 75% correct order discrimination 
(Strasburger 2001). The click TOT was calculated by 
the estimated ISI plus the duration (1 ms) of the first 
click, and the tone TOT by the estimated ISI plus the 
duration (10 ms) of the first tone, thus both using SOA 
(stimulus onset asynchrony, the time interval between 
the onset of the first stimulus and the onset of the sec-
ond stimulus) as TOT index. 
A two-way mixed ANOVA was performed for the 
values of TOT with Stimulus Type (clicks, close fre-
quency tones, and distant frequency tones) as a within-
Table I
Detailed characteristics of participants
Group n
(Male/Female)
Age Range
(Years)
Mean Age
(SD)
Handedness
(Left / Right)
Mosaic
(SD)
Hearing Status
(Normal /Not)
NC 18 (9/9) 20–29 25 (2.4) Right 37.4 (7.3) Normal
NCE 18 (9/9) 19–27 23 (1.8) Right 37.8 (5.8) Normal
(NC) native Chinese speakers without proficiency of a non-tonal language; (NCE) native Chinese speakers with 
proficiency of English; (n) number of participants; (SD) standard deviation
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subjects variable and Subject Group (NC group, NCE 
group) as a between-subjects variable. The results 
showed a significant main effect of stimulus type and 
a non-significant main effect of subject group, 
F2,68=21.531, P<0.001, ηp2=0.388, and F1,34=1.563, 
P>0.05, ηp2=0.044. More importantly, the stimulus 
type significantly interacted with subject group, 
F2,68=3.467, P<0.05, ηp2=0.093. Further analysis of this 
interaction using t-tests with Bonferroni corrections 
revealed very interesting TOT patterns: For the NC 
group, a significantly lower TOT was observed for 
discriminating the temporal order of the two close fre-
quency tones relative to both the clicks (31 ms vs. 56 
ms, P<0.01) and the two distant frequency tones (31 ms 
vs. 54 ms, P<0.01), and no TOT difference between the 
clicks and the distant frequency tones was observed 
(56 ms vs. 54 ms, P>0.05). However, for the NCE 
group, although a similar high TOT was observed for 
the clicks as compared to the NC group (63 ms vs. 56 
ms, P>0.05), both the close frequency tones and the 
distant frequency tones resulted significantly lower 
TOTs relative to their click TOT (21 ms vs. 63 ms, 
P<0.001; 34 ms vs. 63 ms, P<0.01). No TOT difference 
between the two types of tones was observed (21 ms 
vs. 34 ms, P>0.05) (see Fig. 1).
The present study measured temporal order thresh-
olds with both monaurally presented clicks and binau-
rally presented two types of tones in both NC and NCE 
subject groups. The results of click TOT confirmed 
previous observations (Szelag et al. 2011, Bao et al. 
2013), i.e., no TOT difference between NC and NCE 
groups was observed. Thus, the click TOT results sug-
gest a general phenomenon in temporal order process-
ing, i.e., a common and language independent mecha-
nism underlying milliseconds timing which governs 
monaurally presented click ordering. 
With the substitution of frequency-related tones for 
clicks and the more natural mode of stimulus presenta-
tion, namely, binaural instead of monaural presenta-
tion of the stimuli, a more sensitive measurement was 
involved to capture a language effect on temporal 
order perception. As the TOT results of the two differ-
ent types of tones indicated, the NC group showed a 
significantly lower TOT for discriminating the tempo-
ral order of two close frequency tones, while the NCE 
group demonstrated significantly lower TOTs for both 
the close frequency and the distant frequency tones. 
These results are consistent with our predictions based 
on the major difference between tonal and non-tonal 
languages. Since tonal language speakers like Chinese 
were experienced with pitch contour detection in their 
natural language environment, they were more sensi-
tive to small changes in frequency range, thus a lower 
TOT for close frequency tones relative to distant fre-
quency tones was observed for the NC group. As non-
tonal languages are characterized by large changes in 
frequency range, being exposed to such a language 
like English apparently increases the sensitivity to 
large changes in frequencies, thus improving the NCE 
subjects’ temporal order processing of two distant fre-
quency tones. 
The language impact on tone TOT performance in 
the two subject groups can also be interpreted with 
reference to two different strategies used for temporal 
order perception (Bao et al. 2013). As already known, 
both analytic and holistic strategies can be used for 
decoding the sequence of two acoustic stimuli. When 
the analytic strategy is used, a subject has to identify 
the singular acoustic events in their identity and on 
that basis experiencing directly the temporal order of 
the two events. For example, in the TOT measurement 
with tones, the two successively presented tones were 
of different frequencies: one was a low frequency tone, 
and the other was a high frequency tone. Thus, the tone 
order judgment involves not only a temporal order 
task, but also a frequency discrimination task. 
Therefore, the subjects may identify the frequency of 
Fig. 1. Temporal order thresholds (TOTs) measured for 
clicks and two types of tone pairs (600/1 200 Hz and 
400/3 000 Hz) in two subject groups. The “NC group” rep-
resents native Chinese speakers without proficiency of a 
non-tonal language, and the “NCE group” represents native 
Chinese speakers with proficiency of English (**P<0.01, 
***P<0.001).
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each tone immediately following the presentation of 
the individual stimulus, and on that basis report the 
temporal order of the two tones. When a holistic strat-
egy is used, the two successively presented frequency-
related tones are integrated into one unitary percept 
with either an up or a down patterning. On the basis of 
such global patterning, subjects reconstruct second-
arily the temporal order of the two stimuli, leaving the 
identification of each individual tone unnecessary 
(Brechmann and Scheich 2005, Szymaszek et al. 
2009). Compared to the analytic strategy, the holistic 
strategy usually leads to a lower temporal order thresh-
old. 
For native Chinese subjects who were experienced 
in detecting pitch contours, they might use a holistic 
strategy for perceiving the temporal order of two 
close frequency tones and an analytic strategy for the 
two distant frequency tones, thus showing lower 
TOT for close frequency tones relative to distant fre-
quency tones. In contrast, for native Chinese subjects 
who were experienced also in a non-tonal language, 
it could be that being exposed to a non-tonal lan-
guage their analytic strategy was shifted to a holistic 
one for decoding the temporal order of two distant 
frequency tones. The holistic processing mode being 
shaped by tonal or non-tonal language environment 
seems to be consistent with previous studies using 
single neuron recording technique, which suggest 
that neurons in the primary auditory cortex are selec-
tive to directions of frequency modulated sweeps 
(e.g., Tian and Rauschecker 2004). Possibly, such 
neurons are differently stimulated when being 
exposed to a tonal or a non-tonal language. The flex-
ible holistic processing tuned by a tonal or non-tonal 
language experience suggests neural plasticity of the 
auditory brain as suggested previously (Merzenich 
and Sameshima 1993). 
In conclusion, the main results of the present study 
indicated a clear impact of language experience on 
temporal order perception: While native Chinese 
speakers without English proficiency were good at 
discriminating the temporal order of two close fre-
quency tones, native Chinese speakers with English 
proficiency were good at both the close frequency and 
the distant frequency tone order discrimination. 
Combining the similar performance for click order 
perception in both subject groups, a selective modifi-
cation of language experience on temporal order per-
ception is suggested in the present study. 
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Some 150 years ago, Donders published one of the most
important methodological papers in experimental psychol-
ogy (1868/1969). He introduced the paradigm of reaction
time differences to analyze cognitive processes, and he also
stressed the importance of single case studies. The “Don-
ders method” led to important concepts, like the suggestion
of sequential processing stages (Sternberg, 1969), or the
discovery of the eccentricity effect of attentional control in
the visual ﬁeld (Bao & Pöppel, 2007). In spite of the use-
fulness of this paradigm, the question has to be raised as to
whether the underlying theoretical assumption holds true
that temporal processing is of a continuous nature. This
implicit assumption is never explicitly expressed, but it fol-
lows from the statistical treatment of reaction time distribu-
tions, which are considered to be unimodal. To give just
one example, Whelan (2008) states:
Response times are not Gaussian (normal) distribu-
tions but rather rise rapidly on the left and have a long
positive tail on the right … Reaction-time distributions
are similar to the ex-Gaussian distribution … which is
a convolution (mixture) of a Gaussian and an expo-
nential distribution that has been shown to ﬁt empirical
distributions well. (p. 475)
Along with other theoretical distributions that have been
considered (like lognormal or Gamma distributions), such
an ex-Gaussian distribution is unimodal, and unimodality
implies that a reaction can be initiated at any time after
stimulus occurrence; thus, temporal processing has to be
continuous within this theoretical frame.
The focus only on unimodal distributions is surprising
because unimodality is often violated when measuring reac-
tion times. Multimodal distributions have been observed
many times (e.g., Harter & White, 1968; Pöppel, 1970). It
is rather a technical question as to why multimodal distri-
butions are often not observed, and there are several rea-
sons why multimodal distributions may escape attention.
A trivial reason is that the temporal sensitivity for measur-
ing reaction times may not be sufﬁcient; for example, if
different modes in distributions are separated by some
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PsyCh Journal 5 (2016): 177–179
DOI: 10.1002/pchj.142
30 ms, they obviously cannot be observed in measure-
ments with temporal bin widths of 20 ms or 30 ms, or
even longer bin widths. More important reasons for not
observing multimodal distributions are the instationarity
of experimental conditions that comes about in many dis-
guises: Subjects in an experiment may still be in a learn-
ing phase not having reached a plateau of performance. It
takes thousands of trials when measuring choice reaction
time to reach such a plateau (Pöppel, Schill, & von Stein-
büchel, 1990). Another reason for violating stationarity is
that experiments are done at different times of day,
neglecting the importance of circadian phases (Pöppel &
Bao, 2014). Furthermore, multimodality can also be
masked if measurements from different subjects are super-
imposed; even small individual temporal differences
between neighboring modes may simulate a unimodal dis-
tribution when integrated within one histogram. To dem-
onstrate the importance of these technical points, we use
some observations that have been described in detail some
time ago (Pöppel et al., 1990) in which different types of
distributions are disclosed, shedding new light also on
perceptual learning.
In a long-term experiment lasting for 8 weeks, intra-
hemispheric visual and auditory choice reaction times were
studied in three young adult subjects; here we show data
from just one subject (female, 25 years) for auditory choice
reaction time. In the experiments, visual stimuli were pre-
sented at 4-deg eccentricity to the right of the visual axis;
auditory stimuli were presented by earphone to the right ear.
Within one experimental session, 250 visual and auditory
stimuli were presented with equal probability in random
order. To prevent fatigue, after 25 trials, a rest was provided,
and all measurements were taken at 9:00 a.m. To further
reduce variance, reaction times were recorded as “go-
reactions,” that is, the release of the right index ﬁnger from
a testing button towards one of the two response buttons,
and the correct button had to be pressed as quickly as possi-
ble after the appearance of a visual or an auditory stimulus,
thus, preventing the inﬂuence of the movement time towards
a response button. Following an outlier analysis, approxi-
mately 120 measurements within each session and for each
modality remained to construct the statistical distributions
for each day (Figure 1). We show four results from different
phases of the experiment that indicate unique patterns of
response distributions (indicated also as red cartoons).
Figure 1A shows the distribution of measurements at the
beginning of the experiment with a mode at about 300 ms
and with high temporal variability, which might be modeled
as a Gaussian distribution. Such a distribution may be repre-
sentative for typical experiments when inexperienced sub-
jects without an extended learning phase participate in
behavioral studies. At a later phase of the experiment after
some sensorimotor learning has taken place, a completely
different pattern is observed (Figure 1B); the distribution
becomes bimodal with much shorter reaction times for the
ﬁrst and also for the second mode in the distribution. To
model these observations with a Gaussian or ex-Gaussian
unimodal distribution would be misleading. After more repe-
titions, a unimodal distribution develops that is skewed to
the right (Figure 1C); this distribution can indeed be
Figure 1. Distributions of auditory choice reaction time selected from a
long-term experiment with one subject; abstracted distributions in red
(adapted from Pöppel et al., 1990; for details see text). Bin width of mea-
surements was 10 ms. (A) Initial measurement, modeled as a Gaussian
distribution. (B) Bimodal distributions appear by the second measure-
ment. (C) A rightward-skewed unimodal distribution develops with the
seventh measurement, modeled as ex-Gaussian. (D) Final measurement
after 8 weeks is again modeled as Gaussian.
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modeled to be ex-Gaussian. Finally, after even more experi-
mental sessions under identical conditions, a unimodal distri-
bution is observed (Figure 1D) which, however, is
fundamentally different from the ﬁrst distribution
(Figure 1A), although it may be modeled also as a Gaus-
sian distribution. It should be noted that approximately
the same location in the empirical distributions at about
150 ms for the ﬁrst peak in Figure 1B and the peaks in
Panels C and D are observed, indicating long-term stabil-
ity in temporal processing after the initial instability.
This experimental sequence observing stationarity for
measurements shows that statistical distributions of choice
reaction time exhibit fundamentally different patterns. The
bimodality after an initial learning phase (Figure 1B) with
some 60 ms between the peaks suggests excitability cycles
as hypothesized some time ago (Pöppel, 1970); sensory
stimuli entrain neural oscillations and the initiation of
reactions is controlled by speciﬁc phases of these oscilla-
tions. Thus, a reaction cannot be triggered on the neural
level at any time as unimodal distributions would imply;
on this basis, one has to conclude discrete time sampling
of information processing. It has to be emphasized within
this conceptual frame that the periodic processes represent
neural “relaxation oscillations,” which are instantaneously
entrained by stimuli; this is different from neural oscilla-
tions, which do not allow phase-resetting by sensory sti-
muli. Furthermore, they are of a pre-semantic nature
(Pöppel & Bao, 2014), that is, processing stages are not
deﬁned by the information processed, but discrete tempo-
ral windows are used to process information. This mechan-
ism also sheds some new light on the question as to when
processing stages have come to an end. The fact that
bimodality is shifted to unimodality in this individual case
(Figure 1D) does not contradict the proposed mechanism
of discrete time sampling; sensorimotor learning may
result in higher efﬁciency of stimulus processing focusing
on the read-out of sensory input to one time window only.
With respect to the “subtraction method” introduced by
Donders, it has to be concluded that discrete time sam-
pling may be masked by experimental conditions in
which stationarity for measurements is violated. It is
recommended that when analyzing cognitive processes, the
evidence of discrete time sampling is acknowledged, and
that statistical distributions are modeled according to the
observed data.
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When is the right time? A little later!  
Delayed responses show better temporal control 
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Abstract 
Human behaviour is characterized both by action and reaction; the action mode can be conceived of as being embedded in 
anticipatory control, whereas the reactive mode requires the instantaneous processing of stimuli. In the reaction mode, tasks have 
to be completed (most of the time) as fast as possible; in the action mode, the task is to act “at the right time” anticipating the 
consequences of one’s actions. A control machinery for the action mode has been suggested some time ago by the “reafference 
principle” (von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950), the theoretical concept already being formulated by Ernst Mach and Hermann von 
Helmholtz in the 19th century. The basic idea is that an action program not only initiates a motor program, but an efference copy 
is drawn from this program, which is compared after the completion of the movement with the re-afference. When efference copy 
and reafference match, the movement program is cancelled, i.e., the movement has come to an end. There are plenty of examples 
to support the basic notion of the re-afference principle, but there remains one essential shortcoming, i.e., the temporal domain. 
The re-afference principle is conceived of as being temporally neutral which is both theoretically and practically not satisfying. 
How can one test temporal constraints that might shed some more light on behavioural control?  
 
Quite often, observations from everyday behaviour may provide an incentive for experimental paradigms. Everybody may have 
been confronted with the feeling that a planned action with an anticipated movement pattern is experienced to happen at the 
wrong time; sometimes one acts too early and sometimes too late, the reason often being that the attentional control was 
disrupted. Examples can, for instance, be observed in driving an automobile (Tanida & Pöppel, 2006) or in some sport activities 
like football, tennis or squash. Practical experience shows that it is often necessary to delay an action for better temporal control. 
We decided on the basis of theoretical considerations and practical experiences to look into this temporal control problem in 
more detail by examining delayed actions using a modified experimental paradigm of a previous experiment (Szelag et al., 2001).  
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Participants were asked to respond to visual targets presented continuously with pre-defined delays between 400 and 5000 
milliseconds; ten such different delays were chosen (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1500, 2000, 25000, 3000, 4000, 5000 ms). For each 
delay time, 40 trials were sequentially employed, and after each trial the participants was provided a feedback of the response 
time. The goal of the participants was to delay the action as accurately as possible. A critical variable was also the standard 
deviation (SD) of the 40 trials for each pre-defined interval being normalized; i.e., each SD was divided for comparison reasons 
by the average response time to the target delay time. As a control the fastest reaction times for each subject were also measured. 
The results are quite clear and surprising: Participants were very fast to adjust their response time to the pre-defined delay time; 
the best response time was actually observed for the longest delay time with an average of 4992 ms for 5000 ms delay time. More 
interesting, however, were the results for the normalized SDs: The largest value with some 60 ms was observed for the shortest 
delay time of 400 ms. These normalized SDs became smaller for the longer delay times being characterized an exponential decay 
and reaching a plateau of some 20 ms at approximately 3000 ms delay time. As 40 trials were employed, it was possible to 
compute the normalized SDs for the first and second 20 trials; it turned out that there was a clear learning effect, i.e. the second 
20 trials showed much smaller SDs for all pre-defined delay times. The fastest reaction with on average 220 ms was much shorter 
than the selected delay times, thus, lying outside the operating range of the pre-defined delay times. 
 
The higher variance for shorter delay times comes as a surprise and might even be considered to be a paradoxical phenomenon. 
One might expect for shorter delay times smaller variances compared to longer delay times, but the contrary is the case. Better 
temporal control is reached if the “waiting time” is extended beyond the temporal limit of approximately three seconds. If 
attention is focused on the passage of time, an optimal action mode is switched on only after a few seconds; our experiments do 
not indicate how long such an anticipatory “temporal window” may last. But what the experiment indicates is that up to such an 
optimal delay time responses are characterized by temporal instability. It appears as if between fastest reactions and optimal 
actions our behaviour is characterized by a “temporal twilight” zone. If this is a case as the data indicate, it certainly makes sense 
to delay actions for some time, in case a fast reaction is not required. 
 
These observations also shed new light on basic features of the re-afference principle. If actions cannot be precisely pre-
programmed because their execution shows too high temporal variance, the “efference-copy” is not clearly defined. This 
temporal instability makes it next to impossible to match the efference-copy with the re-afference; this then results in behavioural 
instability. Only if sufficient time is allowed to pass may such a match between anticipation and satisfaction become operative. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of the International Conference on Timing and Time 
Perception. 
Keywords: Delayed responses; reafference principle; reaction time; anticipation; movement control 
Acknowledgements 
The study was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Projects 31371018, 91120004 and 
J1103602). 
References 
von Holst, E., & Mittelstaedt, H. (1950). Das Reafferenzprinzip (Wechselwirkungen zwischen Zentralnervensystem und Peripherie). 
Naturwissenschaften 37, 464-476. 
Szelag, E., Rymarczyk, K., & Pöppel, E. (2001). Conscious control of movements: increase of temporal precision in voluntarily delayed actions. 
Acta Neurobiological Experimentalis, 61, 175-179. 
Tanida, K., & Pöppel, E. (2006). A hierarchical model of operational anticipation windows in driving an automobile. Cognitive Processing, 7, 
275-287. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of the International Conference on Timing and Time 
erception.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Synchronization as a biological, psychological and social mechanism
to create common time: A theoretical frame and a single case study
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Abstract: Synchronizing neural processes, mental activities, and social interactions is considered to be fundamental for the creation of
temporal order on the personal and interpersonal level. Several different types of synchronization are distinguished, and for each of them
examples are given: self-organized synchronizations on the neural level giving rise to pre-semantically defined time windows of some tens
of milliseconds and of approximately 3 s; time windows that are created by synchronizing different neural representations, as for instance
in aesthetic appreciations or moral judgments; and synchronization of biological rhythms with geophysical cycles, like the circadian clock
with the 24-hr rhythm of day and night. For the latter type of synchronization, an experiment is described that shows the importance of social
interactions for sharing or avoiding common time. In a group study with four subjects being completely isolated together for 3 weeks from
the external world, social interactions resulted both in intra- and interindividual circadian synchronization and desynchronization. A unique
phenomenon in circadian regulation is described, the “beat phenomenon,” which has been made visible by the interaction of two circadian
rhythms with different frequencies in one body. The separation of the two physiological rhythms was the consequence of social interactions,
that is, by the desire of a subject to share and to escape common time during different phases of the long-term experiment. The theoretical
arguments on synchronization are summarized with the general statement: “Nothing in cognitive science makes sense except in the light of
time windows.” The hypothesis is forwarded that time windows that express discrete timing mechanisms in behavioral control and on the
level of conscious experiences are the necessary bases to create cognitive order, and it is suggested that time windows are implemented by
neural oscillations in different frequency domains.
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Frame of reference
Modern biology is guided by a principle that has been sum-
marized by Dobzhansky (1973) with the memorable sen-
tence: “Nothing in biology makes sense, except in the light
of evolution.” On the basis of this conceptual frame, we both
generalize and also suggest more specifically that nothing in
neurobiology, psychology, the social sciences (or cognitive
science in general), makes sense except in the light of syn-
chronization, that is, the creation of common time for tem-
porally and spatially distributed sources of information or
events. Without synchronization, neural information pro-
cessing, cognitive control, emotional relations, or social
interactions would be either impossible or severely dis-
rupted; without synchronization we would be surrounded by
informational chaos, desynchronized activities, unrelated
events, or misunderstandings. Synchronization as a funda-
mental principle is implemented on different operating
levels by temporal windows with different time constants
(Pöppel & Bao, 2014). Temporal windows are the basis for
the creation of perceptual, conceptual, and social identity
(Zhou, Pöppel, & Bao, 2014), and they provide the necessary
building blocks for the construction of experiential
sequences, or for behavioral organization. Thus, we refor-
mulate: “Nothing in cognitive science makes sense except in
the light of time windows.”
When referring to temporal windows, it is necessarily
implied that information processing has to be discontinuous
or discrete. Although of fundamental importance, the ques-
tion of whether information processing on the neural or
cognitive level is of a continuous or of a discrete nature has
not received sufficient attention in research; for instance, in
experiments using reaction time as a chronometric indicator
in cognitive tasks, continuous processing of information is
taken for granted (see, however, Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts,
2006; Pöppel, 1997; VanRullen & Koch, 2003). The implicit
assumption of a continuous processing mode of information
may be due to an unquestioned orientation of psychological
reasoning towards classical physics. This is how Isaac
Newton (1686/1969) defines time: “Absolute, true, and
mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows
equably without relation to anything external.” With this
concept of an “equal flow,” time serves as a unidimensional
and continuous “container” within which events are happen-
ing at one or at another time. Does this theoretical concept of
temporal continuity provide a solid conceptual background
when we want to understand neural and cognitive processes?
The concept of temporal windows that are suggested to be
implemented by neural or bodily oscillations in general, and
which can be considered to be the operative basis for syn-
chronization on the level of neural, behavioral, and experi-
ential organization, speaks against such a frame of reference.
As will be demonstrated, temporal processing has to be
necessarily discrete to allow for efficient complexity reduc-
tion of sensory information on different operating levels.
Before describing a single case study as a paradigmatic
example, we provide some arguments (mainly from our own
research environment) that prove synchronization as a fun-
damental principle.
Temporal processing units
Access to the environment is obviously gained through our
sense organs. In spite of the triviality of this statement, the
fact has to be realized, however, that the transduction mecha-
nisms are qualitatively different in different sense organs as
reflected in their time constants. The transduction process in
the auditory system is much shorter compared to the visual
system; it takes less than a millisecond at the receptor level
in the auditory modality, but some tens of milliseconds in the
visual modality. Furthermore, light and sound take different
amounts of time to reach an observer; whereas the speed of
light is irrelevant under ecological conditions, the time it
takes for a sound to reach an observer has to be taken into
account. Under optimal conditions (for the visual modality)
a “horizon of simultaneity” is located at an approximately
10-m distance, when the time it takes for the sound to reach
an observer corresponds to the transduction time for optical
stimuli to be transduced at the retina (Pöppel, Schill, & von
Steinbüchel, 1990). More complicated are non-overlapping
routes for transduced signals to travel to central processing
areas in different sensory modalities. If auditory and visual
information have to be integrated, as for instance to identify
a person or an object in one’s personal environment, the
brain is confronted with a logistical problem as persons or
objects are not tagged with respect to their distance, and
neural signals are not necessarily marching in lockstep. To
overcome this logistical problem of integrating information
from different sensory modalities, the neural machinery has
implemented system states or processing units within which
sensory information is treated as co-temporal, that is, as if
they would have happened at the same time. Empirical evi-
dence shows that such processing units within which afferent
information is synchronized have a duration of some tens of
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milliseconds (Pöppel, 1997). One important implication of
such an integrating and synchronizing activity is that tem-
poral continuity within this time window from the perceptual
viewpoint does not exist; a before–after relationship of infor-
mation is not defined within a temporal processing unit.
Physically non-synchronous events are synchronized on the
neural level to allow complexity reduction, and on that basis
the definition of “primordial events” has been suggested
(Pöppel & Bao, 2014).
Experimental support for a time window in this temporal
domain comes from a large number of different paradigms
on the behavioral and physiological level. One such para-
digm is to measure the temporal order threshold in different
sensory channels, that is, how much time it takes to define an
event as such, and to localize it in a perceptual sequence. It
turns out that the temporal order threshold is similar in
different sensory modalities (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961). This
suggests a central and not a peripheral neural mechanism of
processing. The temporal order threshold can, however, be
modulated within limits by long-term imprinting (Bao,
Szymaszek, et al., 2013; Bao et al., 2014) or short-term
priming (Liang, Zhang, & Bao, 2015). Other experimental
support for this time window comes from multimodal histo-
grams of reaction time or from latency measurements of eye
movements; the modes in response histograms are separated
by some tens of milliseconds, which suggest central excit-
ability cycles (Pöppel, 1970; Pöppel & Logothetis, 1986). It
has to be concluded that a response cannot be initiated at any
point on an axis of continuous time, but that it is controlled
by a temporal machinery that allows a response or an action
only in discrete sequential steps. In a theoretical analysis, it
has been shown that the concept of a “traveling moment” as
it has already been implied by James (1890) cannot be held
upright; on the basis of experimental evidence, it has to be
concluded that sensory stimuli entrain an oscillatory
process, and it is suggested that one period of such an oscil-
lation serves as the operative basis for a time window within
which information is integrated.
Oscillations in the temporal domain of some tens of mil-
liseconds have also been observed on the physiological level.
Single-cell recordings in the visual pathway, like in the
lateral geniculate nucleus, show stimulus-triggered oscilla-
tions with periods in this time domain (Podvigin et al., 2004;
Podvigin, Jokeit, Pöppel, Chizh, & Kiselyeva, 1992). Simi-
larly, in the auditory modality the midlatency response of the
auditory evoked potential is characterized by an oscillatory
component in the same frequency range (Madler & Pöppel,
1987; Schwender, Madler, Klasing, Peter, & Pöppel, 1994).
More importantly, general anesthetics suppress this oscilla-
tory component, and patients who undergo an anesthesia
report that no subjective time at all has passed after they
wake up again. Thus, it can be concluded that neural oscil-
lations in the temporal domain of some tens of milliseconds
provide the functional basis for this time window; if the
oscillations are suppressed, as in anesthesia, the time
window is suppressed with the consequence that no sensory
information can be integrated in an appropriate way, and a
loss of consciousness ensues.
A time window of 3 s
One important characteristic of the time window for the
processing units mentioned above is that they are imple-
mented pre-semantically. Thus, it is not the information itself
that creates the time window, but the neural machinery that
provides the time window to be used for the representation of
information independent of the content to be processed.
Because of this distinction, temporal information processing
can be referred to as a logistical function (the “how” of
processing) compared to content functions (the “what” of
experiences) as has been suggested in a taxonomy of func-
tions (Bao & Pöppel, 2012; Pöppel, 1989a); this distinction
between the two functional domains proves to be useful
within the context of modern “connectomics” and a better
understanding of psychiatric and neurologic diseases
(Zaytseva, Chan, Pöppel, & Heinz, 2015). Such a pre-
semantic implementation applies also for a time window of
approximately 3 s (Pöppel, 1997, 2009). Abundant evidence
shows that the brain provides a temporal platform that is
used in visual and auditory perception, movement control,
sensorimotor synchronization, speech segmentation or
attentional modulation, and even in cultural artifacts, like in
music (Pöppel, 1989b) or poetry (Turner & Pöppel, 1988).
The recently discovered eccentricity effect on attentional
control in the visual field (Bao & Pöppel, 2007) is one
example of a time window of a few seconds. Using the
paradigm of inhibition of return (IOR) it has been demon-
strated that spatial attention is modulated differently for the
perifoveal compared to the peripheral region of the visual
field; the IOR effect is significantly stronger in the periphery,
which is associated with a more prominent projection of the
periphery to the superior colliculus of the midbrain, whereas
the perifoveal region shows a more prominent projection via
the lateral geniculate nucleus to the visual cortex. Although
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the IOR effects are based in different neural networks (Lei,
Bao, Wang, & Gutyrchik, 2012), the two attentional systems
share the same time window (Bao, Wang, et al., 2013)
proving the power and apparent necessity of temporal inte-
gration to create unity in cognitive processing.
Such a unity can be violated, as has been demonstrated in
patients with brain injuries or in autistic children, and the
violations can be considered as proof of their existence. In
patients with injuries in the left hemisphere resulting in a
“Broca aphasia,” the time window of 3 s is impaired, result-
ing in alternative strategies to integrate sequential informa-
tion into perceptual units or a gestalt compared to the
effortless temporal integration observed in healthy controls
(Szelag, von Steinbüchel, & Pöppel, 1997). Furthermore, in
a task to reproduce temporal intervals, it has been observed
that stimulus durations up to approximately 3 s are repro-
duced veridically with small variance, whereas longer inter-
vals will be reproduced shorter and with higher variance,
suggesting a different gain function (e.g., Pöppel, 1971).
Some autistic children show a very different pattern of tem-
poral reproduction, that is, they have a tendency to reproduce
any interval with approximately 3 s independent of stimulus
duration (Szelag, Kowalska, Galkowski, & Pöppel, 2004).
This unique behavior observed in single cases allows a direct
look into the temporal machinery of the brain; apparently,
some autistic children (as perhaps also some schizophrenic
patients with formal thought disorder) can no longer modu-
late an endogenously implemented temporal integration
process, that is, the disease uncovers the eigenoperations of
the temporal machinery as the patients seem to be “frozen in
time.”
Although most evidence for a time window of 3 s comes
from behavioral studies, a recent study has provided direct
evidence on the neural level, supporting the concept of a
pre-semantic integration mechanism (Wang, Lin, Zhou,
Pöppel, & Bao, 2015). Using mismatch negativity (MMN)
as an indicator, it was tested whether a time window of 3 s
is particularly sensitive for detecting the violation of the
regularity in a stimulus sequence by employing different
inter-stimulus intervals. The results show that in frontal
midline areas, the amplitudes of the MMN are significantly
larger for inter-stimulus intervals up to 3 s than for the
longer inter-stimulus intervals. It can be concluded that a
time window of 3 s is selective for pre-attentively process-
ing sensory information in a privileged way and that infor-
mation processing is temporally segmented, implementing
in discrete sequential steps operative platforms for the cre-
ation of perceptual and conceptual identity and a “subjec-
tive present” (Pöppel & Bao, 2014; Zhou, Yang, Zhang,
Zhang, & Mao, 2015).
The time window of 3 s also plays an important role in
sensorimotor synchronization (Mates, Müller, Radil, &
Pöppel, 1994; Miyake, Onishi, & Pöppel, 2004). If subjects
are asked to synchronize a regular sequence of auditory
stimuli with defined movements like finger taps, they can do
this with small temporal variance only up to approximately
3 s. If the next stimulus to be synchronized with a motor
action is beyond this time window, precise anticipation is no
longer possible. With longer intervals between successive
stimuli, anticipation of what is going to happen is replaced
by a reaction; one has to “wait” for the next stimulus, which
cannot be anticipated any more with temporal precision. This
time window in sensorimotor synchronization is fundamen-
tal for interpersonal communication because it provides a
common time window within which effortless prediction
and sharing of social intentions becomes possible. It has
been demonstrated that human speech is also segmented
with time windows of a few seconds (Vollrath, Kazenwadel,
& Krüger, 1992); this allows for the creation of common
time in verbal communication, and such common time can
also be considered as an operative basis for an emotional link
between partners as their endogenously generated rhythms
are synchronized.
Operational and conceptual time windows
The time windows of some tens of milliseconds and of a few
seconds described above are expressions of self-organizing
principles of the human brain. In the context of our reason-
ing, they appear to be necessary for complexity reduction of
information, and they represent the neural basis for the cre-
ation of identity on the perceptual and cognitive level
(Pöppel, 2010; Zhou et al., 2014). On different operative
levels, temporally distributed information is automatically
integrated or synchronized; pre-semantic processes provide
temporal platforms for the creation of content. Thus, the
cognitive machinery is driven by neural mechanisms that are
outside conscious control. These time windows represent the
logistics of the brain as suggested in a pragmatic taxonomy
of functions that is based on neuropsychological and psychi-
atric observations as well as evolutionary considerations
(Pöppel, 1989a; Zaytseva et al., 2015). The general concept
of time windows and synchronization applies, however, to
two more functional domains: (1) synchronization of
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behavior with geophysical cycles, like the 24-hr rhythm (as
described in the single case study below); and (2) operational
and conceptual time windows within which distributed infor-
mation is synchronized to give rise to distinct phenomena on
the experiential level. A typical example for such time opera-
tional windows are aesthetic appreciations or moral judg-
ments (Avram et al., 2013, 2014; Pöppel et al., 2013; Vedder
et al., 2015).
In experiments on aesthetic and moral judgments using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the neural
networks of both judgment types have been compared
(Avram et al., 2013). It was observed that both aesthetic and
moral judgment share the same neural network, however,
with one important difference: Moral judgments use the
same neural areas, including the posterior cingulate cortex,
the precuneus, and the temporoparietal junction. Thus, what
appears on the subjective level as different cognitive acts,
like aesthetic and moral judgments, share a common neural
basis. It has to be concluded that moral judgments require
an aesthetic component in their neural implementation; pos-
sibly, this aesthetic component in moral judgments reflects
the search for coherence in cognitive processing, or the
“good” is synchronized with the “beautiful” on the neural
level.
A similar phenomenon of sharing different representa-
tions by synchronization can be observed in neural mecha-
nisms underlying the appreciation of artwork. It has been
shown that the brain distinguishes effortlessly between natu-
ralistic and surrealistic pictures, as if the neural structures
are equipped with a mechanism to recognize without reflec-
tion between what is physically possible and what is impos-
sible (Silveira et al., 2012). However, with a death prime, this
neural difference characterizing naturalistic and surrealistic
pictures is significantly modulated (Silveira et al., 2015).
The prime seems to create a new neural frame of reference.
This modification of the neural responses after a defined
prime (as a death prime in this case) is only possible if within
a time window of finite duration the prime modulates neural
activities in a top-down manner.
An equivalent mechanism of neural modulation within a
time window has to be assumed in music perception. It has
been shown that musical training elicits a higher sensitivity
to detect sadness in speech (Park et al., 2015). This obser-
vation implies that long-term exposure to music modulates
the neural threshold in emotional sensitivity, but this long-
term effect becomes real only in a given moment when
being exposed to expressed sadness in speech. The impor-
tance of a situational context has also been demonstrated
for temporal perception (Zhou et al., 2015). Thus, long-
term experiences as represented in the mnemonic systems
and short-term primes modulate the synchronization of
past and present representations. These effects from the
recent and not so recent past (e.g., Vedder et al., 2015) on
present conscious states can be considered as empirical
evidence for the synchronization of temporally distributed
information within one time window; thus, synchronization
is the necessary mechanism to integrate past and present
representations.
One of the most challenging questions in cognitive
science is to understand the basic mechanisms of personal
identity or one’s own self. It has been suggested that midline
structures of the brain are essential, as has been verified for
instance in a single case study with a professional singer
(Zaytseva et al., 2014). The direct comparison between lis-
tening to her own voice compared to someone else’s voice
showed a relative activation of precuneus, visual cortex,
posterolateral thalamus, and cerebellum in the perception of
self. Referring to oneself is necessarily a subjective phenom-
enon in a present moment, although this may happen on an
implicit level, that is, self-confirmation does not have to take
place on an explicit level (Pöppel & Bao, 2011).
The creation and confirmation of personal identity on a
phenomenological level can also be linked to being one’s
own doppelganger (a “copy of oneself ”), as recent research
results and theoretical considerations suggest (Pöppel,
2010). This hypothesis is based on observations from epi-
sodic memory with subjects of different ages and sexes. If
subjects time-travel to their personal past as represented in
their episodic memory, they spontaneously report that in
images of the past they “see” themselves as an agent, as if
they were their own doppelganger. This doubling must be
based on an active process of the human mnemonic system,
that is, to project an image of oneself into the pictorial
representation from the past. Thus, no image in the episodic
memory represents physical reality; images of the past are
completely individualized and, only on a superficial level,
there may be a correspondence of elements if several observ-
ers have been exposed to the same pictorial scene. This
projection of oneself into images of the past has an important
psychological consequence: Being one’s own doppelganger
makes it possible for anybody to refer to oneself. This self-
reference is an implicit process in the present, but it can be
made explicit if, under conscious control, we time-travel to
our own past as it is represented in episodic memory. That is
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to say, the episodic memory provides an efficient way by
bringing the past into the time window that represents the
“present” (Zhou et al., 2014) to synchronize the past and
present “selves,” thus giving rise to a coherent and subjec-
tively continuous self-identity through the lifespan. On that
basis, it follows that the tragedy of a memory loss is mainly
the loss of a potential and necessary self-reference (Han
et al., 2014). Without the reference to the past in the syn-
chronized present, a patient does not know any more who he
or she is, because the patient has lost the doppelganger in
the personal mirror of his or her episodic memory. Thus, the
synchronization of past images within a time window in the
present can be considered as representing a neural basis of
personal identity.
A temporal bridge between past experiences as being
projected into present experiences is obvious for any kind
of cognitive processing; we want to point out, however, that
such time-encompassing links require synchronizing
mechanisms, and these are necessarily embedded within
time windows. Experimental evidence suggests (as
described above) a time window of a few seconds that
serves as a logistical basis for integration. What is repre-
sented within such a time window is, however, not indepen-
dent of what has been represented before; what will be
represented in the next time window is determined or
modulated by what is represented in a present time window.
Anticipation of what comes next, and the dependence of
present experiences of what has been, reflect another
binding mechanism of the brain, that is, the semantic con-
nection of successive representations. This semantic con-
nection of what is represented in successive time windows
can also be considered as an explanation for the phenom-
enal continuity of time, which has to be understood as an
illusion, although as a necessary illusion (Pöppel & Bao,
2014). On the level of neural activities, temporal processing
requires time windows of finite duration, and they express
discrete timing mechanisms of the brain; on the phenom-
enal level of temporal experiences, we fall victim to seman-
tics, as the continuity of meaning shadows the underlying
neural processing. Connecting the content of successive
time windows of approximately 3 s is itself an active neural
process as reflected for instance in listening to music (Park
et al., 2015), possibly based on the longer time constants of
emotional processing. Such a hypothesis can be derived
from observations with neuropsychiatric cases, like patients
with schizophrenia, in whom the continuity of semantic
processing may be disrupted.
Circadian time windows
Evolutionary adaptations to geophysical cycles
It is useful to distinguish on the time axis between two
domains of temporal control, that is, on the one hand self-
organized mechanisms as mainly exhibited for short-term
intervals in the sub-second to minutes domain (see above),
and on the other hand long-term mechanisms as observed in
circadian or circannual rhythms reflecting evolutionary
adaptations to geophysical cycles. It is an open question
whether the processes of temporal control across the tem-
poral domains are interdependent, thus, reflecting one
mechanism, or governed by independent operative prin-
ciples. It has been argued that one common underlying
mechanism may indeed be possible (Agostino, Golombek,
& Meck, 2011).
Research on circadian rhythms has shown that human
behavior is controlled by an endogenous mechanism
(Aschoff, 1965) that is indicated by free-running periods,
that is, rhythms under constant conditions are no longer
exactly 24 hr corresponding to the geophysical cycle. An
endogenously controlled mechanism can also be suspected
for annual cycles (Roenneberg & Aschof, 1990). For circa-
dian rhythms, it has been shown that they can be synchro-
nized only within a limited range of entrainment that is not
too different from exactly 24 hr (Aschoff, Pöppel, & Wever,
1969); this observation supports the concept of a genetically
controlled time window that is experienced as a day and
matches approximately the rotation of the earth; otherwise
synchronization to any zeitgeber (“time-giver”) would be
possible. It is interesting to note that circadian clocks are
observed for most light-sensitive organisms, from unicellu-
lar organisms to humans (Roenneberg & Merrow, 2005). A
common evolutionary background allows us to study prin-
cipal questions on circadian rhythms with model organisms
like Gonyaulax polyedra or Neurospora crassa (Merrow
et al., 2003), and in particular to analyze mechanisms of
entrainment that apply across species (Roenneberg, Daan, &
Merrow, 2003; Roenneberg, Dragovic, & Merrow, 2005).
Thus, all these organisms share the same time window
created by the adaptation to the rotation of the earth. Circa-
dian rhythms are characterized by a specific pattern of neural
activations (Blautzik et al., 2013) and dysregulations, as
observed in neuropsychiatric cases (Blautzik et al., 2014;
Monti et al., 2013; Wulff, Gatti, Wettstein, & Foster, 2010),
which allow us to better understand the underlying control
mechanisms.
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In addition to the light–dark cycle as the dominant zeit-
geber to synchronize the 24-hr period of rest and activity
with the geophysical cycle, social interactions, or the social
environment in general, have also been shown to play a role
in entrainment (Honma et al., 1995; Mistlberger & Skene,
2004; Wittmann, Dinich, Merrow, & Roenneberg, 2006). It
was found, for instance, that blind subjects can use social
cues to entrain their circadian rhythms (Klerman et al.,
1998). However, it has also been claimed that for humans,
social signals are unable to cause mutual synchrony in con-
stant conditions (Davidson & Menaker, 2003). This contra-
dicts results that, under complete isolation, social
synchronization of circadian rhythms is possible (Aschoff
et al., 1971; Pöppel, 1968). Here we report observations on
synchronization and also desynchronization of circadian
rhythms in a group of completely isolated subjects; some
results on physiological functions have been reported previ-
ously (Pöppel, 1968). As will be described on the basis of
data obtained from a single case, social interactions can be a
powerful tool to get a unique insight into the temporal
machinery of circadian rhythms and their interactions with
short-term timing.
Synchronization and desynchronization of
functions in a single case
Experimental situation
Four young male subjects were isolated completely from the
environment for 3 weeks without any access to external
information. Subjects lived in two connected experimental
rooms underground (a “bunker”), and they did not have any
knowledge about the time of day; there was no direct contact
with the external environment and the subjects did not have
watches. Light intensity in the experimental space chamber
was 1400 Lux during the first half of the experiment and 100
Lux during the second half. Light was continuously switched
on, and the subjects could decide for themselves when they
wanted to get up or go to sleep. Before this group experi-
ment, the subjects had participated in an experiment with
individual isolation; thus, they were already used to the
specific experimental conditions. During the individual iso-
lation, the four subjects showed free-running circadian
rhythms with the following periods: 24.4 hr (Subject S), 24.6
hr (Subject B), 24.9 hr (Subject K), and 25.1 hr (Subject M).
The goal of the group study was to investigate whether
living with others would lead to behavioral synchronization
of the circadian rhythms. Would the subjects exhibit the
same rhythm, or would everyone follow his own rhythm as
observed previously? Another question was whether in case
of social synchronization the group rhythm would be shorter
compared to the average of the individual rhythms. This
question was based on the hypothesis that social interactions
may increase the level of activation for all subjects, which
secondarily could speed up the circadian clock. To answer
these questions, the rest–activity cycle was measured sepa-
rately for each subject, and in addition, body temperature
during the sleep phase and kidney functions were monitored
as indicators of diurnal variations. All urine samples were
collected from each subject to determine volume and con-
centration of different electrolytes (sodium, potassium,
calcium). The subjects also had to perform several tests
throughout their subjective day (always after having deliv-
ered a urine sample), such as the production of 10-s inter-
vals, or they had to indicate their “personal tempo,” that is,
tapping with their fingers at a comfortable and self-selected
speed.
Before the experiment, several psychological tests
(German standardization) were taken independently to gain
general information about the personal profiles of the sub-
jects. These tests showed that Subject S had the highest IQ
with 130 compared to 112 (Subject B), 112 (Subject K) and
120 (Subject M). Measurements with a test on “vegetative
lability” gave the following results: 27 (Subject S), 9
(Subject B), 10 (Subject K), and 10 (Subject M); and mea-
surements with a test on “neuroticism” gave the following
results: 17 (Subject S), 7 (Subject B), 10 (Subject K), and 5
(Subject M). These measurements showed that Subject S was
possibly a psychological outlier or a “critical case” with
highest values in intelligence (130), vegetative lability (27)
and neuroticism (17). Thus, from the psychological point of
view, the isolated group was not a homogeneous sample with
Subject S as a potentially interesting single case.
Physiological and psychological results
The rest–activity cycle of the four subjects showed both
synchronization and desynchronization (Figure 1). In the
first part of the experiment, the rest–activity cycle of the four
subjects was synchronized with a circadian period of 26.2 hr.
The critical case S, however, showed an important phase
difference compared to the other subjects, starting his sub-
jective day on average 2 hr earlier, although the beginning of
the sleep phase was synchronized with the other subjects.
After the first half of the experiment, light intensity was
reduced from 1400 Lux to 100 Lux. After this change, the
subjects continued to live in a synchronized manner for a few
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more days. From day 13 until day 16 of the experiment, the
first signs of an interindividual desynchronization could be
observed. All subjects, except the critical case S, took a
midday nap for a few hours. From day 17 until day 20 of the
experiment, the critical case S no longer lived in synchroni-
zation with the other subjects. At this point, he had a much
shorter subjective day (on average 24.1 hr) compared to the
other subjects, who lengthened their circadian day in syn-
chrony to as long as 27.2 hr.
Under normal circumstances, the diurnal cycle of urinary
excretion is synchronized with the activity cycle. Interest-
ingly, this was not the case with the critical case S in the first
half of the experiment (Figure 2). On the first 2 days of the
experiment, distinct daily maxima were observed, but the
range of amplitude got smaller until a diurnal rhythm was no
longer visible. Only shortly before the change of light inten-
sity, the rhythm of urinary excretion as an index of kidney
functions reappeared; this applied both to volume and the
electrolytes measured in the urine samples. During the
second half of the experiment, the expected diurnal pattern
was observed until the end of the experiment. Measurements
of body temperature of the critical case S during sleep
showed also that he deviated from the other subjects. His
body temperature increased at the beginning of the experi-
ment, it remained at the higher average level of 36.9 °C for a
longer time, and it decreased again to a lower average value
of 36.2 °C when he desynchronized with his rest–activity
cycle from the other group members. Thus, during this phase
of the experiment, the body temperature of the critical case S
during his sleep phase corresponded to an expected lower
value similar to the values of the other subjects.
Other unexpected results were obtained with the measure-
ments of temporal production. Before the group experiment
started, each subject went through a learning phase to
produce as accurately as possible a 10-s interval without
counting. All participants reached within a few trials a reli-
able set point with only small variance (Figure 3). During
isolation, each subject selected within several days of tran-
sitions rather different individual set points when producing
the 10-s intervals; one subject produced the target interval on
average with approximately 6.5 s (M), another one with 8.5
s (B), a third one with 11 s (K), and the critical case S with
16 s. Thus, no correlation was observed between the periods
of the individual circadian rhythms and the temporal produc-
tion of the four subjects. Interestingly, the critical case S with
the shortest circadian rhythm showed the longest temporal
production, supporting the hypothesis of independent
mechanisms for short-term temporal control and long-term
circadian organization.
While the experiment on temporal production showed
high interindividual variance, a rather different observation
was made when measuring the personal tempo (Figure 4).
During the experiments of individual isolation, each partici-
pant had selected a different personal tempo with intervals
between successive taps of approximately 0.2 and 0.8 s; for
the critical case S, the period was on average 0.55 s for
successive days. During the group experiment, an unex-
Figure 1. Rest–activity cycle of four male subjects being isolated
together for 3 weeks under constant conditions. Lines represent time being
awake, dotted lines being asleep. Light intensity in the first half of the
experiment was 1400 Lux and 100 Lux in the second half. On successive
days indicated from top to bottom the four subjects were synchronized with
each other in their rest–activity cycle in the first half of the experiment, but
no longer in the second half, although their synchronized period was no
longer 24 hr. In the first half of the experiment, one subject (S) started his
phase of wakefulness on average 2 hr earlier than the three other subjects.
Figure 2. Diurnal pattern of excretion of urine in one subject (S) partici-
pating in a group experiment with four subjects. The different diurnal
patterns for the first and the second half of the experiment indicate “internal
desynchronization” for the first (suggesting a beat phenomenon) and “inter-
nal synchronization” for the second half of the experiment (for details see
text).
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pected social synchronization occurred: Three subjects,
including the critical case S, selected a personal tempo with
intervals close to 0.2 s, that is, they selected approximately
the same high-frequency tempo. Subject B, who had selected
the rather slow tempo with intervals of 0.8 s in the individual
experiment, changed his personal tempo in the group within
several days to a value close to intervals of 0.4 s, which
corresponds approximately to a harmonic value of the other
subjects being half as fast compared to the others. Thus, an
effect of social synchronization could be demonstrated also
on short-term timing.
Discussion of synchronization and desynchronization
The measurements of the rest–activity cycles of the four
subjects indicate that social synchronization is possible,
thus, contradicting previous claims (Davidson & Menaker,
2003). This is even possible if some effort is required as in
the case of the critical case S; at the beginning of the experi-
ment, this subject forced himself to live in synchrony with
the other subjects although his own circadian clock might
have preferred another rest–activity cycle. This behavior as
an expression of a possible desire to be synchronized with
others and sharing the same time windowmight be explained
by a need for social comfort. Furthermore, the results show
that the social synchronization of the circadian rhythms
towards a mean value of 26.2 hr (first half of the experiment)
and 27.2 hr (second half of the experiment) argues against
the hypothesis that social synchronization results in shorter
rest–activity cycles under free-running conditions when
compared to values obtained under individual isolation.
Several surprising results were obtained with the critical
case S both in long-term circadian timing and short-term
temporal production and personal tempo. They indicated
both the desire to belong to the group by synchronizing the
rest–activity cycle and adjusting the personal tempo, and
also the desire to escape by finally choosing a different
circadian rhythm. The much longer intervals for temporal
production compared to the other subjects also support the
hypothesis that the critical case S was an outlier on both the
physiological and psychological levels; this, however,
allowed deeper insight into the circadian machinery and the
relationship between long-term and short-term timing. As
for the latter, it appears to be unlikely that timing in the
sub-second and second range are controlled by the same
mechanisms as has been suspected (Agostino et al., 2011).
Of particular interest is the rest–activity cycle of the criti-
cal case S, who was synchronized with the other group
members in the first half of the experiment. This period of
26.2 hr was apparently too long for other physiological func-
tions to be synchronized. The phase difference observed in
the critical case S indicates that his circadian clock had a
tendency for a shorter subjective day compared to the others.
Figure 3. Results of temporal production of a 10-s interval by four male
subjects during an initial learning phase (left side) and during complete
isolation. During the learning phase, when the subjects received feedback
about their performance they were finally quite accurate in producing a 10-s
interval; however, during the bunker experiment, after 1 or several days,
every subject selected a personal interval that was different from the learned
set point.
Figure 4. “Personal tempo”—an individually selected speed of finger
tapping with a comfortable tempo—of four subjects during two experiments
of complete isolation. Left: Results from individual (single) isolation for
several days. Right: Results from an experiment with common (group)
isolation. During common isolation, three subjects exhibited a rather similar
tempo with one subject (S) instantaneously adapting to the tempo of two
other subjects, which was very different from the personal tempo of indi-
vidual isolation, whereas one subject (B) after a phase of transition of
several days, adapted to approximately half the tempo of the other three
subjects.
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This could be proven by the circadian modulation of the
vegetative functions as represented for instance by the
kidney functions. Most surprisingly, the circadian modula-
tion of the kidney functions disappeared a few days after the
beginning of the experiment, but reappeared spontaneously
after several days. This suppression of the circadian modu-
lation can be interpreted as a beat phenomenon. Thus, social
synchronization of the critical case S resulted in an internal
desynchronization, which became observable through the
beat phenomenon. Two circadian clocks were running at the
same time, one superimposed by the group and one domi-
nated by the individual circadian clock resulting in the beat.
A support for this interpretation is provided by the second
half of the experiment when the critical case S no longer
lived in synchronization with the group but followed his own
temporal schedule close to 24 hr, whereas the other three
group members extended their circadian day in synchrony
to as long as 27.2 hr. In this second half of the experiment,
the critical case S no longer exhibited an internal
desynchronization. To the best of our knowledge, such a beat
phenomenon with two superimposed circadian cycles in one
person has never been observed before. What are some psy-
chological implications of this unique behavior? The critical
case S, who could be described as highly neurotic but also
highly intelligent, had been eager to adapt initially to the
rest–activity cycle of the other subjects. However, this desire
to adapt in time and thus socially belong was apparently not
appreciated by the other subjects who classified him as an
outsider. The negative attitude of the other subjects might
explain the desynchronization of the critical case S in the
second part of the experiment when he escaped into his own
time window.
This study shows that living in an isolated group under
constant environmental conditions can lead to an
interindividual desynchronization of the subjects and to an
intra-individual desynchronization of different physiological
functions within one subject. Taken together, the observa-
tions on the circadian modulation of functions and on the
personal tempo as well as the data of temporal production
strengthen the concept of an independence of temporal
mechanisms in different functional domains (Pöppel & Bao,
2014), and demonstrate also the power of environmental
variables as indexed by social factors. These observations
may be important for long-term projects like expeditions
into space when participants are no longer exposed to the
natural geophysical cycle; the light–darkness cycle as the
most dominant zeitgeber is no longer available unless simu-
lated. In such a situation, physiological and psychological
synchronization on different operating levels is essential for
success and it might be jeopardized by psychological outliers
no longer sharing the same time window.
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